27 F.4th 95
1st Cir.2022Background
- Petitioner Carlos Monteiro Silva, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in Massachusetts (Sept. 2017) to accessory after the fact to murder under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 274, § 4, based on conduct in 2003.
- DHS charged Silva with removability as an aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because his conviction was "an offense relating to obstruction of justice" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S).
- The IJ and the BIA (citing Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo) applied the categorical approach and concluded the Massachusetts accessory-after-the-fact statute categorically matched the generic federal definition of an obstruction-related aggravated felony, and thus Silva was removable.
- The IJ and BIA also found Silva ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal (the conviction was a "particularly serious crime") and denied CAT relief.
- Silva argued the INA provision unambiguously requires a nexus to a pending or ongoing investigation or proceeding and that the BIA’s interpretation (including "reasonably foreseeable") is unreasonable; he challenged the particularly-serious-crime finding as well.
- The First Circuit held (1) under Esquivel-Quintana tools the statute does not unambiguously require a nexus to a pending/ongoing investigation, and (2) alternatively, the BIA’s interpretation is reasonable under Chevron; it affirmed removability and the withholding bar.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Silva) | Defendant's Argument (DHS/BIA) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1101(a)(43)(S) unambiguously requires a nexus to a pending or ongoing investigation/proceeding | Statute requires a nexus to a pending/ongoing investigation; accessory-after-the-fact statute lacks that requirement | "Relating to obstruction of justice" is broad and need not be limited to pending/ongoing proceedings; accessory-after-the-fact fits | Court: Statute does not unambiguously require such a nexus (Esquivel-Quintana tools) |
| If ambiguous, whether BIA interpretation merits Chevron deference | Deference should not apply (argues statutory meaning is clear) | BIA acted in formal adjudication; its reading is reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference | Court: Even if ambiguous, BIA interpretation is reasonable and gets Chevron deference |
| Whether Massachusetts accessory-after-the-fact is categorically an "offense relating to obstruction of justice" | Least-culpable conduct under state statute does not necessarily involve investigatory nexus; therefore no categorical match | Text, federal analogues (18 U.S.C. § 3), Model Penal Code, state statutes consensus support inclusion of accessory-after-the-fact | Court: Categorical match—Mass. § 4 is within § 1101(a)(43)(S); Silva removable as aggravated felon |
| Whether conviction is a "particularly serious crime" barring withholding of removal | Argues conviction should not be treated as particularly serious on these facts | BIA relied on guilty plea and that Silva aided perpetrators of murder to avoid apprehension | Court: BIA's factual finding supported; conviction is a particularly serious crime; withholding denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (framework for using ordinary tools of statutory interpretation in categorical approach)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (judicial deference framework for reasonable agency interpretations)
- Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018) ("reasonably foreseeable"/"in the offing" gloss on investigatory nexus in obstruction-related statutes)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach and focus on least-culpable conduct)
- Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798 (2015) (limits on reading "relating to" where statutory cross-references narrow meaning)
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (construction of nexus for certain obstruction statutes)