Sierra Club v. Donald Trump
929 F.3d 670
| 9th Cir. | 2019Background
- President Trump sought substantially more funding for a southern border barrier; Congress repeatedly refused large requests, including during a 35‑day shutdown; the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 provided limited, conditional border fencing funds.
- After declaring a national emergency, the Administration identified three funding sources; this appeal concerns only DoD reprogramming under §8005 to transfer ~ $2.5 billion (later actions ~ $1–2.5 billion) from DoD accounts to DHS for construction support under 10 U.S.C. §284.
- Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan authorized reprogramming pursuant to section 8005, finding the transfers necessary in the national interest, for "higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements," and not "denied by the Congress;" Congress’s appropriations committees formally disapproved.
- Sierra Club and Southern Border Communities Coalition sued, alleging the reprogramming violated the Appropriations Clause, separation of powers, APA limits, and NEPA; the district court enjoined use of funds reprogrammed under §8005 for several sector projects and later issued a permanent injunction for additional projects.
- Defendants sought a stay pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit majority denied the stay, holding Defendants were unlikely to succeed on the merits because §8005’s prerequisites ("unforeseen" and not "denied by the Congress") were not satisfied and DoD’s interpretation is not entitled to deference; Plaintiffs have a judicially cognizable cause of action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §8005 authorized DoD to reprogram funds for DHS border‑barrier construction | §8005’s conditions weren’t met: the need was not "unforeseen," and Congress effectively "denied" the requested border‑wall funding | §8005 permits reprogramming for unforeseen military requirements; DoD reasonably interpreted the statute to authorize transfers for DHS requests | Held for Plaintiffs: §8005’s textual limits were not satisfied (need was foreseeable; Congress denied the item), so §8005 did not authorize these transfers |
| Whether agency deference applies to DoD’s interpretation of §8005 | N/A (Plaintiffs argue statutory text controls) | DoD’s interpretation should receive Chevron/Skidmore deference | Held for Plaintiffs: Chevron not appropriate (no clear delegation or formal rulemaking); Skidmore persuasion lacking (conclusory memoranda), so no deference afforded |
| Whether Plaintiffs have a judicial cause of action to enjoin the reprogramming | Plaintiffs can seek equitable relief to enjoin an alleged constitutional violation and/or pursue APA review of final agency action | Defendants contend no cognizable cause of action (claims are statutory only or precluded) | Held for Plaintiffs: they have standing and a cognizable cause—either equitable relief for constitutional violation or APA review (and zone‑of‑interests satisfied) |
| Whether stay pending appeal should issue (balance of harms & public interest) | Public interest and separation of powers favor denial; Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable environmental/recreational harm; respecting Congress’s power of the purse is paramount | Staying would prevent alleged harms from delay, avoid contractor penalties, and permit important counterdrug measures | Held: stay denied—Defendants unlikely to succeed, Plaintiffs’ harms significant, and public interest favors enforcing Appropriations Clause and Congress’s choices |
Key Cases Cited
- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Executive action without statutory or constitutional authority invalid; framework for evaluating executive power)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (courts may review and enjoin unlawful executive acts)
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requirements)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (standards for stay pending appeal: likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of harms, public interest)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (limits on Chevron deference; step‑zero analysis)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (persuasive weight of agency interpretations depends on consistency, reasoning, expertise)
- Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994) (distinguishes statutory exceedance claims from constitutional claims; courts should not convert every statutory dispute into a constitutional question)
- Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (court adjudicated constitutional claim against executive action where plaintiffs alleged concrete injury)
- United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016) (Appropriations Clause enforcement context; courts can enjoin agencies spending in violation of express congressional restrictions)
- Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) (equitable relief may be available against unconstitutional or unlawful official action; Congress can limit equitable remedies)
- Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (zone‑of‑interests test governs whether a statutory cause of action reaches a plaintiff)
- Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (final agency action and APA review standards)
- Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (structural constitutional remedies—Presentment Clause—are enforceable by private parties alleging concrete injury)
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standards for preliminary injunctions and balancing of equities/public interest)