Shelly Buonauito, Mary Weeks, Verlon Abrams, and Sarah B. Thompson v. Keith Gibson, Tom Schueck, Robert S. Moore, Jr., Alec Farmer, and Philip Taldo, Members of the Arkansas State Highway Commission; Scott E. Bennett, Director, Arkansas Department of Transportation; Dennis Milligan, Treasurer of the State of Arkansas; Andrea Lea, Auditor of the State of Arkansas; Larry W. Walther, Director, Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration; And Asa Hutchinson, Governor of the State of Arkansas, 2020 Ark. 352

Background

In 2012 voters adopted Amendment 91, which levied a temporary 0.5% sales-and-use tax and authorized up to $1.3 billion in general-obligation bonds to fund "four-lane highway construction and improvement"; the amendment repeatedly uses the phrase "four-lane highway" and defines "four-lane highway improvements."
Seventy percent of the tax proceeds were allocated to the state; section 4(a) limited bond spending to accelerating or funding "four-lane highway improvements," providing matching funds, and bond issuance costs.
ARDOT selected Projects CA0602 (I-30 Arkansas River Bridge reconstruction) and CA0608 (I-630 widening) — both involving widening existing six-lane interstate sections to eight lanes — to be funded from Amendment 91 bond proceeds.
Appellants (state taxpayers) sued in Pulaski County, alleging an illegal exaction because Amendment 91 authorized spending only on four-lane highways, not on six-to-eight lane interstate expansions; they sought injunctive relief and restoration of funds.
The trial court allowed extrinsic evidence, found the amendment ambiguous, concluded funds could be used for the I-630 project as within the amendment’s intent to fund "state highways," and dismissed the suit.
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, holding Amendment 91’s plain text restricts funding to four-lane highway improvements and does not authorize spending on projects that widen six-lane interstates to eight lanes (CA0602/CA0608); the case was remanded for entry consistent with that opinion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Amendment 91 authorizes bond proceeds for Projects CA0602 and CA0608 (six- to eight-lane interstate widenings)	Amendment 91 expressly limits spending to "four-lane highway" construction and improvements; six- and eight-lane projects are excluded	Amendment 91 funds highway projects generally (including state highways, bridges); the defined term includes bridges and related items so these projects are authorized	Held for plaintiffs: Amendment 91 funds are limited to four-lane highway improvements; the six-to-eight lane projects are not authorized and the trial court erred
Whether the ballot title or extrinsic evidence may control interpretation of Amendment 91	Ballot title and plain amendment text require construction to "four-lane" meaning; court should not rely on extrinsic materials to contradict plain text	Defendants relied on legislative intent and other materials to show voters intended broader "state highways" funding	Held: Court construes amendment text first; where text is plain and unambiguous, external materials cannot defeat that meaning; the majority relied on the plain text
Whether the defined phrase "four-lane highway improvements" includes bridges and other items absent a "four-lane" modifier	Appellants: repeated use of "four-lane" and the definition’s structure limits all listed items to four-lane facilities	Defendants/dissent: the definition lists "bridges" and other items separately; punctuation and structure indicate "four-lane" modifies only roadways, so bridges may be any size	Held: Majority: context and repeated "four-lane" references restrict the amendment to four-lane facilities generally (expressio unius); therefore bridges in this program are limited to four-lane scopes for funding purposes
Proper use of canons (expressio unius) and plain-language rules in constitutional construction	Appellants: expressio unius applies because the amendment repeatedly specifies "four-lane."	Defendants: expressio unius misapplied; plain reading and punctuation show bridges and other items are distinct and not qualified by "four-lane"	Held: Majority applies expressio unius and gives words their ordinary meaning; where text is plain, canons support exclusion of unmentioned alternatives; dissent disagreed on bridge point

Key Cases Cited

Hartwick v. Thorne, 300 Ark. 502 (1989) (recognizes citizen suit for illegal exaction and ability to enjoin misapplication of public funds)
Clark v. Johnson Reg'l Med. Ctr., 362 S.W.3d 311 (2010) (appellate review of constitutional interpretation is de novo)
Ghegan & Ghegan, Inc. v. Weiss, 338 Ark. 9 (1999) (plain and unambiguous constitutional language must be given its ordinary meaning)
Gazaway v. Greene Cnty. Equalization Bd., 314 Ark. 569 (1993) (discusses expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon)
State v. Older, 361 Ark. 316 (2005) (constitutional provisions should be construed to avoid absurd results)
Forrester v. Martin, 383 S.W.3d 375 (2011) (legislative-referred ballot titles identify amendments but do not explain their content to voters)
Steele v. Thurston, 2020 Ark. 320 (2020) (clarifies limited role of ballot titles from legislative referrals in constitutional interpretation)
Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371 (2013) (addresses appealability principles; cited in dissent about scope of interlocutory appeals)