924 F.3d 309
6th Cir.2019Background
- Flint residents filed an 89‑page § 1983 complaint alleging that local and state officials’ decisions to switch Flint’s water supply and related conduct exposed residents to lead‑contaminated water and violated substantive due process (bodily integrity), seeking money damages from officials in their individual capacities.
- The district court denied defendants’ motions to dismiss; a panel of the Sixth Circuit permitted the asserted substantive due process claims to proceed to discovery over qualified immunity defenses.
- Defendants sought rehearing en banc; the full court denied rehearing en banc.
- Concurring opinions (Gibbons; Sutton) emphasized deference to the pleadings and allowed discovery given plausible allegations of intentional or reckless conduct, but urged caution about substantive due process expansion and urged careful, tailored discovery and possible abstention to await state‑court proceedings.
- A dissent (Kethledge) argued the panel’s qualified‑immunity analysis was legally insufficient: substantive due process (bodily integrity) is too vague and historically tied to intentional intrusions, so plaintiffs’ negligence‑style allegations cannot overcome qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether complaint plausibly alleges a substantive‑due‑process (bodily integrity) violation | Plaintiffs: officials’ decisions and omissions exposed residents to lead and nonconsensual bodily intrusion by contaminants; allegations of reckless/intentional misconduct suffice to plead a conscience‑shocking violation | Defendants: allegations sound in negligence/gross negligence, not the intentional conscience‑shocking conduct required for substantive due process | Panel: complaint contains plausible allegations that could amount to conscience‑shocking conduct; claim survives 12(b)(6) and proceeds to discovery |
| Whether individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity at pleading stage | Plaintiffs: alleged intentional/reckless poisoning places this case within established bodily‑integrity precedent or is egregious enough to overcome qualified immunity | Defendants: law not "clearly established"; bodily‑integrity precedent involves intentional intrusions unlike this fact pattern | Panel: qualified immunity is a factual inquiry not resolvable on pleading; discovery allowed. Dissent: argues qualified immunity should have prevailed because law here is not clearly established |
| Whether federal courts should abstain or stay federal substantive due process claims pending state proceedings | Plaintiffs: federal forum available to vindicate federal constitutional rights | Defendants: federal courts should defer to state courts (Mays state‑court case) and avoid creating novel federal constitutional torts | Concurring (Sutton): urged consideration of staying or holding federal claims in abeyance to allow state courts to address similar state constitutional claims; panel did not stay |
| Standard of review at 12(b)(6) for complex, novel substantive‑due‑process claims | Plaintiffs: Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard permits discovery on plausible allegations; avoid premature legal rulings | Defendants: courts should dismiss novel, broad substantive due process claims at pleading stage to avoid turning due process into tort law | Concurring (Gibbons, Sutton): emphasize that at 12(b)(6) court must accept plausible allegations and allow discovery; caution against overbroad constitutional rulemaking before facts are developed |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading standard: plausible allegations and discovery)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (qualified immunity standard for individual officials)
- Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (clearly established law requirement for qualified immunity)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (scope of qualified immunity protection)
- Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (substantive due process—caution and historical grounding)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 ("shocks the conscience" standard for substantive due process)
- Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (egregiousness can inform clearly established inquiry)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (do not define clearly established law at high level of generality)
- Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (forcible stomach pumping; bodily integrity precedent)
- Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (forcible administration of antipsychotic medication; bodily integrity precedent)
- Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (precedent selection for clearly established law)