Sessions v. Dimaya
584 U.S. 148
SCOTUS2018Background
- James Dimaya, a lawful permanent resident, faced removal because his prior California first‑degree residential burglary convictions were deemed "aggravated felonies" as "crimes of violence" under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(F) via 18 U.S.C. §16(b).
- Section 16(b) defines a crime of violence as any felony that "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force ... may be used in the course of committing the offense."
- The Court applied the void‑for‑vagueness (Due Process) doctrine to assess whether §16(b)'s "residual clause" gives fair notice and avoids arbitrary enforcement when read using the categorical/"ordinary case" approach.
- The plurality (joined by Justices and in parts by Justice Gorsuch) held §16(b) unconstitutional to the extent it requires an "ordinary case" risk analysis like the one invalidated in Johnson v. United States.
- Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas (in part) and Alito dissented, arguing §16(b) differs materially from the ACCA residual clause and can be applied (or should be interpreted focusing on actual underlying conduct) without vagueness problems.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dimaya) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §16(b) is void for vagueness facially | §16(b) is impermissibly vague because the "ordinary case"/categorical analysis forces judges to speculate about hypothetical typical conduct, producing unpredictable, arbitrary outcomes | Vagueness doctrine should be relaxed in civil/immigration context; statute intelligible or can be applied by courts | Held: §16(b) (as incorporating an ordinary‑case analysis) is unconstitutionally vague (plurality + Gorsuch concurrence); statute invalid to that extent |
| Proper vagueness standard (criminal vs civil) | Deportation is severe; fair‑notice (stringent) standard applies despite civil label | Civil context (and foreign‑relations/immigration) permits more leniency; only "unintelligible" laws should fall | Held: stringent fair‑notice standard applies; grave civil penalty (deportation) warrants heightened scrutiny (plurality/Gorsuch) |
| Whether Johnson v. United States controls | Johnson's invalidation of the ACCA residual clause controls because §16(b) uses substantively similar language and requires the same ordinary‑case inquiry | §16(b) materially differs from ACCA: it asks about "risk" (not "potential"), focuses on offender's own use of "physical force," and limits risk to "in the course of committing the offense"; Johnson thus not controlling | Held: Johnson controls as to the ordinary‑case categorical method; §16(b) like ACCA's residual clause in its critical respects and invalid under vagueness doctrine (majority/Gorsuch) |
| Proper interpretive alternative (avoidance) | N/A (primary challenge was facial vagueness) | Courts should avoid vagueness by reading §16(b) to assess the defendant's actual underlying conduct (not the ordinary case), or otherwise construe statute narrowly | Dissenters would adopt or prefer the underlying‑conduct reading and would uphold §16(b); plurality declined to adopt that saving construction here because parties conceded the categorical approach and the record/testing was inadequate |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (invalidating ACCA residual clause as void for vagueness)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (interpreting §16(b) to exclude negligent DUI offenses; applied ordinary‑case analysis)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (origin of the categorical approach for prior offenses)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (articulating ordinary‑case risk inquiry for residual clauses)
- Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) (fair‑notice requirement under Due Process)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (vagueness doctrine as protection against arbitrary enforcement and improper delegation)
- Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (supporting an underlying‑conduct approach for some INA provisions)