Sebring, Steven James
PD-0921-15
| Tex. App. | Aug 28, 2015Background
- Early morning marijuana sale goes awry: appellant Steven Sebring sold 3.5g to Joshua Durrance; after Durrance reduced the amount and offered less money, an argument ensued and Sebring fired multiple shots, killing Durrance and wounding a passenger.
- Sebring returned home, smoked marijuana, took Seroquel, and later slept in a locked bedroom; he did not call police or wake his mother.
- Officers surrounded the house for about two hours after the shooting, then went to the front door; Sebring’s mother answered and (according to officers) consented to entry and directed them to appellant’s room; she testified she had no key and did not consent to entry into his locked room.
- Officers forced open the locked bedroom door, found Sebring on the bed, arrested him, and discovered a .380 under his pillow; about an hour later police recorded Sebring’s confession at the station.
- Trial court denied Sebring’s motion to suppress the gun and his confession (finding consent and/or exigency and voluntariness); a jury convicted him of murder and assessed 60 years’ imprisonment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Sebring) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Admissibility of firearm seized during warrantless entry | Entry was justified because (a) Sebring’s residence was the crime scene, (b) officers had probable cause and consent from resident mother, and (c) exigent circumstances existed; seizure was incident to lawful arrest. | Mother did not validly consent to entry of locked bedroom; no exigent circumstances existed because officers waited ~2 hours and could have obtained a warrant. | Court affirmed: probable cause and "suspicious place" existed; credited officer testimony that mother consented; alternatively exigent circumstances justified entry; gun admissible as search incident to arrest. |
| 2. Admissibility of videotaped confession | Confession was voluntary; although Sebring had taken Seroquel, he was coherent and knowingly waived rights. | Seroquel rendered Sebring incapable of voluntarily waiving rights; statement was involuntary. | Court affirmed: trial court’s factual finding of voluntariness supported by officer testimony and recording; admission proper. |
| 3. Legal sufficiency of murder conviction | Evidence (shooting at close range, chambering a round, multiple shots) supports intent to kill or act clearly dangerous to human life. | Evidence insufficient to prove intent; claimed self-defense. | Court affirmed: viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict, rational jury could find murder beyond reasonable doubt. |
| 4. Factual sufficiency of rejection of sudden passion at punishment | State: evidence did not preponderate to show sudden passion; confessions and witnesses indicated lack of fear and no gun seen in car. | Sebring: provocation, threats, alleged "pistola" and reaching under seat caused sudden passion; verdict manifestly unjust. | Court affirmed: under Meraz standard, jury credibility determinations stand; negative finding not against great weight and preponderance. |
Key Cases Cited
- Becknell v. State, 720 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (consent to search locked adult child’s bedroom may be invalid when only occupant controls access)
- Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (U.S. 1969) (scope of search incident to arrest limited to arrestee’s person and area within immediate control)
- Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (U.S. 2006) (exigent-circumstances exception to warrant requirement for officer/third‑party safety)
- United States v. Munoz‑Guerra, 788 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1986) (police creating exigency by surrounding house and then forcing entry to prevent warrant acquisition may render entry unreasonable)
- McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (State bears burden to prove exigent circumstances for warrantless entry)
- Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (standard for factual‑sufficiency review of affirmative defenses proved by preponderance)
- Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (intent to kill may be inferred from use of deadly weapon)
- Granville v. State, 423 S.W.3d 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (discussing search incident to arrest principles)