Schorr v. DoPico
686 F. App'x 34
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff-appellant David Schorr, an attorney proceeding pro se, was subject to an investigation by the First Judicial Department Attorney Disciplinary Committee for secretly audio-recording a court proceeding.
- The committee issued a private admonition after considering mitigating circumstances; Schorr rejected the admonition and requested a formal hearing.
- Schorr alleged the committee re-opened its investigation in retaliation for his request for a hearing and sued two committee officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First and Fifth Amendment retaliation.
- The district court dismissed Schorr’s complaint under Younger abstention and for failure to state a claim; Schorr appealed and moved to supplement the record with an email concerning a denied preliminary injunction.
- The Second Circuit conducted de novo review of Younger abstention and considered whether the bad-faith exception applied; it also addressed abandonment of the preliminary-injunction issue on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Younger abstention bars federal review of Schorr's claims | Schorr contends the state disciplinary proceeding is not one of the "exceptional" types warranting Younger because formal charges had not been filed | Defendants contend the ongoing disciplinary proceeding is a state civil enforcement matter analogous to attorney-discipline actions and falls within Younger | Court affirmed abstention: state attorney-discipline proceeding is ongoing and falls within Sprint's exceptional categories, so Younger applies |
| Whether the bad-faith exception to Younger applies | Schorr argues the committee acted in bad faith and retaliated by re-opening the investigation in violation of its rules | Defendants assert the committee acted within its authority, considered mitigation, and had a reasonable prospect of proving charges | Held: Bad-faith exception not shown—Schorr failed to plausibly allege subjective bad faith or that the committee had no reasonable expectation of success |
| Whether the committee’s conduct constituted unconstitutional retaliation sufficient to overcome abstention | Schorr asserts re-opening the investigation and subpoena threats were retaliatory and aimed to harass | Defendants point to admitted unauthorized recording and applicable rules making subpoenas and suspension consequences lawful | Held: Committee's actions were consistent with enforcing rules; Schorr admitted recording and committee could likely prove charges, undermining retaliation claim |
| Whether Schorr may supplement the appellate record with an email about the denied preliminary injunction | Schorr seeks to add an email explaining the district court’s denial based on default | Defendants implicitly argue the preliminary-injunction denial is not before the court on appeal | Held: Motion to supplement denied as moot—Schorr abandoned the preliminary-injunction issue on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal courts generally must abstain from enjoining ongoing state criminal prosecutions)
- Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (state-initiated attorney-discipline proceedings are civil enforcement actions warranting deference)
- Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013) (clarified Younger applies only in three categories of "exceptional" proceedings)
- Diamond "D" Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2002) (bad-faith exception requires a showing that the state actor had no reasonable expectation of success)
- Cullen v. Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1994) (describes bad-faith and harassment exception to Younger)
- Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut, 585 F.3d 639 (2d Cir. 2009) (discusses Younger abstention framework)
- Falco v. Justices of the Matrimonial Parts of Supreme Court of Suffolk Cty., 805 F.3d 425 (2d Cir. 2015) (advises caution in relying solely on the older three-part Younger test)
- LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1995) (issues not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned)
