883 F.3d 826
9th Cir.2018Background
- Sarah Patterson was on pretrial release for theft and drug charges and later arrested on domestic violence charges; Release Assistance Officer James Van Arsdel moved to revoke her release in court, which Judge Stone orally denied.
- After the denial, Van Arsdel gave Judge Tichenor an unsigned arrest warrant (without the usual revocation form/affidavit) and did not disclose Judge Stone’s prior denial; Tichenor signed the warrant.
- Van Arsdel regularly socialized with Judge Tichenor and his wife was Tichenor’s judicial assistant; the warrant bore the assistant’s initials.
- Patterson was arrested on the warrant and jailed for two days until Van Arsdel told a deputy the warrant was defective and she was released.
- Patterson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure; the district court dismissed on the ground Van Arsdel had absolute prosecutorial immunity.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding Van Arsdel was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for submitting the bare unsigned warrant and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Van Arsdel is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for submitting the unsigned warrant to Judge Tichenor | Patterson: Van Arsdel acted in a non-prosecutorial, investigatory/police-like capacity; no absolute immunity | Van Arsdel: Submitting warrant applications is a prosecutorial function entitled to absolute immunity | Van Arsdel not entitled to absolute immunity; his act was analogous to recommendation/investigative functions and warrants only qualified immunity |
| Whether presenting a bare unsigned warrant (without affidavit/motion) is equivalent to filing a prosecutorial revocation motion | Patterson: Bare warrant is not a motion and lacks the judicial-phase advocacy needed for absolute immunity | Van Arsdel: Functionally similar to filing a motion to revoke bail, thus prosecutorial | Court: Bare warrant without the usual motion/affidavit is more like a recommendation/police-type act and not protected absolutely |
| Whether immunity should depend on the actor’s title or the function performed | Patterson: Look to function; Van Arsdel’s duties were investigatory under ORS and he lacked delegated release authority | Van Arsdel: Function qualifies as prosecutorial regardless of title | Court: Immunity depends on function, not title; Van Arsdel’s role resembled parole/law enforcement investigatory functions |
| Whether extending absolute immunity here would create anomaly (shielding less formal procedures but not proper procedures) | Patterson: Granting absolute immunity for the bare warrant while denying it for a motion+affidavit would be anomalous | Van Arsdel: Immunity necessary to protect judicial processes and officials | Court: Avoided anomalous extension; refused to extend absolute immunity further |
Key Cases Cited
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (absolute immunity for prosecutors performing advocacy functions)
- Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (immunity depends on nature of function; limited immunity for factual attestations)
- Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (absolute immunity is narrow; qualified immunity for certain non-advocacy acts)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (police submitting deficient warrant materials not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity)
- Cruz v. Kauai County, 279 F.3d 1064 (prosecutor loses absolute immunity when acting as witness/attesting to facts)
- Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 1184 (parole officer’s investigative/recommendation role entitled only to qualified immunity)