Santiago v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61

Background

Jherald, a six-year-old with profound hearing impairment, attended a public school in Bayamón, Puerto Rico, and received transportation as part of IDEA services funded by the Department of Education.
The Department contracted with a private bus company owned by Guillermo Cotto and Luz Oyola to transport students; a driver, Freddy Márquez, operated the bus that carried Jherald.
In October 2003, Jherald allegedly disclosed sexual abuse by Márquez; his mother, Santiago, sought action from school personnel but delayed engagement with administrators.
Santiago filed suit on May 7, 2008, alleging §1983 claims against the private bus owners, a Title IX claim against the Commonwealth, and local-law claims; district court later addressed multiple procedural twists.
The district court granted summary judgment to the private defendants on §1983, reinstated then dismissed the Title IX claim against the Commonwealth, and dismissed local-law claims without prejudice.
On appeal, Santiago challenges the §1983 ruling against the private defendants and the dismissal of the Title IX claim.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether private bus defendants acted under color of state law	Santiago argues private bus defendants were state actors through public function or nexus.	Cotto/Oyola contend private parties are not state actors despite a transportation contract.	No state action; §1983 claim against private defendants fails.
Whether transportation of students is an exclusive public function	Transportation service is an exclusive state function under public function theory.	Transportation is not an exclusive state function; private providers may perform it without state action.	Transportation is not an exclusive public function; not state action under public function theory.
Whether the private defendants were coerced or significantly encouraged by the state (state compulsion) or had a nexus with the state	States' involvement through IDEA creates a close tie making private conduct state action.	No coercive state regulation or symbiotic nexus shown between Commonwealth and private bus company.	Neither state compulsion nor nexus/joint action established.
Whether Title IX claim against the Commonwealth survives the pleading standards and actual-knowledge requirement	Principal or appropriate person had notice and deliberate indifference; complaint should support this.	No appropriate person with actual knowledge; complaint fails to plead actual knowledge or deliberate indifference.	Title IX claim inadequately pleaded; failed to identify an appropriate person with actual knowledge.
Whether the district court properly dismissed the Title IX claim under Rule 12(b)(6)	Dismissal circumvented proper review; factual allegations support plausible Title IX claim.	Complaint insufficient under Twombly/Iqbal; no plausible Title IX claim.	Dismissal affirmed; Title IX claim not plausibly pleaded.

Key Cases Cited

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (Supreme Court, 1982) (private school not state actor; private education function not exclusive)
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (Supreme Court, 1961) (state action where private entity is joint participant in the challenged activity)
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (Supreme Court, 1974) (targeted examination of state action; exclusivity limits private action as state action)
Black ex rel. Black v. Ind. Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707 (3d Cir., 1993) (transportation not an exclusive public function)
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (Supreme Court, 1998) (actual knowledge and appropriate person required for Title IX liability)
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (Supreme Court, 1999) (deliberate indifference standard for Title IX harassment claims; actual knowledge required)
Plamp v. Mitchell Sch. Dist., 565 F.3d 450 (8th Cir., 2009) (appropriate person for Title IX notice; authority to take corrective action)
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988) (state must foreclose alternatives to medical care; exclusivity of state action context)
Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22 (1st Cir., 2002) (education not exclusively public function; private entities may provide education)
Perkins v. Londonderry Basketball Club, 196 F.3d 13 (1st Cir., 1999) (nexus/joint action considerations for state action)