Sanders v. Boeing Company, 68 F.4th 977

Plaintiffs (flight attendants Sanders and Sodrok) allege hearing injuries from an overly loud smoke detector on a January 8, 2017 United Airlines flight.
Plaintiffs filed multiple suits: an initial Houston federal suit (voluntarily dismissed), then a Dallas federal suit (3:18-CV-3165) naming Boeing, Kidde, and Jamco; the district court ordered amended pleadings to establish diversity.
Plaintiffs failed to cure jurisdictional pleading defects; the Northern District dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to comply with court order; the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on appeal.
Plaintiffs refiled in Texas state court in November 2021; defendants removed and moved to dismiss as time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs invoked Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 16.064 (the jurisdictional savings statute), arguing their prior federal suit tolled the limitations period and they refiled within 60 days after the prior dismissal became final.
The district court rejected tolling, holding § 16.064 requires the prior suit to have been filed in the "wrong court" and that the 60-day period ran from entry of the district-court judgment; the Fifth Circuit certified two determinative questions to the Texas Supreme Court rather than making an Erie guess.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.064 apply where the prior suit was filed in a court that had proper jurisdiction if plaintiffs failed to plead facts to invoke it?	§ 16.064 tolls limitations because the prior suit was dismissed "for lack of jurisdiction," even though plaintiffs could have pleaded diversity.	§ 16.064 requires the prior action to have been filed in the "wrong court" (i.e., actually lacking jurisdiction), so tolling doesn't apply when plaintiffs omitted necessary jurisdictional allegations.	Fifth Circuit did not decide; certified the question to the Texas Supreme Court.
When does the prior dismissal "become[] final" for purposes of § 16.064(a)(2), starting the 60‑day refiling clock: at district-court judgment entry or at appellate resolution?	The 60‑day tolling period runs from finality after appellate resolution (here, after the Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc / issued mandate).	Finality occurs when the district court entered judgment; appeals do not delay the start of the 60‑day refiling window.	Fifth Circuit did not decide; certified the question to the Texas Supreme Court.

Griffen v. Big Spring ISD, 706 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1983) (interpreting predecessor to Texas savings statute)
Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81 (Tex. 2021) (discussing savings-statute principles and limitations burdens)
In re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2010) (legislative history and treatment of savings statute)
City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2009) (comparative discussion of related remedial provisions)
Clary Corp. v. Smith, 949 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997) (adopting a "wrong court" requirement)
Brown v. Fullenweider, 135 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004) (rejecting a strict "wrong court" requirement)
Triple P.G. Sand Dev., LLC v. Del Pino, 649 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022) (flexible application of § 16.064)
Integrity Glob. Sec., LLC v. Dell Mktg. LP, 579 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019) (applying § 16.064 despite plaintiff mistakes about federal jurisdiction)
Reagan Natl. Advert. of Austin, Inc. v. City of Austin, 498 S.W.3d 236 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016) (liberal construction of filing requirement; discussion of finality timing)
Long v. Castle Texas Prod. LP, 426 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. 2014) (Texas courts assess finality differently depending on context)