Sanchez v. Manufacturing
166 A.3d 49
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Sanchez, with two prior left-shoulder surgeries (2009, 2012), felt a "pop" in his left shoulder while moving a ~100 lb barrel at Edson on April 15, 2013, but did not report injury until weeks later and sought treatment May 22, 2013.
- Treating surgeon O’Holleran diagnosed an anterior glenoid (bony Bankart) fracture and Hill-Sachs lesion from the April 15 event and recommended further treatment; he placed work restrictions and later advised possible surgery.
- Employer-selected examiner Selden examined Sanchez, reviewed records (including additional records later), and concluded the April 15 event produced only a temporary strain; he opined the fracture/lesions preexisted that incident.
- Commissioner-ordered examiner Barnett examined Sanchez and concluded the bony Bankart and Hill-Sachs lesions were attributable to the April 15, 2013 incident and recommended limited duties and neurologic assessment.
- Commissioner credited Selden over O’Holleran and Barnett: awarded temporary total benefits for a limited period in summer 2013 but denied later temporary partial/total benefits tied to the fracture/lesions; the Workers’ Compensation Review Board affirmed.
- Sanchez appealed to this court arguing (1) Selden’s opinion lacked sufficient subordinate facts and was speculative because he initially lacked full prior records, and (2) the commissioner failed to articulate why he disregarded Barnett (the commissioner’s own examiner).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the commissioner’s causation/extent finding supported by competent subordinate facts? | Sanchez: Selden formed his opinion before reviewing full prior records, so his causation opinion was speculative and insufficient to support the commissioner’s findings. | Edson: Selden physically examined Sanchez, reviewed records (including additional records and later addendum), and thus provided competent medical evidence; commissioner may choose between conflicting medical opinions. | Affirmed: Selden’s opinion provided a reasonable basis; commissioner reasonably relied on it and there was evidence supporting his inferences. |
| Should appellate deference to commissioner’s credibility be reduced because medical examiners did not testify live? | Sanchez: Under Bode, when expert witnesses do not testify, appellate court should weigh reports rather than defer. | Edson: Unlike Bode, the commissioner had live testimony from Sanchez (about exercise/weightlifting) that bore on credibility; thus deference remains warranted. | Affirmed: Deference stands because commissioner’s credibility findings were informed by live testimony and other record evidence. |
| Did the commissioner need to articulate reasons for departing from his own examiner Barnett’s opinion? | Sanchez: Commissioner should explain why he discounted Barnett, the examiner chosen under §31-294f. | Edson: Regulations and board precedent permit decisions that do not rely on the commissioner’s examiner when the decision’s reasoning is ascertainable; board may interpret its rule. | Affirmed: Board correctly found the commissioner’s decision complied with applicable regulatory standard; no remand required. |
| Was any remand for further articulation required? | Sanchez: Yes—requested remand for commissioner to explain rejection of Barnett. | Edson: No—board properly reviewed and found the decision’s reasoning ascertainable under §31-301-3. | Affirmed: Board did not abuse discretion by declining remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- DiNuzzo v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet Geo, Inc., 294 Conn. 132 (Conn. 2009) (expert opinion without sufficient subordinate facts may be speculative and insufficient to prove causation)
- Bode v. Connecticut Mason Contractors, The Learning Corridor, 130 Conn. App. 672 (Conn. App. 2011) (limited deference to commissioner when credibility determinations rest entirely on documentary reports from non-testifying experts)
- Gartrell v. Dept. of Correction, 259 Conn. 29 (Conn. 2002) (commissioner has sole initial responsibility to draw inferences from contested facts)
- Blakeslee v. Platt Bros. & Co., 279 Conn. 239 (Conn. 2006) (standard for affirming commissioner’s factfinding when evidence supports inferences)