Sanchez, Luis, PD-0372-15

Appellant Luis Sanchez was indicted for third-degree felony assault-family violence for choking Rachael Price, alleged to be a person "with whom the Defendant has or has had a dating relationship" under Tex. Pen. Code § 22.01(b)(2) and Tex. Fam. Code § 71.0021(b).
Sanchez waived a jury; the bench trial resulted in conviction and a six-year sentence; the 11th Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction (Sanchez v. State, 460 S.W.3d 675).
Key factual dispute: Price testified they dated ~June 2006–Dec 2009, had a child, and that she never considered herself married to Sanchez despite a common-law divorce petition filed on her behalf; she said she sought divorce paperwork at counsel's advice based on cohabitation and joint tax returns.
Sanchez argued the relationship became a common-law marriage (or otherwise was more than a "dating relationship"), creating a variance between the indictment and proof and precluding conviction under the dating-relationship enhancement.
The State argued (and the Court of Appeals held) that "has or has had a dating relationship" plainly covers past dating relationships, so the assault could be prosecuted under the family-violence enhancement even if the dating relationship had ended or an intervening marriage/divorce occurred.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court could rationally find Price and Sanchez were never married and thus the assault was between persons who "have had" a dating relationship	State: Price's testimony that she never agreed to marry and did not consider herself married supports that they were not common-law spouses	Sanchez: The intervening divorce proceeding and divorce petition demonstrate a common-law marriage, so the relationship was not merely a past dating relationship	Court of Appeals: The factfinder could rationally conclude no common-law marriage; the relationship qualified as a past dating relationship under the indictment
Whether a past dating relationship qualifies under Tex. Fam. Code § 71.0021(b) and Tex. Pen. Code § 22.01(b)(2) to elevate assault to a third-degree felony	State: The statute's plain language ("have or have had") includes past dating relationships irrespective of when they occurred; no fatal variance	Sanchez: Interpreting "have had" to permit convictions based on remote or intervened relationships is absurd and not legislative intent; an intervening marriage should preclude the enhancement	Court of Appeals: Followed plain meaning—"have or have had" encompasses prior dating relationships; no fatal variance; conviction sustained

Sanchez v. State, 460 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015) (affirming conviction; held past dating relationship suffices under Fam. Code § 71.0021(b))
Bays v. State, 396 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (statutory construction principles; consider legislative intent when text ambiguous)
Baird v. State, 398 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (statute ambiguous if reasonably susceptible to more than one understanding)
Bingham v. State, 913 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (give effect to plain statutory language)
State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (presume every word in a statute has purpose; give effect to each word if possible)
Tovar v. State, 978 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (harsh statutory results do not equate to absurdity requiring deviation from plain meaning)
Stanul v. State, 870 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994) (courts avoid interpretations leading to absurd results)