Salomon Ledezma-Cosino v. Jefferson Sessions, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9361

Background

Salomon Ledezma-Cosino, a Mexican national who entered the U.S. without inspection in 1987, conceded removability after a 2008 DUI arrest and applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
Cancellation required, inter alia, 10 years of continuous presence and being a person of "good moral character" during that period; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1) bars those who are "habitual drunkard[s]."
The IJ found Ledezma-Cosino was a "habitual drunkard" based on medical records (more than ten years of heavy alcohol use, 1 L tequila/day), a 2008 DUI conviction, and family testimony; BIA affirmed and denied cancellation.
A three-judge panel initially granted relief on equal protection grounds, but that opinion was vacated on rehearing en banc; the en banc court considered substantial-evidence, vagueness, and equal protection challenges.
The en banc majority upheld the agency: (A) substantial evidence supports the "habitual drunkard" finding; (B) the statutory phrase is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to petitioner; (C) the classification survives rational-basis equal protection review.
Multiple concurrences and a dissent reasoned separately on deference under immigration plenary power, the rational-basis standard, and statutory meaning of "habitual drunkard," with the dissent urging a narrower, conduct-based reading tied to public harm.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether substantial evidence supports the BIA's finding that petitioner was a "habitual drunkard."	Ledezma-Cosino: record insufficient to show habitual drunkenness; alcoholism status is not dispositive.	Government: medical records, long history of heavy drinking, DUI conviction and family testimony support finding.	Held: Substantial evidence supports the agency's finding.
Whether the statutory term "habitual drunkard" is unconstitutionally vague.	Ledezma-Cosino: statute vague; fails to give fair notice.	Government: term admits objective factual inquiry; petitioner’s conduct falls clearly within it.	Held: Not unconstitutionally vague as applied to petitioner.
Whether § 1101(f)(1)'s bar on habitual drunkards violates equal protection (Fifth Amendment).	Ledezma-Cosino: classification irrational/impermissible discrimination.	Government: classification rationally furthers public safety; rational-basis review applies in immigration.	Held: Classification passes rational-basis review; no equal protection violation.
Proper standard of review and scope of "good moral character" label (statutory interpretation).	Dissent: "habitual drunkard" should be read as conduct causing public harm; being an alcoholic alone insufficient.	Majority/Concurrences: statutory label is an intermediate classification; courts assess rationality of congressional action, not label wording.	Held: Majority did not adopt narrower conduct-only reading; plurality opinion upholds agency result; dissent would remand for reinterpretation.

Key Cases Cited

Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2015) (standard for reviewing agency factual findings in immigration cases)
Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2012) (de novo review of constitutional questions)
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (vagueness doctrine and fair notice principles)
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (as-applied vagueness limits and inability to challenge law based on others' conduct)
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (rational-basis review: if plausible reasons exist, inquiry ends)
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (deference to Congress on immigration classifications)
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (plenary power and special deference in immigration context)
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding conclusive presumptions under rational-basis review)
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (administrative cost and rational-basis support for categorical rules)