Rusty Holloway v. Lamar County, 680 F. App'x 282

Holloway, a large former college football player, was in a car accident in Lamar County and possessed a handgun and knife which he surrendered to officers; he repeatedly left an ambulance and began walking toward a hospital.
Holloway’s sister had procured a chancery-court ‘‘Writ to Take Custody for Mental Examination’’ from Jefferson Davis County alleging he was suicidal/aggressive; the writ was directed to the Jefferson Davis County sheriff.
Lamar County officers confirmed the writ was active via dispatch and the Jefferson Davis County sheriff; Lamar County Sheriff Rigel told deputies Purvis and McNelly that Sheriff Strickland (Jefferson Davis) had a certified copy of the writ and asked for assistance in taking Holloway into custody.
Officers followed Holloway; Holloway testified he walked with hands on his head, did not immediately comply with commands to get on the ground, and was tased in the back, fell, was tased again while being handcuffed, and lost consciousness.
Holloway sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful seizure/false imprisonment and excessive force; the district court denied the deputies’ summary-judgment motion for qualified immunity on both claims.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the district court erred and reversed qualified-immunity denial as to seizure, vacated and remanded the excessive-force claim for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Lawfulness of seizure / false imprisonment	Holloway: deputies lacked statutory authority and probable cause because writ was directed only to Jefferson Davis County sheriff and no warrant justified seizure	Purvis/McNelly: they reasonably relied on confirmation that writ was active and on Sheriff Rigel’s orders; they had probable cause to detain under mental-health writ doctrine	Held: Qualified immunity for deputies on seizure claim — reasonable to infer writ and probable cause; seizure not clearly established unconstitutional
Excessive force (tasing)	Holloway: tasing was objectively unreasonable — he posed no threat, committed no crime, and did not resist	Purvis/McNelly: their understanding of the writ and Holloway’s size and noncompliance made use of taser reasonable to prevent danger or resistance	Held: District court erred by rejecting deputies’ reliance on writ; appellate court vacated and remanded excessive-force claim for further proceedings (did not grant judgment for deputies)

Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2012) (tasing found excessive where suspect committed no crime, posed no threat, and did not resist)
Cantrell v. City of Murphy, 666 F.3d 911 (5th Cir. 2012) (officers may seize without warrant when they have probable cause to believe a suicidal person is dangerous)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified-immunity two-step inquiry)
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law)
Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2008) (elements for Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and Graham factors)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness standard for excessive force)
Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1998) (parties generally limited to relief requested in briefs)
Bethany v. Stubbs, 393 So. 2d 1351 (Miss. 1981) (Mississippi law describes writs as for commitment where individual is dangerous to self or others)