879 F.3d 96
4th Cir.2018Background
- Russell L. Moody worked for Huntington Ingalls for 45 years and gave 90 days' notice of retirement effective Oct. 31, 2011.
- While in his notice period (Sept. 19, 2011) Moody injured his right shoulder at work (rotator cuff tear) but continued working until his planned retirement.
- Moody underwent shoulder surgery on Dec. 13, 2011 and his physician restricted him from work through Feb. 16, 2012; Huntington paid surgery costs but refused temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for Dec. 13–Feb. 16.
- The ALJ awarded TTD benefits, finding Moody was incapacitated by the injury during recovery; the Benefits Review Board (BRB) reversed, holding voluntary retirement before the debilitating effects bars "disability" under the LHWCA.
- The Fourth Circuit reviewed legal questions de novo, held the BRB misinterpreted 33 U.S.C. § 902(10), and reversed and remanded, concluding voluntary retirement does not defeat an injury-caused incapacity to earn wages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether voluntary retirement before the onset of an injury’s debilitating effects precludes a "disability" under 33 U.S.C. § 902(10) | Moody: "Disability" means incapacity to earn wages caused by injury; retirement does not render a claimant incapable, only unwilling, and does not negate injury-caused incapacity | Huntington: Voluntary retirement produces total loss of ability to earn wages, so no further incapacity from injury exists; LHWCA compensates actual wage loss | Court held retirement does not categorically preclude "disability"; incapacity (ability to earn) is distinct from voluntary cessation of work (actual earnings) and statutory text controls |
Key Cases Cited
- Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997) (LHWCA disability focuses on lost capacity to earn, not strictly post-injury wages)
- Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Hord, 193 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 1999) (LHWCA compensates economic harm from decreased earning capacity)
- Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 449 U.S. 268 (1980) (LHWCA as a compromise scheme providing certainty of compensation)
- Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369 (2013) (statutory interpretation begins with text and ordinary meaning)
- Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1995) (interpretation of LHWCA should effectuate its broad remedial purpose)
- Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Riley, 262 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2001) (no deference owed to BRB legal conclusions)
- Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. [case reference], 36 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 1994) (ALJ factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (mootness and recurrence doctrine)
