POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER CO. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL.
No. 79-816
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 8, 1980—Decided December 15, 1980
449 U.S. 268
Richard W. Turner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Stephen A. Trimble.
Elinor Hadley Stillman argued the cause for the federal respondent. With her on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, Laurie M. Streeter, and Lois G. Williams. Leslie Scherr argued the cause for respondent Cross. With him on the brief was William F. Krebs.
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Longshoremen‘s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA),
Cross is employed by Potomac Electric Power Co. (Pepco) as a cable splicer—a job that requires strength and agility. In 1974, he earned a total of $21,959.38, including overtime pay of $8,543.30. In December of that year, he injured his left knee in the course of his employment, thereby suffering a permanent partial loss of the use of his leg. The physical impairment is described as a 5 to 20% loss of the use of one leg, but the resulting impairment of his earning capacity is apparently in excess of 40%.2 Although Cross has retained his job, he has not been able to perform all of the strenuous duties required of a cable splicer and therefore he has received no overtime and has not qualified for certain pay increases.
Because he worked in the District of Columbia, respondent Cross is entitled to compensation under the LHWCA.3 It is undisputed that the injury to his leg is a “permanent partial disability” within the meaning of
His claim, however, is for the larger amount measured by two-thirds of the difference between his average weekly earnings before the injury and his present wage-earning capacity, multiplied by the number of weeks that his disability continues.5
The Administrative Law Judge allowed the larger recovery. He held that an injured employee is not required to accept the specific amount authorized by
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also affirmed. 196 U. S. App. D. C. 417, 606 F. 2d 1324 (1979).
Recognizing that the Act “must be construed in light of its humanitarian objectives,” and noting a “recent trend in workmen‘s compensation law away from the idea of exclusivity of scheduled benefits,” the court concluded that the “all other cases” language in
I
The language of the Act plainly supports the view that the character of the disability determines the method of compensation. Section 8 identifies four different categories of disability and separately prescribes the method of compensation
It is also noteworthy that the statutory direction that precedes the schedule of specifically described partial disabilities mandates that the compensation prescribed by the schedule “shall be paid to the employee, as follows.”10 We are not free to read this language as though it granted the employee an election. Nor are we free to read the subsequent words “all other cases” as though they described “all of the foregoing” as well; the use of the word “other” forecloses that reading.
In sum, we find nothing in the statute itself to support the view that the reference to “all other cases” in
The legislative history of the Act is entirely consistent with the conclusion that it was intended to mean what it says. Although that history contains no specific consideration of the precise question before us,11 one aspect of the Act‘s history is somewhat enlightening. The relevant language was enacted in 1927.12 It was patterned after a similar “scheduled benefits” provision in the New York Workmen‘s Compensation Law enacted in 1922.13 A few years after enactment of the LHWCA, the New York Court of Appeals was confronted with the same question of construction under the New York statute that is now presented to us under the federal statute. The New York Court of Appeals apparently considered the statutory language so clear on its face that little discussion of this issue was necessary:
“Obviously, the phrase ‘in all other cases’ signifies that the provisions of the paragraph shall apply only in cases where the injuries received are not confined to a specific
member or specific members.” Sokolowski v. Bank of America, 261 N. Y. 57, 62, 184 N. E. 492, 494 (1933).
Nothing in the original legislative history of the federal Act or in the legislative history of subsequent amendments14 indicates that Congress did not intend the plain language of the federal statute to receive the same construction as the substantially identical language of its New York ancestor.
III
The weight of judicial authority also supports a literal reading of the Act.
During the first half century of administration of the LHWCA, federal tribunals consistently construed the schedule benefits provision as exclusive. Although the exclusivity question did not explicitly arise until 1964, prior to that time
It was not until 1975 that the Benefits Review Board announced its dissatisfaction with the Williams construction of the statute and concluded that claimants suffering from a permanent partial disability may elect to proceed under either the schedule or
While the federal decisional authority on this question is scarce, state-law authority apparently is not. The lower court cited, and the respondents rely upon, the “recent trend in workmen‘s compensation law away from the idea of exclusivity of scheduled benefits.” 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 421, 606 F. 2d, at 1328.19 Although this “trend” unquestionably exists, it is neither uniform nor based entirely on cases presenting issues comparable to the precise issue before us.20
More importantly, a proper understanding of the judicial role in this case reveals that the recent trend actually supports a literal reading of the federal statute. Our task is to ascertain the congressional intent underlying the schedule benefit provisions enacted in 1927; we are not free to incorporate into those provisions subsequent state-law developments that we may consider sound as a matter of policy. In attempting to ascertain the legislative intent underlying a statute enacted over 50 years ago, the view that once “dominate[d] the field” is more enlightening than a recent state-law trend that has not motivated subsequent Congresses to amend the federal statute.21 The once dominant view is entirely consistent with a literal reading of the Act.
IV
Respondents suggest two reasons why this settled construction is erroneous. They submit that it does not fulfill the fundamental remedial purpose of the Act and that it may produce anomalous results that Congress probably did not intend. The first submission is not entirely accurate; the second, though theoretically correct, has insufficient force to overcome the plain language of the statute itself.
The LHWCA, like other workmen‘s compensation legislation, is indeed remedial in that it was intended to provide a certain recovery for employees who are injured on the job. It imposes liability without fault and precludes the assertion of various common-law defenses that had frequently resulted in the denial of any recovery for disabled laborers. While providing employees with the benefit of a more certain recovery for work-related harms, statutes of this kind do not purport to provide complete compensation for the wage earner‘s economic loss.23 On the contrary, they provide employers with definite and lower limits on potential liability than would have been applicable in common-law tort actions for damages. None of the categories of disability covered by the LHWCA authorizes recovery measured by the full loss of an injured employee‘s earnings; even those in the most favored categories may recover only two-thirds of the actual loss of
It is true, however, that requiring resort to the schedule may produce certain incongruous results. Unless an injury
As this Court has observed in the past, it is not to be lightly assumed that Congress intended that the LHWCA produce incongruous results. Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408, 412-413 (1932). But if “compelling language” produces incongruities, the federal courts may not avoid them by rewriting or ignoring that language.
If anomalies actually do occur with any frequency in the day-to-day administration of the Act, they provide a persuasive justification for a legislative review of the statutory compensation schedule. It would obviously be sound policy for Congress to re-examine the schedule of permanent partial disability benefits more frequently than every half century.28 In such a re-examination the extent and importance of hypothetical cases such as those described by respondents could be fairly evaluated. In this judicial proceeding, however, concern with such hypothetical cases is less compelling than sympathy for the actual plight of the individual litigant in the case before us. Nonetheless, that sympathy is an insufficient basis for approving a recovery that Congress has not authorized.
The judgment is
Reversed.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.
The Court in this case and the dissent in the Court of Appeals argue rather persuasively (but, for me, not convincingly) that, although they reach an incongruous result, see
That, of course, is of no help or comfort to respondent Cross, the particular litigant here, who suffered the injury and who, as the Court concedes, ante, at 283, might have had a greater award had his injury been less enduring. That does not make much sense to me and, while I realize that statutory inequities occasionally exist in the area of workmen‘s compensation where seemingly arbitrary lines must be drawn somewhere, I cannot believe that by the language of this statute Congress intended such a result.
Soon after the Longshoremen‘s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA),
“The measure before us, like recent similar legislation in many States, requires employers to make payments for the relief of employees and their dependents who sustain loss as a result of personal injuries and deaths occurring in the course of their work, whether with or without fault attributable to employers. Such laws operate to relieve persons suffering such misfortunes of a part of the burden and to distribute it to the industries and mediately to those served by them. They are deemed to be in the public interest and should be construed liberally in furtherance of the purpose for which they were enacted and, if possible, so as to avoid incongruous or harsh results.”
See also Voris v. Eikel, 346 U. S. 328, 333 (1953).
Today‘s decision departs from these principles by reaching, rather than avoiding, a harsh and incongruous result.1 It is undisputed that respondent Cross has suffered an injury that will reduce his weekly earnings by $130.13 for the rest of his working life. To compensate him for this injury, the Benefits Review Board awarded him two-thirds of his lost earnings—$86.76 per week or approximately $4,500 per year—for as long as he continues to work. Under the Court‘s decision, however, the most that Cross will receive is a total of about $12,800,2 less than three years’ compensation as awarded by the Board. If the Board now accepts petitioner‘s argument that Cross has lost only 5% of the use of his leg, he will
The starting point, of course, is the statute‘s definition of “disability.”
Not surprisingly, then, the amount of compensation that the Act provides depends upon the amount of wages lost by the injured employee due to his injury. A worker who suffers permanent total disability, and therefore is unable to earn any wages, receives two-thirds of his average weekly wages.
The Act‘s treatment of permanent partial disability should be read against this background. As the Court notes,
This interpretation is far more in harmony with the overall purpose of the Act than is the Court‘s construction. The House Committee that considered the legislation explained that workers’ compensation “has come to be universally recognized as a necessity in the interest of social justice between employer and employee,” and that this Act would provide an injured worker with “compensation during the period of his illness or inability to pursue his usual employment. . . .” (Emphasis added.) H. R. Rep. No. 1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20 (1927).4 The compensation that the Court‘s decision provides to respondent Cross falls far short of this goal.
An additional purpose of the statute was to afford prompt relief to covered workers “without the delay and expense which an action at law entails.” Id., at 20. The inclusion of a schedule of benefits in
Although the Court states that the “weight of judicial authority” supports its view, it is able to cite only a single Federal District Court decision in point, namely, Williams v. Donovan, 234 F. Supp. 135 (ED La. 1964), aff‘d, 367 F. 2d 825 (CA5 1966), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 977 (1967).6 This contrasts with the consistently held view of the Benefits Review Board, the agency established to administer the LHWCA.7 Sokolowski v. Bank of America, 261 N. Y. 57, 184 N. E. 492 (1933), of course, provides scant support for today‘s decision. That case was decided after the LHWCA was enacted, and is an uncertain guide, at best, to the intent of the Congress that passed the Act six years earlier.
Thus, the anomalous results the Court‘s decision imposes upon respondent Cross and other claimants under the LHWCA8 are not mandated, in my view, by the statute. It
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Notes
“Compensation for disability shall be paid to the employee as follows:
. . . . .
“(c) Permanent partial disability: In case of disability partial in character but permanent in quality the compensation shall be 66 2/3 per centum of the average weekly wages, which shall be in addition to compensation for temporary total disability or temporary partial disability paid in accordance with subdivision (b) or subdivision (e) of this section, respectively, and shall be paid to the employee, as follows:
“(1) Arm lost, three hundred and twelve weeks’ compensation.
“(2) Leg lost, two hundred and eighty-eight weeks’ compensation.
“(3) Hand lost, two hundred and forty-four weeks’ compensation.
“(4) Foot lost, two hundred and five weeks’ compensation.
“(5) Eye lost, one hundred and sixty weeks’ compensation.
. . . . .
“(18) Total loss of use: Compensation for permanent total loss of use of a member shall be the same as for loss of the member.
“(19) Partial loss or partial loss of use: Compensation for permanent partial loss or loss of use of a member may be for proportionate loss or loss of use of the member.
“(20) Disfigurement: Proper and equitable compensation not to exceed $3,500 shall be awarded for serious disfigurement of the face, head, or neck or of other normally exposed areas likely to handicap the employee in securing or maintaining employment.
“(21) Other cases: In all other cases in this class of disability the compensation shall be 66 2/3 per centum of the difference between his average weekly wages and his wage-earning capacity thereafter in the same employment or otherwise, payable during the continuance of such partial disability, but subject to reconsideration of the degree of such impairment by the deputy commissioner on his own motion or upon application of any party in interest.”
The Court‘s decision also rejects the consistent interpretation of the Benefits Review Board, the agency which administers the LHWCA. In four cases, in addition to this one, the Board has ruled that the schedule of benefits set out inThis computation is derived from
“The wage-earning capacity of an injured employee in cases of partial disability under subdivision (c) (21) of this section or under subdivision (e) of this section shall be determined by his actual earnings if such actual earnings fairly and reasonably represent his wage-earning capacity: Pro-
tained in the LHWCA, for the
“Under the present act an employee may receive compensation to the extent of 66 2/3 percent of whatever loss he has sustained in wage-earning capacity as caused by the injury. Unless the injury results in wage loss, no compensation can be paid. The absence of a schedule covering members and functions of the body has presented two principal difficulties, the first of which is the extreme difficulty in determining fairly and objectively the precise extent to which a particular physical impairment diminishes the injured employee‘s wage-earning capacity.”
The Court of Appeals appropriately noted that on occasion the schedule may overcompensate a claimant. For example, a lawyer who loses an arm due to an accident at work may not suffer any diminution in his earning ability, but he would be eligible for compensation under the schedule. 196 U. S. App. D. C. 417, 421, n. 28, 606 F. 2d 1324, 1328, n. 28 (1979). To this extent, the schedule is an exception to the principle that disability is an economic concept rather than a medical one, but it is an exception that Congress deliberately chose to make. In addressing the second of the “principal difficulties” presented by the then absence of a schedule in the FECA, the Senate Report concluded:
“A particular physical impairment to a member or function of the body does not always cause a proportional reduction in earning capacity. An employee having a loss of a member or function may be able to return to employment without apparent wage loss. In that event, notwithstanding the severe physical loss to him, he may not under the present act be paid compensation for his physical impairment. It is understandable that employees with such losses expect some form of indemnity for their loss.” S. Rep. No. 836, at 17.
In relying upon this legislative history of the FECA, I do not mean to suggest that that history is part of the legislative history of the LHWCA. As the Court notes, ante, at 275, the legislative history of the LHWCA is silent concerning the reasons why Congress included a schedule. Although Congress’ intent in this matter cannot be discerned with absolute certainty, it is plausible that its reasons for adopting a schedule for the FECA were the same as its reasons for having one for the LHWCA.
Before analyzing the statute and its history in detail, Judge MacKinnon wrote:
“Nothing in section 8 permits an employee whose injury is unquestionably confined to one of those set out in the schedule to circumvent Congress’ conclusive presumptions with a showing of lost earning capacity in excess of the specified benefit. The majority holds otherwise, and does so despite the fact that during the fifty-two year old regime of an essentially unaltered statutory scheme no federal court has ever read section 8 in that manner while a number of federal courts have adopted a contrary approach. I am not unsympathetic to the result the majority‘s holding achieves, but I submit that it is within the province of the legislative branch to weigh and decide whether this result ought to obtain.” Id., at 422-423, 606 F. 2d, at 1329-1330.
The one paragraph per curiam affirming the District Court‘s decision in Williams does not discuss the exclusivity issue.Cross’ injury were a temporary partial disability, he would be entitled to receive two-thirds of his lost earning capacity for a maximum of five years.
Today‘s decision also creates a significant disincentive for the seriously injured workers who otherwise might wish to return to work. The courts and the Benefits Review Board have held that a worker who is unable to do any work as the result of a scheduled injury may be compensated for permanent total disability, and the Court does not question this rule. See ante, at 277-278, n. 17. A worker who has been permanently and totally disabled receives two-thirds of his average weekly wages.
Mason v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 1 BRBS 357, 363-365 (1975). In Mason, the Board rejected Williams in favor of American Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones, 138 U. S. App. D. C. 269, 426 F. 2d 1263 (1970), a decision upon which the court below also relied. See 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 421, 606 F. 2d, at 1328. The opinion in Jones, however, does not address the exclusivity issue presented in this case. Rather, Jones held merely that a scheduled injury can give rise to an award for permanent total disability under
he is qualified. 138 U. S. App. D. C., at 271-272, 426 F. 2d, at 1265-1266. This conclusion is entirely consistent with the statute which, in
See Collins v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 9 BRBS 1015 (1979); Brand v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 8 BRBS 698 (1978); Dugger v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 8 BRBS 552 (1978); Richardson v. Perna & Cantrell, Inc., 6 BRBS 588 (1977); Longo v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 BRBS 357 (1975). It should be noted that two of these decisions, Dugger and Longo, involved permanent total, not permanent partial, disability; therefore, comments in those decisions pertaining to the exclusivity issue are dicta. See n. 17, supra. It should also be noted that the Benefits Review Board is not a policymaking agency; its interpretation of the LHWCA thus is not entitled to any special deference from the courts. See Hastings v. Earth Satellite Corp., 202 U. S. App. D. C. 85, 94, 628 F. 2d 85, 94 (1980) cert. denied, post, p. 905; Tri-State Terminals, Inc. v. Jesse, 596 F. 2d 752, 757, n. 5 (CA7 1979).
In the Board‘s most recent examination of the exclusivity issue, Collins v. Todd Shipyards Corp., supra, Chairman Smith vigorously dissented from the majority‘s conclusion that
The majority quoted the following passage from a leading treatise on workmen‘s compensation law:
” ‘Although it is difficult to speak in terms of a majority rule on this point, because of significant differences in statutory background, it can be said that at one time the doctrine of exclusiveness of schedule allowances did dominate the field. But in recent years there has developed such a strong trend in the opposite direction that one might now, with equal justification, say that the field is dominated by the view that schedule allowances should not be deemed exclusive, whether the issue is treatment of a smaller member as a percentage loss of a larger, or treatment of any scheduled loss as a partial or total disability of the body as a whole.’ ” 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 214-215, 606 F. 2d, at 1328-1329, quoting 2 A. Larson, Workmen‘s Compensation Law § 58.20, pp. 10-212 to 10-214 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
With respect to the limited question before us, it appears that, despite the recent trend to the contrary, a significant number of jurisdictions continue to view schedule benefits as exclusive in cases of permanent partial disability. See, e. g., E. Blair, Reference Guide to Workmen‘s Compensation Law § 11:07, p. 11-24 (1974); 11 W. Schneider, Workmen‘s Compensation § 2322 (a), pp. 562-565 (Perm. ed. 1957). Indeed, Professor Larson‘s treatise indicates that exclusivity, although perhaps no longer the majority view, nonetheless represents the view of “many jurisdictions.” See 2 A. Larson, supra, § 58.00, p. 10-164; § 58.20, pp. 10-206 to 10-212; see also id., § 58.13, p. 10-174.
The compromise nature of workmen‘s compensation legislation is well recognized:
“Workmen‘s compensation acts are in the nature of a compromise or quid pro quo between employer and employee. Employers relinquish certain legal rights which the law affords to them and so, in turn, do the employees. Employers give up the common-law defenses of the fellow servant rule and assumption of risk. Employees are assured hospital and medical care and subsistence during the convalescence period. In return for a fixed schedule of payments and a fixed amount in the event of the worker‘s death, employers are made certain that irrespective of their fault, liability to an injured workman is limited under workmen‘s compensation. Employees, on the other hand, ordinarily give up the right of suit for damages for personal injuries against employers in return for the certainty of compensation payments as recompense for those injuries.” 1 M. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries § 55, p. 102 (3d ed. 1975).
See also E. Blair, supra n. 20, § 1:00, pp. 1-1 to 1-2; W. Prosser, Law of Torts 531-532 (4th ed. 1971). This Court has previously recognized that the concept of compromise is central to the LHWCA, as adopted by the District of Columbia Workmen‘s Compensation Act: “A prime purpose of the Act is to provide residents of the District of Columbia with a practical and expeditious remedy for their industrial accidents and to place on District of Columbia employers a limited and determinate liability.” Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S., at 476.