Ross v. Blake
136 S. Ct. 1850
| SCOTUS | 2016Background
- In 2007 inmate Shaidon Blake alleged two guards (Madigan and Ross) used excessive force; Madigan assaulted Blake and resigned after an Internal Investigative Unit (IIU) inquiry condemned Madigan.
- Blake sued both guards under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; a jury found Madigan liable and awarded damages; Ross raised PLRA exhaustion as an affirmative defense.
- Blake did not file a Maryland Administrative Remedy Procedure (ARP) grievance because he believed the IIU investigation substituted for ARP.
- The district court dismissed Blake’s suit for failure to exhaust ARP; the Fourth Circuit reversed, adopting an unwritten “special circumstances” exception allowing reasonable, mistaken beliefs about exhaustion to excuse noncompliance.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether courts may create a judge-made “special circumstances” exception to the PLRA’s mandatory exhaustion requirement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Blake) | Defendant's Argument (Ross) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether courts may excuse failure to exhaust under PLRA for “special circumstances” | Fourth Circuit’s exception should apply when prisoner reasonably believed remedies were exhausted (IIU substituted for ARP) | PLRA requires exhaustion of available remedies; no judge-made exceptions | No; courts may not engraft a freewheeling “special circumstances” exception onto PLRA’s mandatory text |
| Scope of PLRA’s mandatory language (“No action shall be brought… until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted”) | The IIU investigation made ARP unnecessary, so BLake complied in substance | Blake failed to use ARP so PLRA bars suit | PLRA is mandatory except where administrative remedies are not “available” |
| What counts as an “available” administrative remedy under §1997e(a) | ARP was unavailable to Blake because wardens routinely dismissed ARPs while IIU investigations were pending | ARP remained available and Blake should have used it | Remedies are “available” only if capable of use — dead ends, opaque procedures, or official interference render remedies unavailable |
| Whether evidence about Maryland practice (ARP/IIU interaction) suffices to excuse exhaustion | Submitted administrative dispositions and AG briefs show wardens dismiss ARPs during IIU investigations, supporting unavailability | No cited example of a warden adjudicating ARP merits during IIU; ARP remains the standard process | Case remanded to determine on the record whether ARP was actually “available” to Blake; if unavailable, PLRA exhaustion does not bar his suit |
Key Cases Cited
- Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001) (PLRA exhaustion is mandatory regardless of the relief the administrative process can provide)
- Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (excessive-force claims are subject to PLRA exhaustion)
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (PLRA creates a mandatory exhaustion regime; courts may not add exceptions contrary to text)
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (clarifies pleading and exhaustion requirements under PLRA)
- McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993) (statutory exhaustion provisions must be followed; courts cannot rewrite clear statutory text)
- Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010) (statutory interpretation principles for exhaustion begin with text and apply consistently)
- Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (the mandatory ‘shall’ normally limits judicial discretion to create exceptions)
- McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969) (judicial exhaustion doctrines historically have exceptions, but statutory text controls)
- Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995) (when Congress amends a statute, courts presume the change has substantial effect)