Roslyn Oden v. SEPTA
671 F. App'x 859
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- Roslyn Oden, a long-time SEPTA bus operator, was reassigned to a cashier position in 2011 after medical disqualification for a sleep disorder and other disabilities.
- Oden requested workplace accommodations (flexible reporting, use of sick/personal time, breaks) from her supervisor Stacey Richardson; Richardson allegedly told her to transfer instead.
- On January 31, 2013, Richardson reviewed video showing Oden reading on her phone for ~40 minutes and leaving her booth for ~75 minutes (resulting in unregistered fares); SEPTA terminated Oden on February 27, 2013 for multiple rule violations.
- Oden filed charges with PHRC and EEOC in July 2013, then sued in district court alleging ADA and PHRA discrimination/retaliation against SEPTA and PHRA + § 1983 Equal Protection and First Amendment claims against Richardson.
- The district court granted summary judgment for SEPTA and Richardson, holding (1) failure-to-accommodate claims time-barred; (2) Oden failed to show pretext for termination; (3) § 1983 Equal Protection and First Amendment claims failed.
- The Third Circuit affirmed, reviewing summary judgment de novo and applying McDonnell Douglas framework where applicable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure-to-accommodate (ADA & PHRA) | Oden contends Richardson denied accommodation requests in 2011, entitling her to relief | SEPTA/Richardson argue claims are untimely under statutory filing deadlines | Time-barred; Oden waived challenge on appeal |
| Discrimination / Retaliation (ADA & PHRA) | Termination was motivated by disability discrimination/retaliation; employer's stated reasons were pretext | SEPTA/Richardson point to video-documented, serious rule violations as legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons | No pretext; plaintiff did not produce evidence to discredit employer's reasons or show determinative discriminatory motive |
| § 1983 — Equal Protection | Richardson treated Oden differently than other cashiers, showing purposeful discrimination | Richardson argues comparators were not similarly situated (different conduct) | Failed: comparator not alike in all relevant respects (e.g., Oden left booth 75 minutes) |
| § 1983 — First Amendment retaliation | Oden asserts her accommodation requests were protected speech on public concern | Richardson contends requests were personal employment grievances not protected | Failed: accommodation requests are mundane employment grievances, not public concern |
Key Cases Cited
- Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2015) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2003) (McDonnell Douglas framework for retaliation)
- Olson v. Gen. Elec. Aerospace, 101 F.3d 947 (3d Cir. 1996) (McDonnell Douglas framework for discrimination)
- Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454 (3d Cir. 2015) (individual accommodation requests are not public-concern speech)
- Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014) (equal protection — similarly situated requirement)
- Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2012) (ADA and PHRA interpreted consistently)