Ronald Bailey-El v. Housing Authority of Baltimore, 686 F. App'x 228

Ronald G. Bailey-El, a pro se plaintiff and public employee, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after termination by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City.
District court dismissed his complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim and as time‑barred.
Bailey-El asserted First Amendment retaliation claims related to his termination and a procedural due process claim based on denial of a post‑termination arbitration hearing under a collective bargaining agreement.
The appellate court reviewed dismissal de novo and applied the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard and a three‑year statute of limitations under Maryland law.
Court affirmed dismissal of the First Amendment claims as time‑barred but concluded the procedural due process claim’s timeliness and merits were not plainly deficient on the face of the amended complaint.
The case was vacated in part and remanded with instructions to allow Bailey‑El to amend to clarify whether the collective bargaining agreement created a property interest and what post‑termination process he received.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether First Amendment claims were time‑barred	Bailey‑El contends his claims arose from his termination and are timely	Housing Authority argues claims accrued at termination and are beyond the 3‑year limit	Affirmed: First Amendment claims are barred by statute of limitations
When procedural due process claim accrued	Accrual occurred when Bailey‑El discovered denial of requested arbitration (after termination)	Authority treats accrual at termination, so claim is untimely	Vacated: accrual not plainly established on face of complaint; timeliness unclear
Whether Bailey‑El had a property interest in continued employment via CBA	Bailey‑El asserts the collective bargaining agreement entitled him to arbitration/for‑cause protections creating a property interest	Authority asserts presumption of at‑will employment unless CBA or contract clearly limits discharge	Vacated: district court failed to resolve whether CBA created a property interest; plaintiff may plead facts to show one
Whether the process afforded was constitutionally adequate	Bailey‑El alleges denial of a post‑termination arbitration hearing	Authority found complaint did not sufficiently allege the process actually provided	Vacated: complaint not developed enough to evaluate adequacy of pre/post‑termination process; remand to allow amendment

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: factual matter required to state a plausible claim)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir.) (accrual when plaintiff knew or should have known of injury)
Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997) (scope of pre‑ and post‑termination process due when property interest exists)
Jackson v. Long, 102 F.3d 722 (4th Cir.) (no property interest in arbitration hearing itself)
Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555 (6th Cir.) (collective bargaining agreement can create property interest requiring just cause)
King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206 (4th Cir.) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)
De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir.) (§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal reviewed under Rule 12(b)(6) standard)