Romero v. Evans
280 F. Supp. 3d 835
E.D. Va.2017Background
- Four noncitizen petitioners (Guatemala/El Salvador) reentered the U.S. after prior removals, had reinstated removal orders, expressed reasonable fear of return, and were placed in withholding-only proceedings before Immigration Judges.
- Petitioners remained detained by ICE while withholding-of-removal applications were adjudicated; they sought habeas relief asserting detention authority derives from 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (which permits bond hearings), not § 1231 (which authorizes mandatory detention during the removal period).
- One petitioner, Guzman Chavez, was detained in Florida when suit was filed in Virginia; respondents moved to dismiss her claims for lack of jurisdiction over the immediate custodian.
- The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the pure legal question whether petitioners are detained under § 1226(a) or § 1231.
- The court concluded the petitioners are detained under § 1226(a), are therefore entitled to individualized bond hearings, and dismissed Guzman Chavez without prejudice for improper forum as to her location-based jurisdictional defect.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper habeas respondent / jurisdiction for Guzman Chavez | May sue ICE Director/AG (official who can grant bond); warden can't provide requested relief, so naming higher officials is proper and suit may be filed where immigration proceedings occur | Padilla rule: proper respondent is immediate custodian (warden); habeas must be filed in district with territorial nexus to custodian | Court: Where the warden cannot provide the relief sought (bond hearing), petitioner may name officials who can, but petition must be filed where either petitioner or those officials are located; Guzman Chavez (detained in Florida) dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction in this district |
| Statutory source of detention: § 1226(a) vs § 1231 | § 1226(a) governs because a decision whether the alien "is to be removed" remains pending until withholding-only proceedings conclude; reinstated order is not "administratively final" for § 1231 purposes | § 1231(a)(5) & reinstatement regs make the removal order administratively final upon reinstatement, so § 1231 governs and detainees are subject to mandatory detention | Court: Petitioners detained under § 1226(a); withholding-only proceedings mean removal is not final for § 1231 removal-period purposes; petitioners entitled to bond hearings |
| Deference to DHS regulations (Chevron/Auer) | Regulations do not clearly resolve whether withholding-only proceedings place detainees in the § 1231 removal period; thus deference is inappropriate | DHS regs (8 C.F.R. pts. 241.8, 241.4) indicate reinstatement and Part 241 administration, warranting deference to agency interpretation | Court: Regulations are ambiguous or inapplicable to withholding-only context; Chevron/Auer deference rejected in resolving the statutory question |
| Scope of relief ordered | Petitioners seek release or bond hearings; class claims pending | Respondents contend § 1231 forecloses bond hearings | Court: Orders individualized bond hearings under § 1226(a); denies respondents' summary judgment; grants petitioners' summary judgment (except Guzman Chavez dismissal) |
Key Cases Cited
- Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (proper habeas respondent is immediate custodian; file in district of confinement)
- Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (service-of-process location principles in habeas context)
- Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341 (jurisdictional concepts in habeas proceedings)
- Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (continued jurisdiction where government moves petitioner)
- Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59 (2d Cir.: aliens in withholding-only proceedings detained under § 1226(a))
- Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881 (9th Cir.: concluded reinstated orders support § 1231 detention)
- Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (due process limits on continued post-removal-period detention)
- Jarpa v. Mumford, 211 F. Supp. 3d 706 (D. Md.: agency heads remained proper respondents where relief practically comes from higher officials)
