Roberto Hernandez-Serrano v. William Barr
981 F.3d 459
| 6th Cir. | 2020Background
- Roberto Hernandez-Serrano entered the U.S. without inspection at age 16 in 2015 and was placed in removal proceedings. He later sought Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status via an I-360 petition.
- In June 2017 he moved to administratively close his removal case while USCIS adjudicated his I-360; the IJ denied that motion and later ordered removal in April 2018.
- Hernandez-Serrano appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA); three weeks after his appeal CIS approved his I-360 and he moved to remand. The BIA denied relief, applying Matter of Castro-Tum (A.G. 2018), which interpreted 8 C.F.R. §§1003.10 and 1003.1(d) as not granting IJs/BIA a general authority to administratively close cases.
- The majority of the Sixth Circuit panel (Kethledge, joined by Guy) reviewed the regulation interpretation de novo, affirmed Castro-Tum’s conclusion that those regulations do not delegate a general authority to administratively close cases, and denied the petition.
- Judge Clay dissented, arguing the regulations’ broad language (“any action … appropriate and necessary for the disposition”) authorizes IJs/BIA to administratively close cases in appropriate circumstances (citing examples like provisional-waiver or SIJ scenarios) and would remand for reconsideration.
- The opinion notes the large scale of administrative closure historically (hundreds of thousands of cases) and frames Castro-Tum as a corrective limiting executive practice to what the panel viewed as the regulations’ text.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 8 C.F.R. §§1003.10 & 1003.1(d) delegate a general authority for IJs/BIA to administratively close cases | Hernandez-Serrano: regs’ broad "any action … appropriate and necessary for the disposition" language authorizes administrative closure when suitable | AG/BIA: those regs limit actions to ones "for the disposition" of a case; administrative closure is typically a decision not to decide and thus not authorized generally | Held: No. The court held the regs do not delegate a general authority to suspend proceedings by administrative closure (affirming Castro-Tum). |
| Whether administrative closure qualifies as an action "necessary for the disposition" of a case under those regs | Plaintiff: in some contexts (e.g., SIJ, provisional waivers, visa-queue issues) closure can be necessary to allow disposition by another agency | Respondent: administrative closure is not a disposition and usually prevents resolution; continuances and specific regulations cover narrow situations | Held: Generally no; closure is usually inconsistent with "necessary for the disposition," so the regs do not support a general closure power. |
| Whether the BIA erred by applying Castro-Tum to deny relief in Hernandez-Serrano’s case | Plaintiff: Castro-Tum is wrongly decided; BIA should have considered whether closure was appropriate/necessary here (SIJ facts) | Respondent: Castro-Tum is controlling agency precedent and correctly construes the regs | Held: The panel concluded Castro-Tum was a correct interpretation to apply; petition denied. |
| Whether remand was required because administrative closure might be appropriate in some narrow statutory/regulatory contexts (e.g., §212.7 provisional-waiver or SIJ-adjustment timing) | Plaintiff & dissent: even if not general, regs permit closure where necessary to permit statutory/regulatory relief; BIA’s categorical application of Castro-Tum foreclosed consideration and thus remand required | Respondent: petitioner didn’t preserve certain specific legal-necessity arguments before IJ/BIA; BIA correctly applied Castro-Tum | Held: Majority: no remand; petitioner failed to preserve some specific arguments and Castro-Tum governs; Dissent: would remand for agency reconsideration. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (framework for reviewing executive interpretations of ambiguous regulations)
- Ruiz-Del-Cid v. Holder, 765 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2014) (de novo review of statutory/regulatory interpretation in immigration context)
- Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019) (held Castro-Tum wrongly decided; recognized broader IJ/BIA closure authority)
- Meza Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2020) (rejected Castro-Tum and upheld IJ/BIA discretion to administratively close in some circumstances)
- United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) (interpretive point on expansive sense of the word "any")
- I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992) (observing delay generally advantages the alien in removal proceedings)
- Fed. Power Comm’n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952) (courts should not intrude on agency functions grounded in agency expertise)
- Ford Motor Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 364 (1939) (equitable remedies may require agency action at a court's direction)
- Gor v. Holder, 607 F.3d 180 (6th Cir. 2010) (agency is bound by its own regulations)