Robert E. Lee Supinger, Jr. v. Richard D. Holcomb
16-1932
| 4th Cir. | Dec 4, 2017Background
- Supinger and Stultz were non‑probationary DMV law‑enforcement supervisors terminated in April 2013 after an internal investigation and amid prior criticisms they had made of DMV management and reorganization plans.
- Virginia law permits non‑probationary law‑enforcement officers to grieve suspensions/terminations under either the Virginia Grievance Procedure (VGP) or the Law‑Enforcement Officers Procedural Guarantees Act (LEOPGA), but not both.
- Supinger and Stultz grieved suspensions under VGP, did not immediately elect a forum for termination grievances, then in October 2013 submitted clear LEOPGA election letters for their terminations; the DMV denied LEOPGA hearings as untimely and asserted the employees had elected VGP.
- Because the DMV denied LEOPGA hearings, Supinger and Stultz received no post‑termination administrative hearing; they sued asserting procedural due process violations and Stultz additionally asserted a First Amendment retaliation claim.
- The district court denied qualified immunity to several DMV officials on the due process claims and on Stultz’s First Amendment claim; the government officials appealed.
- The Fourth Circuit affirmed denial of qualified immunity on the due process claims (finding LEOPGA election clear and statutory scheme unambiguous) and remanded the First Amendment qualified‑immunity issue for further proceedings (to be held in abeyance pending development of the record).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DMV officials are entitled to qualified immunity for denying post‑termination LEOPGA hearings | Supinger & Stultz: election of LEOPGA was clear; DMV’s refusals deprived them of constitutionally required post‑termination hearings | Officials: statutory scheme ambiguous; grievances were untimely or VGP had been elected | Denied qualified immunity; officials violated clearly established due‑process rights by denying LEOPGA hearings |
| Whether filing LEOPGA ~6 months after termination was untimely | Plaintiffs: six‑month filing shortly after state‑court proceedings and tolling made LEOPGA timely; no DMV rules defined "reasonable time" | Officials: plaintiffs’ LEOPGA requests were untimely; prior VGP actions foreclosed LEOPGA | Court: statute’s "reasonable time" ambiguous in DMV’s favor; given lack of guidance and tolling, plaintiffs’ requests were reasonable |
| Whether statements indicating intent to use VGP constituted an election foreclosing LEOPGA | Plaintiffs: earlier discussions/stays/tolling were not formal VGP elections; termination grievances were separate from suspension grievances | Officials: plaintiffs had effectively elected VGP, so LEOPGA was unavailable | Court: communications did not amount to a formal VGP election; October LEOPGA letters were controlling |
| Whether qualified immunity should be decided now for Stultz’s First Amendment claim | Stultz: his speech was on matters of public concern and motivated his termination | Officials: not clearly established that his speech was public‑concern or outweighed government interests; chain‑of‑command concerns | Court: remanded First Amendment qualified‑immunity issues to district court to hold in abeyance pending further factual development on due‑process claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (qualified immunity standard)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (pretermination and posttermination procedural due process requirements)
- Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (property interest standard for due process)
- Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (balancing public‑employee speech against government‑employer interests)
- Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attys. Office, 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir.) (sources that may clearly establish rights)
- Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 167 (4th Cir.) (elements of procedural due process claim)
- McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271 (4th Cir.) (First Amendment public‑concern and balancing framework)
- Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (state action/deprivation analysis)