Richard Manriquez v. Joel Ensley, 46 F.4th 1124

In August 2016, officers seized a motel key from John Soriano and obtained a telephonic search warrant describing only Room #1 at the Copper Mountain Motel (577 W. Kiser).
After executing the motel search, Officer Ensley phoned the issuing judge and asked to “amend” the warrant to include Soriano’s primary residence (711 W. Sonora). The judge orally approved; officers did not physically amend the warrant.
Officers then searched Richard Manriquez’s home (Soriano’s uncle), a scuffle occurred, and officers seized drug paraphernalia; the county declined major drug charges and the possession charge was dismissed; Manriquez was later convicted of obstruction (not appealed).
Manriquez sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an illegal search; the district court found the warrant facially invalid and denied qualified immunity to Officers Lawrence and Ensley on the illegal-search claim.
The Ninth Circuit majority held the search violated the Fourth Amendment (warrant was facially deficient) but reversed the denial of qualified immunity, concluding the unlawfulness was not "clearly established" given the novel facts (oral judicial approval without a written amendment).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the warrant was facially valid as to Manriquez’s home	Warrant listed only the motel; therefore search of home violated the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement	A judge orally approved adding the home; officers reasonably believed the search was authorized despite not amending the warrant	Court: Warrant was facially deficient; searching the home without a warrant specifying that place violated the Fourth Amendment
Whether an oral judicial amendment cures a warrant that does not specify the place to be searched	Oral approval is insufficient; the written warrant must particularize the place	Oral judicial authorization made the search valid even if officers failed to annotate the warrant	Court: Oral approval does not cure the facial defect; the Fourth Amendment requires the warrant itself to specify the place
Whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity	Manriquez: prior law clearly established the particularity requirement, so officers are not immune	Officers: Given lack of directly on-point precedent and the judge’s oral approval, a reasonable officer could have believed the search lawful	Court: Officers granted qualified immunity — violation not "clearly established" in the circumstances (reversed district court denial)

Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (warrant so deficient on its face that search is unreasonable; particularity requirement can be clearly established)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good-faith exception; a warrant may be so facially deficient that officers cannot reasonably presume validity)
United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006) (Fourth Amendment particularity limits and role of magistrate)
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014) (qualified immunity standard; avoid defining rights at high level of generality)
Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2002) (warrant defects and the need for written corrections from a magistrate)
United States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2009) (two-part particularity analysis: identify premises and risk of mistakenly searching another)
United States v. Mann, 389 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2004) (particularity standard quoted)
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012) (a warrant can be so facially deficient as to render it invalid despite magistrate approval)