Ricardo Chacon v. Robert Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1131

Ricardo Chacon, a Salvadoran who entered the U.S. unlawfully as a child, pleaded guilty in 2016 to dealing in firearms without a license under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and was sentenced to 30 months in prison.
DHS initiated removal proceedings in 2017; Chacon conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection.
The Immigration Judge denied relief, finding the § 922(a)(1)(A) conviction to be an "aggravated felony" (illicit trafficking in firearms) that bars asylum; the BIA affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the federal firearms conviction categorically qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C).
The court applied the categorical approach, adopted the BIA’s definition of "illicit trafficking" as "unlawful trading or dealing," and compared that generic definition to § 922(a)(1)(A).
The court concluded § 922(a)(1)(A) necessarily involves unlawful commercial dealing in firearms and thus is categorically an "aggravated felony," making Chacon ineligible for asylum; the petition for review was denied.

Issue	Chacon's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) is categorically an "aggravated felony" as "illicit trafficking in firearms" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C)	§ 922(a)(1)(A) is broader than the INA's trafficking definition and may cover non‑commercial conduct	§ 922(a)(1)(A) requires engaging "in the business" of dealing/importing/manufacturing firearms and thus constitutes unlawful trading or dealing — i.e., trafficking	Held: § 922(a)(1)(A) categorically fits the INA "illicit trafficking" definition and is an aggravated felony
Whether the BIA’s construction of "illicit trafficking" is entitled to deference	BIA's reading is overbroad or not controlling	BIA reasonably construed "illicit trafficking" as "unlawful trading or dealing" and that interpretation is persuasive/deferable	Held: BIA’s definition is a permissible construction entitled to deference and persuasive weight
Whether the court should consider conviction facts rather than statute elements in determining categorical match	Court should consider factual record of the conviction to narrow the offense	Use the categorical approach; compare statutory elements to generic offense definition, not individual facts	Held: Applied the categorical approach; did not consider underlying factual conduct

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (established the categorical approach for generic-offense analysis)
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (statutory phrase referring to a generic crime triggers categorical analysis)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (do not look to underlying facts when applying the categorical approach)
Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard for de novo review of categorical questions)
Ho Sang Yim v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) (categorical-approach framework application)
Rendon v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2008) (trafficking requires commercial dealing or intent to engage in commercial dealing)
Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) ("trafficking" denotes commercial dealing)
Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (unlicensed export conviction fits firearms trafficking definition)
Soto-Hernandez v. Holder, 729 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013) (state unlawful firearm delivery can constitute illicit trafficking)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency interpretations entitled to deference when reasonable)