Reyes, Rafael
PD-1020-15
| Tex. App. | Aug 11, 2015Background
- Indictment charged Reyes with evading arrest or detention while using a vehicle, a third-degree felony if in flight from a peace officer (Tex. Penal Code §38.04).
- Jury trial in 2013 resulted in conviction and a three-year confinement with a $3,000 fine; sentence imposed June 26, 2013.
- Appellant filed a motion for new trial; the trial court denied, and notice of appeal was timely filed.
- Court of Appeals (Eastland, Tex.) affirmed Reyes’s conviction; petition for discretionary review followed.
- Appellant argues lenity should govern due to conflicting amendments to §38.04; appellee contends amendments are not ambiguous and sentencing was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the evidence sufficient to support the conviction? | Reyes contends insufficiency under Griego/Redwine. | State argues evidence shows intentional flight from officer, with visible lights/siren. | Sufficient evidence; conviction affirmed. |
| Was there reversible error in denying a hearing on the motion for new trial based on GPS data? | GPS data entitles hearing and potential relief. | GPS info cumulative/impeaching, not grounds for relief. | No abuse of discretion; hearing denied. |
| Is Senate Bill 1416's amendment to §38.04 unconstitutional under the single-subject rule? | SB 1416 unconstitutional; punishment improper. | SB 1416 does not violate single-subject rule. | Not unconstitutional; sentence within third-degree felony range. |
| Do conflicting amendments to §38.04 require lenity to dictate punishment? | Lenity should apply due to conflict between HB 3423 and SB 1416. | Statute not ambiguous; lenity not triggered. | Statute not ambiguous; sentencing proper under §38.04 as third-degree felony. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014) (statutory interpretation requires but-for causation and ambiguous language may trigger lenity)
- Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) (ambiguity in criminal statutes resolved in favor of lenity)
- Cuellar v. State, 70 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (rule of lenity applied in lenient interpretation of criminal statute)
- Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (lenity invoked when statute ambiguous after traditional interpretation)
- Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990) (lenity reserved for statutory ambiguity in criminal statutes)
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (lenity applies when statute remains ambiguous after analysis)
- Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (ambiguous statutory language may require lenity)