Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13817

Background

The Republic of the Marshall Islands sued the United States (N.D. Cal.), alleging the U.S. breached Article VI of the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by failing to pursue good‑faith negotiations toward nuclear disarmament and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (including an order requiring the U.S. to convene negotiations within one year).
Article VI obliges each party to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures" to end the nuclear arms race and achieve complete disarmament, but the Treaty contains no domestic enforcement mechanism.
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing (redressability) and as presenting nonjusticiable political questions; it did not rely on the U.S. argument that Article VI is non‑self‑executing.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding Article VI is non‑self‑executing, the Marshall Islands’ claimed injuries are not redressable in U.S. courts, and the claims raise political questions committed to the political branches.
The court emphasized separation‑of‑powers concerns: Article VI contemplates future, discretionary diplomatic action by the Executive (and potentially the Senate), contains imprecise and aspirational language (e.g., "effective measures," "at an early date"), and lacks judicially manageable standards or an enforcement mechanism.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Self‑execution: Is Article VI directly enforceable in U.S. courts?	Marshall Islands: Article VI creates direct rights between treaty parties and is judicially enforceable.	U.S.: Article VI is not self‑executing; it contemplates political‑branch action and is not a directive to courts.	Held: Article VI is non‑self‑executing and not judicially enforceable.
Standing / Redressability: Can federal courts provide relief for the Marshall Islands’ injuries?	Marshall Islands: Court can declare breach and order U.S. to negotiate, redressing injury.	U.S.: Courts cannot compel multilateral negotiations; judicial relief cannot redress injury from other states’ conduct.	Held: Lack of redressability; courts cannot meaningfully remedy alleged Article VI breaches.
Political question doctrine: Do claims involve nonjusticiable political questions?	Marshall Islands: "Good faith" is a judicially manageable standard; courts can adjudicate.	U.S.: Negotiation timing, scope, and strategy are constitutionally committed to political branches and lack judicial standards.	Held: Claims present political questions (textual commitment and lack of manageable standards), so nonjusticiable.
Requested remedy / scope of relief: May court compel the U.S. to "take all steps necessary" to comply?	Marshall Islands: Equitable relief is appropriate to enforce treaty obligations.	U.S.: An injunction directing negotiations would unconstitutionally intrude on Executive foreign‑policy prerogatives.	Held: Courts may not order the Executive to conduct or supervise diplomatic negotiations; requested relief denied.

Key Cases Cited

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (distinguishing self‑executing from non‑self‑executing treaties and directing text‑based inquiry)
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (when treaty obligations require political response, courts have no redress)
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (political question factors governing nonjusticiability)
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (judicial role in declaring rules of decision)
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829) (treaty provisions addressed to political department are non‑self‑executing)
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (foreign relations matters are committed to political branches)