Renee Lange v. City of Oconto, 28 F.4th 825

Background

Plaintiff Renee Lange is deaf and primarily communicates in American Sign Language (ASL); during four police encounters in 2016–2017 officers relied on her minor children (or other non-credentialed methods) rather than providing a qualified ASL interpreter.
Lange sued the City of Oconto and City of Oconto Falls under Title II of the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, claiming denial of effective communication and discrimination.
At trial the Cities’ officers testified they had prior experience communicating with Lange by pen-and-paper, lip-reading, and limited verbalization and believed those methods were effective; some witnesses described Lange as agitated during incidents.
The district court instructed the jury that police “should not rely on a minor child … except in an emergency,” but also added that police “need not interfere … in the decision of a private citizen to use his or her own child” to communicate — an instruction Lange objected to.
The jury returned a verdict for the Cities. The district court admitted testimony from Detective Crocker about numerous prior contacts between Lange and police (≈115) and later taxed $1,000 in costs to Lange despite her indigency (clerk had taxed ~$4,013).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Jury instruction re: use of minor children as interpreters	The court misstated the DOJ regulation by allowing a rule that police may refrain from preventing a private citizen from using a minor child to interpret, creating an impermissible exception to the prohibition on minors as interpreters	Instruction correctly harmonized §35.160(b) (give primary consideration to disabled person’s request) with (c)’s prohibition, and reflected reasonableness	Even if the sentence was erroneous, it was not prejudicial given the overall instructions and evidence; no new trial.
Denial of JMOL (Rule 50) that minors were used absent emergencies	Evidence established officers used Lange’s minor children in non-emergencies and thus violated §35.160(c)(3) entitling Lange to judgment as matter of law	Reasonable jury could find officers lacked deliberate indifference because they believed other auxiliary aids were effective based on prior interactions	Denial of JMOL affirmed: evidence supported jury verdict for defendants.
Admission of Detective Crocker’s testimony about other contacts (Rule 404/403)	Testimony about other interactions was impermissible “other acts”/propensity evidence and unfairly prejudicial	Testimony was admitted for non‑propensity purposes (communication ability, relationship, defendants’ state of mind); probative value outweighed prejudice	Admission not an abuse of discretion; testimony was probative of Lange’s communication abilities and did not unduly prejudice outcome.
Taxing costs against an indigent plaintiff	Because Lange is indigent and claims were not frivolous and raised novel/important civil‑rights issues, taxing costs chills litigation and is inappropriate; Christiansburg standard should apply to ADA/Rehab Act costs	Rule 54(d) presumes costs to prevailing party; district court considered indigency, reduced costs to $1,000, and adequately explained factors under Rivera/Weeks; Christiansburg attorney‑fee standard does not apply to costs under the Rehabilitation Act	District court did not abuse discretion: indigency recognized and costs reduced; $1,000 award affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (agency views implementing Title II warrant respect)
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) (standard for awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing defendant)
Rivera v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2006) (two‑step indigency analysis for taxing costs)
Richardson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 926 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2019) (presumption in favor of prevailing party recovering costs)
Lacy v. Cook County, 897 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2018) (deliberate indifference standard for Title II damages)
Kuberski v. Rev Recreation Grp., Inc., 5 F.4th 775 (7th Cir. 2021) (prejudice standard for jury instruction errors)
United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (Rule 404(b) requires a propensity‑free chain of reasoning for other‑act evidence)
Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 1997) (only misconduct or inability to pay normally justify denying costs)