*1 example, For testi- deterred from ceedings portrayed. exercising his First Amend- Therefore, that had mony at trial indicated Ovadal ment rights. there been overpasses signs on Beltline with at been cognizable no constitutional harm under ques- in least six times before dates § 42 U.S.C. 1983. Accordingly, judg- tion, and had interacted with the Madison ment of the district court is Affiemed. police on of those occasions without several Tr.
any restriction on his activities. Dec.
12, 17, only at 68-69. The other witness called, frequent partner
that Ovadal his Foht, demonstrations Mike testified
these overpasses
that he had been on Beltline years
between ten and twelve times prior question to the and de- incidents Emily RIVERA, Plaintiff-Appellee, spite frequent interactions with Madison had forced to move. Tr. police never been 12, at it particularly
Dec. 92-93. We find CHICAGO, CITY OF Defendant- 8, telling (after that on November Appellant. events that led Ovadal to file this suit in No. 06-1318. alleges which he that he was “chilled and exercising deterred” from his First Appeals, United States Court of rights) Amendment Ovadal Foht were Seventh Circuit. bridge back on a over the Beltline. Tr. again, they Dec. 79-80. Once interact- Argued Oct. 2006. officer, police ed with Madison and the Decided Nov. 2006. officer that they informed them were free facts, protest. to continue their Id. The no
longer light viewed most favorable to
Ovadal, support allegations do not that any
there was ever absolute ban on Ovadal
protesting bridges from or that he was
chilled and deterred exercising his
rights.
III. Conclusion summary, passage city of the
ordinance has made claim for declara-
tory injunctive relief moot because alleged repeated. violations cannot be findings
We defer to the district court’s
fact that the actions of the defendants on specific in question dates were not speech.
content-based restrictions on support any
evidence at trial does not al-
legation general that there was a unwrit- policy placed prohi-
ten content-based on speech.
bitions Ovadal’s The record was not chilled or
indicates Ovadal *2 finding
its that Rivera is appeals. now For following rea- sons, we vacate the district court’s denial *3 of costs proceed- and remand further ings. Background
I. 21, 2001, p.m., On June at 11:30 former Chicago police officer Mario Morales went Emily apartment, Rivera’s identified police himself as a officer and demanded that let him in. Rivera Rivera was home with her six year daughter old and one month old At the inci- son. time of the dent, a wearing bulletproof Morales was badge pouch. vest and a opened Rivera the back door forcibly and Morales en- inside, apartment. tered the Once Mor- ales informed her he had a search warrant it but never showed to her. Mor- ales led Rivera upstairs, handcuffed her placed hands behind her back and her on a (argued), Michael D. Robbins Schlesin- up- bed. While Rivera was handcuffed Robbins, IL, & ger Chicago, for Plaintiff- stairs, apartment Morales ransacked the Appellee. and then left. Rivera report did not Emily K. (argued), Paster Office Following incident to law enforcement. Division, Corporation Appeals Counsel incident, pled guilty Morales to numer- IL, Chicago, Defendant-Appellant. felony federal offenses for which he is ous In currently plea agree- incarcerated. his FLAUM, Judge, Before Chief ment, entering Morales admitted Rivera’s EASTERBROOK, BAUER and Circuit apartment. Judges. brought complaint Rivera a two-count FLAUM, Judge. Chief against alleging Morales a violation of her rights Fourth Amendment under U.S.C. Chicago Mario police Former officer battery § claim. and a state law home, Emily Morales entered Rivera’s stayed The district court Rivera’s claim her, apart- handcuffed and ransacked her of related criminal pending the resolution Rivera a default judgment ment. obtained against Approximately matters Morales. Morales, currently in against prison who is later, year Rivera filed a motion to va- being after convicted of numerous felonies. stay, cate the which the district court attempt judgment, an to collect the granted. respond Morales failed to (“the City Chicago Rivera sued complaint, sought Rivera a default City City”). granted The district court him, judgment against which the district summary City judgment, and the submit- $175,000. granted the amount of pursuant ted a bill of costs the court 54(d)(1). attempted Procedure Rivera then to collect this Federal Rule Civil City through supple- City’s judgment court denied the costs based on from the The losing parties Feder- to avoid under proceeding collection under mental 54(d)(1). proper interpretation Procedure 69. Rivera Rule al Rule of Civil 54(d)(1) legal Mor- of Rule is a conclusion that argued City that the was liable for city em- we review de novo. Gavoni v. Dobbs conduct because he was ales’s House, Inc., under color of state law Cir. ployee and acted 1999). apartment. when he entered her summary arguing judgment moved for 54(d)(1) perti Rule provides for Morales’s should not be liable part, “[ejxeept express provi nent acting within conduct because he was sion therefore is made either in a statute *4 scope employment. the of his The district rules, in the United States or these and entered granted the motion costs shall be allowed as of course the
judgment
City.
for the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise
favor,
Following
judgment
the
its
the
54(d)(1).
directs.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
The rule
City submitted a bill of costs to the district
provides
presumption
losing
the
In response,
argued
court.
Rivera
party
grants
will
costs but
the court
she should not
costs associated with
Although
discretion to direct otherwise.
litigation
the
because she is
To
specifically
Rule 54 does not
mention indi
support
indigence,
her claim of
Rivera sub-
gence,
speaks
the rule
of the district
assets, stating
mitted an affidavit of her
terms,
general
court’s discretion in
and
single
that she is a
mother of four chil-
certainly
prohibit
does not
a district court
dren,
month,
salary
per
earns a
of $1800
considering indigence
assigning
when
only
money
a nominal amount of
in her
losing party.
costs to a
account,
checking
stamps,
receives food
1983,
Since
this Court has held that it is
and has no other assets. The affidavit did
“within the discretion of the district court
expenses
list her
include the
plaintiffs
to consider a
indigency
deny-
$175,000judgment against
among
Morales
54(d).”
ing costs under Rule
Badillo v.
her assets. The district court found that
Co.,
1160,
Cent. Steel & Wire
717 F.2d
showing
Rivera made a
sufficient to dem-
(7th Cir.1983);
1165
see also Mother &
“indigency
inability
onstrate her
(7th
704,
Cassidy,
Father v.
338 F.3d
708
pay costs.”
Cir.2003);
Union,
Reed v. Int’l
945 F.2d
Analysis
(7th
198,
II.
Cir.1991); Congregation
204
Touche,
Co.,
Passion v.
Ross &
854 F.2d
City
arguments
ap-
makes two
on
(7th Cir.1988).
219, 222
Though
City
the
peal. First,
City requests
the
this Court
adopted
exception
asserts
that we
the
reexamine whether district courts
analysis
without
relying
without
on
losing party’s indigence
consider a
any prior precedent,
was a case of
Badillo
ruling on a
by
bill of costs submitted
impression
Court,
first
for this
and that is
prevailing party under Federal Rule of
why
precedent
no
opinion.
was cited
54(d)(1). Second,
City
Civil Procedure
In that
unambiguous
case we relied on the
argues that the district court abused its
54(d),
language of Rule
and held that the
City’s
discretion
denying the
motion for
power to award
costs is matter within
costs.
the sound discretion of the district court.
Badillo,
A. City argues support that we should argument of its that we cases, abolish the exception indigent that allows should reconsider the Badillo line of
635 ” Faulkner, claims.... v. 18 Court McGill F.3d City Supreme states that (7th Cir.1994).1 456, 460 exception adopted indigence has never 54(d). it is true that the While to Rule Finally, takes issue with the adopted such an has never Supreme Court exception indigence gives because dis- avail- it has not foreclosed its exception, trict courts unbounded discretion and en- Furthermore, seven other ability either. courages litigants por- of modest means to district courts consider permit circuits tray indigent they themselves as whether indigence when deter- losing party’s not, truly leading are or to fraud on the to award costs. See Rod mining whether concerns are policy district courts. These Farms, 1180, 360 F.3d riguez Whiting v. however, legitimate; the answer is not to (10th Cir.2004); Thomp v. Lampkins 1190 Rather, indigence exception. eliminate the (8th 1009, Cir.2003); son, F.3d 1017 337 provide the better course is to the district (2d Scully, 273 guidance considering courts with wheth- Whitfield Cir.2001); Tramp., v. AI Chapman an indigent party er hold liable for Cir.2000); In re F.3d Litig.,
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
F.3d
First,
*5
the district court must
(3d Cir.2000); Cherry Champion
462-68
finding
make a
factual
that the
threshold
(4th
442,
Int’l
186 F.3d
446
Cir.
Corp.,
losing party
of
“incapable
paying
is
the
Cal.,
1999); Stanley v. Univ.
178 F.3d
of S.
court-imposed costs at this time or in the
(9th Cir.1999).
1069,
Only one circuit
1079
McGill,
future.”
F.3d at 459.
18
The
expressly prohibited
district courts
losing party
provide
burden is on the
to
considering losing party’s indigence
from
court
the district
with “sufficient documen
54(d).
awarding costs under Rule
when
support
finding.” Chap
tation to
such a
Petree,
724,
McDonald v.
409 F.3d
732
See
man,
fied that she lives
If
an
express
opinion
we are to
on the
mother,
certainly
would
bear on
her
which
however,
subject,
I would not endorse our
City’s costs if she has
ability
her
practice,
my colleagues
current
as
do in
testi-
pay.
no rent to
Rivera also
little or
(I
opinion.
join
Part II.A of the court’s
do
Royce
that her
has not lived with
fied
son
II.B,
why a
explains
Part
which
remand is
years
Royce’s
and that
father
her for two
appropriate
ap-
under this
current
circuit’s
him.
supports
proach.)
It would
better to
award
full-time and has no
employed
Rivera is
(which is
“as of course”
what
Rule
Moreover,
problems
speak
of.
medical
says)
bankruptcy
question
and leave to
$175,000judgment against Mario
she has a
possible.
whether collection is
Discretion
currently
Morales is
Although
Morales.
against
be exercised
an award when
up
years
prison, Rivera has
seven
up
victor has run
costs or otherwise
against him. She
judgment
collect this
judicial process,
par-
abused the
but
a citation to discover
yet
has not
filed
good
relative wealth is not a
reason to
ties’
so she cannot claim that
Morales’ assets
winner, any
deny costs to the
more than a
satisfy
Morales has no assets with which
losing litigant’s indigence
good
would be a
judgment
in her favor. Given
damages
an award of
reason to withhold
court
provide
Rivera did not
the district
theft,
battery,
or breach of contract.
expenses
a schedule of
and did
with
If
with
indigent person
an
hits someone
finding
that she
identify any basis for
$1,000 loss,
the court
a car and causes
City’s costs
incapable
will be
$1,000
regard to the
will award
without
future,
point
at
in the
the district
some
indigent person
If an
hits
driver’s income.
denying
abused its discretion
a lawsuit and causes a
someone with
*7
City’s costs.
(in
defense),
$1,000
costs of
the same
loss
award of
consequence should ensue: an
III. Conclusion
award,
$1,000. For either
whether collec-
reasons, we
For the above stated
Vaoate
bankruptcy
question
tion occurs is
con-
proceedings
and Remand for further
exemptions).
law of
(including the state
opinion.
with this
sistent
pay
cannot
all creditors
When a debtor
full,
pay something,
in
can
there is no
but
EASTERBROOK,
Judge,
Circuit
litigants who are out
why prevailing
reason
concurring.
nothing
receive
while oth-
pocket
of
should
sensibly rejects Chicago’s pro-
The court
And when
valid claims.
er creditors retain
Badillo v. Central Steel
posal to overrule
pay
cannot
is so destitute
he
debtor
(7th
Co.,
Cir.1983),
of victorious court);
benefit creditors not before
justice must without be administered re-
gard persons. 54(d) together
Rule
must be read
with
§
U.S.C.
says
which
subsection
(a)(1)
litigant
that an impoverished
may
AEREE
re LINEE
ITALIANE
without
proceed
prepaying
filing
fees.
(ALITALIA), Petitioner.
Only
excused,
pre-payment
as
is
subsec-
No. 06-2935.
(f)(1)
tion
shows: “Judgment
be ren-
dered
costs at the
of the suit
conclusion
States
Appeals,
United
Court of
action
proceedings”.
as
other
All
Seventh Circuit.
fees,
filing
costs—which include the
see 28
1920(1)
§
U.S.C.
remain as debts of
Aug.
2006.
Submitted
—thus
side,
losing
paid
if and
Decided Nov.
2006.
resources are available.
McGill v.
See
Faulkner,
(7th Cir.1994);
dul-Wadood
Cir.1996).
Making the award of routine *8 (a)
three additional benefits: It avoids the
expense suit-by-suit inquiries into indi- which
gence, as this case shows
complex. Why replicate bankruptcy pro- just
ceeding to decide on an award of (b)
costs? It avoids positives. false Some
people indigent who claim to be aren’t.
Indeed, very indigent, “I’m assertion please implies solvency.
so excuse me” that,
Why you seek to avoid an if award (A destitute, you? pau-
are cannot harm who
per fears that could be award
