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United States v. Nicolas Gomez
763 F.3d 845
7th Cir.
2014
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*1 сondition health serious chronic Hansen’s which leave) bases on other were FMLA days on the unable to work him rendered favor of judgment upheld court require not does decision Our 654-57, question. WL Id. at defendant. merely costly trial through a go to FMG 3608698, *5-6. depres- his say-so that own Hansen’s on certifi- a medical produced has Hansen from work. him to be absent required sion fact issue of a material raises that cation his testimony about own to his addition issue. days at on incapacity to his as medical has Dr. Post’s incapacity, Hansen case this distinguishes The certification a serious health that he has certification where by FMG on relied from those flare-ups episodic cause will that condition sup- evidence no medical had employee job his performing from him prevent leave. FMLA to entitlement porting to necessary for him medically make and ex- leave requested Hansen’s Although Presumably, Dr. work. from absent and frequency estimated Dr. Post’s ceeds his accordance with testify in would Post request- duration, where as in Schaar credit jury will Whether certification. days of number exceeded leave ed his due incapacity of claims Hansen’s com- certified, the certification when to be remains July dates on the depression testimony own Hansen’s with bined weigh Hansen’s can jury decided. work- him from prevented depression his certification the medical testimony against has Hansen days question, ing on the provides Dr. testimony Post any issue a material to raise enough evidence Hansen’s from or detract may add to a reasonable would allow fact that of evidence, to claims, all the other along with Crowell, Dr. as in in his favor. And to find was entitled Hansen whether determine would Hansen Post’s certification July 2011 absences. his for leave FMLA pre- periodically flare-ups episodic func- job his performing venting him III. Conclusion un- he was finding support a could tions summary of grant court’s The district essential or more perform one able to the case is is Reveesed Re- judgment days he position his functions of proceedings consistent for further manded abun- be an may not There absent. was opinion. entitle- Hansen’s as to evidence dance of July for FMLA leave ment to raise enough

absences, there is Thus, reject of fact.

material issue med- no Hansen has argument that

FMG’s to substantiate ical documentation America, STATES UNITED ab- July 2011 his necessity of medical Plaintiff-Appellee, in combina- sences; Post’s certification Dr. just testimony do can Hansen’s tion with Defendant-Appellant. GOMEZ, Nicolas that. No. 12-1104. is- raises material Hansen’s was unable he as to whether of fact sue Appeals, Court United States job of his because functions perform Circuit. Seventh days he on the health condition his serious 11, 2013. Sept. Argued certifica- Dr. Post’s Although absent. 18, 2014. Aug. Decided July cover specifically tion does intermit- need absences, the certified finding that support could

tent leave *5 Fullerton, Attorney, Office D.

Stuart IL, Attorney, Chicago, United States Plaintiff-Appellee. Petro, Attorney, Michael Angela person’s J. M. character or to be- Rentz, IL, for Chicago, Defendant-Appel- have in a way. certain So-called “other act lant. evidence” is purposes, admissible for other however, see Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(2), WOOD, Judge, Before Chief here the district court admitted the evi- POSNER, BAUER, FLAUM, dence purpose for the of proving Gomez’s EASTERBROOK, KANNE, ROVNER, identity as Güero. SYKES, WILLIAMS, TINDER, and Gomez was convicted on all counts. On HAMILTON, Judges. Circuit appeal primarily he challenged the district SYKES, Judge. Circuit court’s decision to admit the other-act evi- agents suspected Federal Nicolas Go- 404(b)(2). dence under Rule A divided mez of involvement a cocaine-distribu- panel affirmed. We reheard the case en ring operating tion in Chicago and Milwau- clarify banc to the framework for admit- wiretap phones kee. A on the of Robert ting other-act evidence. We now conclude Romero, Chicago supplier, a known re- that our four-part circuit’s test should be vealed a reseller named “Güero” who lived replaced by an approach that closely more agents Milwaukee. The believed that tracks the Federal Rules of Evidence. Gomez was Güero. When Romero and Applying a here, rules-based framework Güero September scheduled a deal for we hold that the cocaine found Gomez’s agents followed Romero as he bedroom admitted, should not have been drove Chicago to Milwaukee and harmless, but the error was so we affirm parked his car on a street near Gomez’s the judgment. house. The two men had brief conversa- tion next to Romero’s car and then left the Background I. scene on day agents foot. Later that *6 In 2010 federal agents were investigat- seized Romero’s parked ear—still where Romero, ing a Chicago-based sup- cocaine

he had quarter left it—and a found kilo- plier. A wiretap phones on his revealed gram of in cocaine the trunk. Gomez was regularly he was conducting business arrested conspiracy and to Milwaukee, with a reseller in a man he distribute cocaine and related crimes. called “Güero” or “Guerito.” The cell At trial the introduced more phones registered Güero used were to a than 50 recorded telephone calls between residence at 2522 West Mineral Street in Romero detailing and Güero their cocaine Milwaukee where Gomez and his brother- in leading the months up to transactions (Other Reyes in-law people lived. lived in September 3. tying The evidence the calls too, the house although the record doesn’t to Gomez’s residence overwhelming, was them.) identify When Romero and Güero so his defense was that Güero must have arranged a cocaine phone, sale over the been Reyes, Victor his brother-in-law who GPS data tracked driving Romero from lived in the response same house. Chicago an alley to behind Gomez’s house government sought to introduce a small on Mineral Street. When several months quantity of cocaine found Gomez’s bed- of wiretap evidence established this trans- room at the time of his arrest. Gomez actional pattern, only thing left was to objected, 404(b)(1) citing Rule of the Fed- catch conspirators in the act. Evidence, eral Rules of prohibits which admission of crimes, evidence of other The opportunity September 2, came on wrongs, or acts for purpose of showing when Romero and Güero discussed a that the told Romero 3. Güero September September day. On following for the sale he was and that had been towed Gomez’s house out Mercedes agents staked DEA (The FBI number group of Milwaukee, separate phone. a a new cell using and Chicago left He agents Romero. DEA was deactivat- followed agents gave Gomez Milwaukee, Mercedes, drove asked day.) in a white Romero very When ed block and a a within on street parked and the “three happened after had Güero what groups of Both house. of Gomez’s a half responded Rey, El left Güero of [them]” a brief videorecorded and agents watched stopped had been that his brother-in-law Romero and Gomez between interaction driving away El while by police Mercedes. parked to the standing next Reyes. happened what Rey exactly— conversation, two men a short After when he had then asked Güero Romero and company hands, parted then shook by police, and and searched stopped been opposite directions. away walked while stopped that he explained was Güero DEA past him happened route took to Go- what walking exactly Gomez’s — to confirm his him stopped agents, who mez. an anti- part of Pretending to be identity. four weeks 29—almost September On and force, him down they patted gun task Gomez at agents arrested later —federal name, address, telephone and for his asked table were Go- the kitchen his home. On gave Gomez The number. number Güero had and the cell phone mez’s wallet arrange used to number Güero the same September 3. When using since been go let him agents day. the sale bedroom, they agents searched Gomez’s and walked home. Gomez filled with documents found a shoe box later, minutes FBI agents A few Gomez, including phone bill addressed green minivan as Gomez drove watched phones cell Güero had of the three for one up Romero. picked the street and down Although all September until up used Rey, El Mercado The two men drove to registerеd under were phones three cell store, grocery and nearby restaurant name, the cellular- Reyes’s records from (Gomez’s brother- Reyes they met where the billing confirmed provider service housemate). agent An FBI in-law to Gomez at addressed statements were pho- into the restaurant them followed Agents also Street. Mineral 2522 West con- meeting. Surveillance tographed cocaine quantity found small Rey and left El three men as the tinued *7 bed- in Gomez’s pants of pair a pocket of ways. separate went their room. in a tan Suburban Reyes away drove directly DEA by a to the brought identified stopped and was and Gomez was must’ve been in center Chica- processing and Romero agent. prisoner Gomez FBI’s of them returned him. neither spooked agents because interviewed where two go a took phone white to the Mercedes—Romero recorded three of the They played Chicago. Later way the describing taxi all back calls, including the one agents seized day the federal that identified 3. Gomez September events car A of the search Mercedes. abandoned all three. He as Güero own voice on his quarter a revealed headquarters at DEA conspiracy to charged with thereafter was in the hidden trunk. of cocaine kilogram distribute, cocaine with intent possess counts of three § and see U.S.C. following morning, аnd evening That a drug to facilitate using telephone a showed Romero phone calls recorded 843(b). crime, § see id. reviewing the events frantically Güero At trial the introduced more II. Discussion than phone 50 recorded calls and testimo- Admissibility A. The of Other-Act Evi- ny agents from various federal to establish dence just we’ve facts described. Gomez’s identity defense was mistaken claimed Rule prohibits the admission of —he simply that he wrong place was at crimes, evidence of other wrongs, or acts He wrong time. also that the argued purpose for the of proving person’s a char- government would never be able to show acter or to behave in a certain possession him in of cocaine. In response way, permits the but use of this evidence prosecutors sought to introduce small purposes: other quantity of cocaine found in Gomez’s bed- (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a room at the time of his arrest. Gomez crime, wrong, or other act is not admis- 404(b)(1) objected on grounds. prove person’s sible to character judge initially trial govern- denied the order to particular show that on a occa- ment’s request ultimately admitted the sion person acted accordance with evidence to show identity Gomez’s as Güe- the character. ro.1 In the end Gomez focused his defense (2) Uses; Permitted ... This evi- on attempting to raise reasonable doubt may dence be admissible for another government’s about the contention that he purpose, proving motive, such as oppor- Güero, arguing was likely more was intent, tunity, preparation, plan, knowl- Reyes was coconspirator. Romero’s edge, identity, mistake, absence of or He jurors reminded the Reyes lived lack of accident. same address and had also met with 404(b). Fed.R.Evid. September on Romero and that the cell phones used in regis- were conspiracy Our long circuit has four-part used a Reyes’s tered in jury name. The convict- test to determine when other-act evidence ed on all Gomez counts. is admissible: appeal

On primarily Gomez challenged To if determine such evidence is admis- the admission of the sible, other-act evidence— the district engage court must in a the cocaine found his bedroom on the four-pronged analysis and evaluate day (1) of his arrest —and also raised sen- whether evidence is directed to- tencing A issue. divided panel ward establishing a matter in issue oth- affirmed, court disagreement but the er than defendant’s propensity to to the evidentiary question. limited (2) Unit- commit the charged, crime the evi- Gomez, ed States dence shows that the other act is similar (7th Cir.2013); (Hamilton, id. 1159-63 enough and enough close in time to be J., dissenting). We the panel (3) vacated issue, relevant to the matter in opinion granted en banc rehearing evidence is sufficient support challenge Gomez’s to the admission of the finding the defendant committed *8 404(b). other-act evidence (4) under act, Rule the We similar and the probative now panel opinion reinstate the on the value of evidence is not substantially sentencing only issue and address Rule outweighed danger of prej- unfair 404(b) question. udice.

1. The court also allowed the longer other-act evi- no defends the admission purpose showing dence for the Gomez's of the purposes, evidence for these so we do knowledge and the absence of mistake. The not them address here.

853 in rele- 616, applying the practice and better F.2d 620 Zapata, 871 v. States United Cir.1989) vant rules ‍‌​​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​‌‍of evidence. v. (7th (citing States United (7th 776, Cir. 779 738 F.2d Shackleford, (Relevance) and 1. Rules 401 & 402 (4) (2), 1984) (1), of the test and parts for (Relevance on a 104 Conditioned States, U.S. v. United and Huddleston Fact) (1988), 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 681, 108 S.Ct. begin evidentiary All (3)). questions part for 402, general which contains in our commonplace Multipart tests are ad is “[r]elevant evidence principle useful, they can be but sometimes and law is and evidence “[irrelevant missible” legal principles stray or distract evidence 401 defines relevant not.” Rule implement; over designed they are (having probative is both as which creep law can of the misapplication time make a more or less “any tendency to fact when regrettable especially This in. the evi than it would be without probable roadmap clear a provides law itself (the dence”) “of fact must be material Rules of Evidence analysis, as the Federal action”). determining in consequence problem noted this do. We have generally four- 404(b) third factors our Espe- second context before. the Rule to the basic generally correlate one, part test other-act cases like this cially drug 402, 401 and inquiry under Rules relevance au- admitted almost is too often evidence rote apply with the but the rules do of the consideration tomatically, without Step inflexibility implies. the test purpose for of the which “legitimacy district court test directs the three for it.” and the need is to be used evidence of the whether the evidence to evaluate Miller, v. 673 F.3d States support act proffered other is sufficient (7th Cir.2012); States see also United commit- finding that the a defendant Cir.2006) Jones, 800, 812 if act is two asks the other Step it. ted J., a (Easterbrook, (“Allowing concurring) the con- enough to recent and similar both drug routinely to introduce prosecutor relevant in the case to duct in chief without in the case convictions (i.e., determining consequence “of to some concrete demonstrating relevance action”). F.2d Zapata, 871 See need- litigants creates between the dispute rest on the that a conviction will risk less “sufficiency” inqui three —the Step inference.”). More- forbidden 104(b), which ad from Rule ry—flows here, over, aspects explain we some as a fact: conditioned dresses relevance basis in the adequate lack an our test depends of evidence relevance “When rules. exists, must be proof a fact on whether finding support introduced sufficient evaluating test for four-part Our does exist.” the fact has Fed.R.Evid. admissibility of other-act evidence States, 104(b).2 v. United In Huddleston it in We now abandon to be useful. ceased whether considered Supreme Court rules- straightforward more of a favor re of other-act the admission change is less This approach. based court finding by the quires preliminary a shift in modification than substantive prepon- proved by has been clarity that the act produce hope that we will paradigm stylistic, purely so to be guage intended slightly was different 2. The text of Rule States, text. Fed.R.Evid. 104 quote the current of Huddleston v. United at the time (2011 amend- advisory committee's notes 99 L.Ed.2d U.S. 108 S.Ct. *9 ments). (1988), lan- change the but the to current 854 682, the evidence. at ‘sufficiently idiosyncratic

derance of 485 U.S. two crimes ” 1496. The Court i permit pattern.’ 108 S.Ct. held an inference of Id. at 498 t 689, Thomas, (quoting does not. Id. at 108 S.Ct. 1496. Re United States v. 321 (7th 627, Cir.2003)). lying principle on the default that relevant F.3d 634-35 Some- speci prior evidence is admissible unless rule times the may bad act be too dissimi- otherwise, fies the Court concluded that lar to relevant show а distinctive history or nothing pattern, only the text of Rules 104 leaving the forbidden propen- 404(b) requires judge or to find that sity inference. Id. proved proponent has the other act hand, On the other the need to check for may before the evidence be admitted. Id. similarity recency and may be substantial- 687-89, Although 108 S.Ct. 1496. ly diminished or nonexistent depending on preliminary by finding judge is not particular purpose for which the evi- required admissibility, as a condition of dence is offered. See United v. States emphasized Court that other-act evidence Torres, (7th 321, Cir.1992); 977 F.2d 326 may not be admitted unless the evidence is 1273, United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d sufficient for the to find a prepon (7th Cir.1987). 1277 In some cases the derance of the the other act relative similarity of the other act to the 689-90, committed. Id. 108 S.Ct. charged may offense be unimportant as a requirement 1496. This remains in full See, Foster, test of e.g., relevance. 652 force as a condition of relevance. F.3d at 785-86 (holding similarity that the of the other-act evidence to test, Step two of the which re exceedingly offense was “of signif- minimal quires inquiry an into similarity and icance” when prior evidence of a check- act, timing loosely of the other connect cashing scheme was introduced to show ed to principles the basic of relevance relationship criminal between the defen- found in 401 Rules and 402. See United dant and his accomplice an аrmed bank Foster, (7th 776,

States v. 652 F.3d 785-86 robbery); Shriver, United States v. Cir.2011) (explaining that comparison “the (7th Cir.1988) 968, (same F.2d prior [the defendánt’s] acts to the motive). respect this, Recognizing charged crimes” is “directed at establish repeatedly said that “similarity” 404(b) evidence”) ing relevancy of the requirement for admitting other-act evi- (citing Lloyd, States v. 71 F.3d Foster, dence “unduly is not rigid,” (7th 1256, Cir.1995)). 1264-65 But 785, F.3d at “loosely instead is inter- strength inquiry of this varies depending preted applied,” United States v. Var- particular on the theory of admissibility. (7th Cir.2008). gas, 552 F.3d example, For one permissible purpose for the introduction of other-act evidence is to Our discussion thus far should illustrate prove a identity defendant’s through problem treating “similarity” “distinctive operation, manner of or modus and “timing” factors as formal boxes to operandi.” United Simpson, States v. 479 check in the admissibility analysis. It’s far (7th Cir.2007), F.3d 497-98 abrogated tempting stop too at superficial compar- part grounds by other United States meaningfully isons without analyzing how Boone, Cir.2010). similarity recency prior of the bad A prior act will be relevant to this purpose act affect unique its relevance in the cir- “ when it ‘bears a singular strong resem cumstances of the case. And the similari- blance to the pattern of ty the offense and timing may of the other act charged’ with the similarities between the bear on the question relevance at all. We *10 simultaneously return to a framework that condemns besmirching think it bеst to character by showing the relevance of other-act evidence and one or more of weighs ‘motive, intent, directly. opportunity, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of principle positive To restate ”). mistake or accident’.... In the crimi- proffered extent to which a terms: The context, especially cases, nal and in drug crime, wrong, or act” is close “other criminal few defendants are activity new to time and similar to the conduct at issue range and the of possible fairly defenses is bearing on its may the case rele limited, so at of permitted least three vance, starting point which is the for all purposes listed in the in- knowledge, rule-— importance of questions, evidence but the tent, identity routinely and in play. —are similarity recency will de testing for Because other-act evidence can serve pend purpose on the for which the specific once, purposes evidentiary several dis The propo other-act evidence is offered. 404(b) putes under Rule often raise the other-act evidence should ad nent of the following question: permissible Does ul directly, without the dress its relevance purpose (say, proof timate of the defen of an artificial checklist. straightjacket intent) dant’s or knowledge cleanse an 404(b) 2. Rule impermissible subsidiary purpose (propen sity)? On thе surface the rule seems to 404(b) excludes relevant evidence (b)(2) if permit this. But subsection crimes, if wrongs, of other or acts the rule allows the admission of other bad purpose person’s is to show a propensity they acts whenever can be connected to way, in a behave certain but other-act intent, knowledge, the defendant’s or may evidence be admitted for “another (or identity plausible non-pro some other to, including, not purpose” but limited pensity purpose), against then the bar motive, intent, “proving opportunity, prep- propensity virtually evidence would be aration, knowledge, identity, plan, absence mistake, meaningless. point We have made this or lack of accident.” Fed. See, 404(b). e.g., before. United States straightfor- The rule is R.Evid. McMillan, 744 F.3d Cir. enough, but confusion because ward arises 2014); Miller, admissibility keyed (explaining purpose to the offered, “if applied mechanically,” permit which the evidence is and other- usually purposes act ted listed in the rule “would ov capable being evidence is of the rule multiple purposes, principle” used for one of which is erwhelm the central (quoting propensity.3 Beasley, against propensity See 809 F.2d at evidence 1279)). (“Almost any Beasley, act 809 F.2d at 1279-80 bad i.e., different, misconception non-propensity 3. A common about Rule use. evidence— 404(b)(2). technically it's in- is that it establishes a rule оf exclusion So Fed.R.Evid. subject exceptions. quite purposes listed in to certain That's not correct to characterize (2) right. say "exceptions” to the rule of The text of the rule does not subsection as (1). propensity except of Evidence do evidence is inadmissible subsection The Rules motive, exceptions prove opportunity, true to the rule when it is used to intent, contain some Rather, evidence, says against they’re propensity found etc. notably through prove in Rules 412 evidence—other-act evidence offered to elsewhere— person’s inviting an inference which are limited to sexual-assault cases. character contrast, conformity purposes enumerated in subsec- that he acted in therewith —is cat- (2) 404(b) simply identify egorically tion of Rule situa- inadmissible. Fed.R.Evid. (1) 404(b)(1). by its acknowledges But the tions in which the rule of subsection rule also apply. may terms that there be "another” use for other-act does *11 evi- sity theory that makes the other-act this inherent tension To resolve asking how specifically that it’s not dence relevant and rule, have cautioned in the we particular of the other-act the evidence tends to make proponent the enough for probable. more or less point purpose consequence to to a fact of simply evidence Ciesiolka, v. example, and assert that For Unitеd States 'list “permitted” evidence, (7th 347, Cir.2010), it. we noted relevant to Rule 614 F.3d 355 is other-act 404(b) precisely ulti with the that it was critical to “delineate just concerned is conclusion, legitimate with the chain of ends to which the evidence but also mate explained In Miller we supports non-propensi applied.” that could be reasoning admitting specifical- the evidence. that the court should ask “more ty for purpose Reed, 519, evidence is relevant ly v. 744 F.3d 524- how” other-act United States Lee, (7th Cir.2014); help v. in order to permitted purpose United States 25 968, Cir.2013); impermissible Mil uses of other-act evi- expose 724 976-77 F.3d words, ler, pure propensity purposes. In other 673 673 F.3d at 697-98. dence Richards, evi v. rule allows the use of other-act F.3d at 699. ‍‌​​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​‌‍United States (7th Cir.2013), only supported its admission is 719 F.3d 746 we said dence when specifi- chain of reason must consider by propensity-free court[ ] the “district some (“When Lee, cally prior F.3d at 978 one how the conviction tends to ing. purposes non-propensity exception.” for which the Id. beyond looks serve (internal being quotation offered and considers at marks and alter- evidence is omitted). jury being explained inferences the is asked ations And Lee we what evidence, by and what the chain of from that that the court must “consider draw logic, logic by jury being chain of it will sometimes become which the is asked to label, intent, jury despite glean knowledge, cleаr ... the defendant’s rely etc., the evi essentially being proof prior asked to of his misdeeds.” proof propensi dence as of the defendant’s 724 F.3d at 976-77. offense.”); ty to commit the Mil emerges from these principle ler, 697-99; v. 673 F.3d United States the district court recent cases is (7th Cir.2004), Jones, 753, 757 389 F.3d just proposed should not ask whether the grounds by

vacated on Jones other is relevant to a non- other-act evidence States, 1125, 125 S.Ct. U.S. exactly the propensity purpose but how (2005). 2948, This is not 162 L.Ed.2d 864 purpose relevant to that evidence is —or say that other-act evidence must be specifically, more how the evidence is rele- propensity inference excluded whenever relying propensity vant without on a infer- drawn; rather, can ex questions ence. Careful attention to these evidence if its relevance to “an cludes the help identify evidence that serves no will only through purpose” other is established permissible purpose. propensity the forbidden inference. 3. Rule 403 Spotting a hidden infer Jones, Finally, even if other-act evi always easy. is not See ence reason, relying on a although pro at 757. For this dence is relevant without F.3d inference, may be excluded un required pensity the record to reflect a long full applies “with by exercise of discretion” der Rule which “principled Miller, context, court, Beasley, district 809 F.2d at force” court discretion reсently gives the district emphasized we have more if proba- exclude relevant evidence its importance identifying non-propen- by of a firearm a fel- “substantially outweighed possession unlawful tive value is on). course, there are prejudice,” degrees ... unfair Of various danger of Fed. trial, raises in a disagreement stip- R.Evid. 403. Other-act of factual prejudice unfair be- concerns about special spectrum. ulations are at one end of that some risk always it almost carries cause generally 2 Imwinrelried, See EdwáRD J. Uncharged pro- draw the forbidden that the will §§ 8:10— Misoonduct Evidenoe *12 Lee, 724 F.3d at inference.4 See pensity (2004) (reviewing 15 various forms of dis- preju- “inherent risk of (describing 976 the their agreement and effect on the admissi- to the defen- poses that such evidence dice evidence). bility of other-act Because each dant”). heavy does much of the 403 unique, balancing case is Rule 403 is a admissibility analysis by ex- lifting highly context-specific inquiry; there are may be cluding other-act evidence Miller, categorical few rules. See 673 through non-propensi- a slightly probative at general guiding prin- F.3d 696-97. The theory high a likelihood of ty but has ciple degree is to which the non- by leading jury a creating prejudice unfair actually disputed issue is propensity. conclusions based on draw probative case will affect the value of the Miller, (explaining F.3d at 697 See 673 othеr-act evidence. See United v. States “all acts evidence that under Rule 403 bad 310, Cir.2014); Causey, 748 F.3d 318 probative for value and must balanced Lee, 976; Miller, 724 at at F.3d 673 F.3d Chap- v. prejudice”); unfair United States 696-97. (7th Cir.2012) man, 822, 827 hand, On the other there are a few (“The al- evidence [other-act] admission say discrete circumstances in which we can ways with it some risk of unfair carries categorical as a matter that other-act evi defendant, but the critical prejudice to the substantially prejudicial more dence is sufficiently issue is whether that risk is factors.”). probative. Supreme than The de Court’s outweighed by other There, example. cision in Old is one Chief degree i. The to which unlawful the defendant was a fact contested is possession by of a firearm a felon and stipulate offered to to his status as a felon important issue in Rule One learning the de prevent balancing in this context is the extent prior govern tails of his conviction. The factual non-propensity propo to which the rejected stipulate, ment his offer to actually sition is contested the case. permitted prosecutor the district court example, For if a defendant offers to con prior to introduce the conviction over the stipulate cede or to the fact for which the offered, objection. 519 evidence additional evidence defendant’s Rule 403 U.S. is See, 177-78, 117 may probative e.g., little value. at 644. have S.Ct. States, 519 U.S.

Old Chief reversed. Id. 191-92, Supreme Court 136 L.Ed.2d 574 S.Ct. (1997) began by 117 S.Ct. 644. The Court (holding stipula that a defendant’s “familiar, rule prior felony acknowledging standard tion to conviction removes prove its probative prosecution prosecution its value in a that the is entitled to senting gives 4. cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid Rule 403 also the court discretion probative val- may implicate exclude relevant evidence if its 403. Other-act evidence these substantially outweighed by danger well, ue is prob- concerns as but the more common issues, “confusing misleading jury, prejudice. lem is the risk of unfair time, delay, wasting needlessly pre- undue or or, choice, necessarily govern- in issue and the own of its case may evidence of other acts ment submit a criminal defendant exactly, that more the matter in attempt in an to establish way or admit his out of stipulate may not case-in-chief, assuming the other re- its evidentiary force of the case as full quirements of Rules and 403 are present it.” Id. at chooses Government hand, On the other satisfied.... 186-87, But when a defen- 644. S.Ct. only that when intent is stated a felon is an element of dant’s status as issue, pro- proof so that to that stipulate he offers to offense and formal gives scribed act rise to an fact, his conviction prior the evidence of inference of intent, then unless the has value, leaving only probative loses its that the defense will reason to believe prejudice. risk of unfair Id. substantial issue, raise intent an evidence of oth- as 191-92, specific S.Ct. this issue should er acts directed toward situation, its court abuses discre- district *13 government’s in case-in- not be used admitting prior the details of the tion in until chief and should not be admitted Id. conviction. the defendant raises the issue. requires special also Our circuit added). (emphasis 738 F.2d at 781 other-act evidence is offered caution when specific-intent/general-in intent, though permissi a prove which in context tent distinction the Rule purpose nonetheless non-propensity is ble sometimes The critical is misunderstood. improper likely pro “most to blend crimes, point general-intent is that for Miller, at In uses.” 673 F.3d 698. pensity defendant’s intent can be inferred from the involving general-intent e.g., cases crimes — itself, “automatically” act so intent is not (as offenses distinct from drug-distribution a paradigm at issue. The case involves possession drugs drug conspiracies or Hicks, charge drugs, of distribution of see distribute) have with intent —we 1070-71, a crime general-intent 635 F.3d at a rule that other-act evidence is adopted government only for need show which to show intent unless the not admissible physically that the defendant transferred puts beyond intent “at issue” defendant drugs; can infer from that act See, general guilt. e.g., denial of United that the defendant’s intent was to distrib Hicks, 1063, 635 F.3d 1070-71 States v. ute them. Hence our rule that “[b]eeause (7th Cir.2011); Shackleford, at 738 F.2d gener is a drugs] [оf unlawful distribution 781, part grounds by in on other overruled crime, govern al intent in order for the States, 681, Huddleston v. United 485 U.S. prior ment to introduce bad acts to show 108 S.Ct. 99 L.Ed.2d Our most intent, put the defendant must his intent at complete explanation of this rule comes Id.; issue first.” see also States v. United from Shackleford: (7th Manganellis, 864 F.2d 539 Cir. previously distinguished have be- We 1988). in tween situations which intent is contrast, repeatedly government issue because the must we have rejected specific-intent for specific show intent as an essential ele- a similar rule of cases “in ment of the crime and when intent is crimes because this class only automatically at formal issue can be inferred tent is issue.” Conner, act. from the When the crime States Cir.2009) cases). intent, proof specific (collecting we Unfortunate requires that, frequently too has ly, precedent held because it is material ele- line of by government, ment to it seen as a rule of automatic admission proved be been specific- substantially outweighed by must not be other-act evidence eases Lee, 981; prejudice. of unfair again, risk And crimes. See 724 F.3d.at intent degree non-propensity to which the Miller, firmly F.3d at 698-99. We actually may issue is Miller, contested have a rejected emphasizing that notion in bearing probative value of the oth- subject always evidence is other-act er-act evidence. balancing. F.3d at 696-98. to Rule 403 “[ijntent although can explained We on, moving pause Before we to note a an ‘automatically issue’ because is point government raised that one of crime,” specific element of a intent other- suggest our recent cases could be read to prove act evidence offered to intent “can generally applicable rule that other-act evi- issue, completely irrelevant to that still be may dence not be admitted unless the only impermissible way.” in an or relevant “meaningfully dispute[s]” defendant Id. at 697-98. We have reiterated these non-propensity issue for which the evi- See, e.g., Richards, themes in other recent cases. dence is offered. 719 F.3d at Lee, 697). Miller, (“Simply 724 F.3d at 976 because a (citing 673 F.3d at Rich- that, subject formally actually like intent is issue ards never held for clari- sake, ty’s when the defendant has claimed innocence reiterate there is no categorical such prerequisite, rule or obliged prove and the his to adopt Nothing we decline one now. guilt intent as an element of his does not supports imposing the Rules of Evidence automatically open proof the door to of the *14 a prerequisite such universal to the admis- wrongful pur- defendant’s other acts for Indeed, sion of other-act evidence. intent.”); poses establishing of his advisory explicitly disapproves committee Earls, ‍‌​​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​‌‍466, 471 States any requirement generаl of of this sort. (“Rule Cir.2012) 404(b) provide does not a advisory See Fed.R.Evid. 401 committee’s rule of automatic admission whenever bad (1972) (“The *15 Fed.R.Evid. rely on the forbidden inference that limine are common even in the absence of in person has a certain character and acted request a defense for notice. As soon as it character, that on the oc- accordance with may becomes clear that other-act evidence charged propo- casion in case. If the case, part prosecution’s of the the dis showing, can initial nent make this judge trict should raise with the defendant every in assess district court must case in limiting whether the defense wants a -probative whether the value of other- (since requires struction Rule 105 it to be substantially outweighed by act evidence is and, so, if given request) what kind. prejudice may the risk of unfair ex- if clude the evidence under Rule 403 given, limiting in When great. risk is too The court’s Rule 403 to the case struction should be customized (“A balancing should take account of the ex- boilerplate. than rather Id. 811-12 non-propensity tent to which the fact for good limiting instruction needs to be con actually which the evidence is offered is at it jury crete so that the understands what evidence.”). issue in the case. legitimately may do with the “effectively distinguish appro In order to Jury ii. instructions inferences,” priate inappropriate id. 812, lan jurors plain should be told Appropriate instructions may prej- guage specific purpose to unfair for which the help reduce the risk of Application they B. offered and should Rules-Based evidence is about the defen- Framework any not draw conclusions particu- that on a character or infer dant’s Here, gov- the district court allowed the in accor- lar occasion the defendant acted ernment to use the evidence of the user a character trait. Our circuit’s dance with quantity of cocaine found in Gomez’s bed- Jury good 3.11 is a Pattern Instruction room for the purpose proving his identi- it needs customization starting point, but error, ty as That Güero. but for particular for the case. reasons explain, we will the error was harmless. Moreover, we see no reason to keep jury in the dark about the ratio Only 1. The Evidence Was Relevant rule infer against propensity nale for the Through Propensity Inference of under Lay people capable ences. are proponent Because the of the in our standing principle the foundational explain other-act how it is evidence must cases, system justice try that “we rather a non-propensity purpose, relevant to Allen, 429 Mich. persons.” People than government needed a rationale for con (1988); 420 N.W.2d see also necting the cocaine fоund Gomez’s bed Linares, States v. identity room to rely his as Güero without (D.C.Cir.2004) (explaining that a com ing on the forbidden inference. of innocence is ponent presumption of the discussed, accepted way As we’ve one to tried for what that “a defendant must be prove identity use other-act evidence to did, is”); 1 Imwinkel- he not for who he argue perpetrator that the had a dis (2004) § supra, (explaining 1:3 RIED, operandi. suggests tinctive modus Gomez against propensity rule “identity” limit we should uses of guards against temptation “pe the illicit theory. other-act evidence to this We see past for or her nalize the defendant his Indeed, pre no reason to do so. we have misdeeds”). limiting The court’s instruc viously operandi said that modus is not the if it tion would be more effective told the theory admitting other acts to exclusive

jurors they not use the must other-act prove identity. Simpson, 479 F.3d at 498. has a evidence to infer that the defendant Accordingly, reject Gomez’s invitation “in certain character and acted character” ways other- artificially limit the which present case because does not prove act evidence can be admitted past acts that follow from the defendant’s time, however, identity. At the same particular crime he committed the identity does not defense of mistaken *16 in case. the give government green light the itself use other-act evidence.

Finally, the instruction would be identity theory of rele improved by tying limiting principle support the To its here, government of The vance the relies on two prosecution’s proof. the burden jurors gov in other-act evidence was ad should be reminded that the eases which duty beyond response a rea mitted in to a defense of mistak prove ernment’s is to Brown, every specific identity: the en States v. 471 sonable doubt element of (7th Cir.2006), States charged, discharge crime and it cannot its F.3d 802 and United (7th Cir.1999). Gibson, that the F.3d 673 inviting burden an inference There, the defen past sug inapplicable. acts Brown is person defendant is whose in a alleged participated to commit dant was to have gest willingness propensity or interrupted by that was drug crimes. transaction scene, opposite that reached the identical case but another He fled the police. charged with Simpson conclusion. was apprehended in the deal was man involved cocaine, in his de- selling and as Gibson law enforce cooperate with agreed to identity. govern- The was mistaken fense cooperator at 804. The ment. Simpson’s introduced statement ment drug buyer who Brown as identified deal- admitting the FBI that he had been police arrived. when fled the scene years leading or four ing cocaine for three identity— was mistaken Brown’s defense charged crime. We held up to the nothing do with that he hаd he claimed admitted to improperly this evidence was specific occa on this cooperator —not only be identity because it could prove Id. at In any other time. 806. sion or by way imper- of an relevant to that issue introduced evi government response at 497- propensity inference. Id. missible purchased drugs had that Brown dence by highlight- distinguished 98. We Gibson many occa cooperator prior from the specifically pointed ing that Gibson had this use of other-act approved sions. We finger culprit at an alternative it undercut Brown’s evidence because —his history drug of brother —and Gibson’s lying. Id. that the was cooperator claim likely that he—not dealing made it more admissibility theory of The basic drug dealer. Id. at his brother —was the of other transac in Brown—that evidence contrast, Simpson argued n. 1. In more a witness the defendant and tions between wrong had the generally police the witness’s iden is admissible to bolster guy. Id. participant of the defendant as a tification Gibson, Here, in mistaken- as Gomez’s a distinct charged in the transaction —is per- another identity singled defense out widely acknowledged theory of admis son—his brother-in-law and housemate 404(b). sibility under Rule See ImwinK- Reyes the “real” Güero. The Victor —as (2006). § But it has no supra, 3:7 elRied, government quantity introduced the user evi application in this case. other-act cocaine found in Gomez’s bedroom fоr quantity of cocaine dence here —a user showing that as between purpose days after found in Gomez’s bedroom 26 two, likely it was more that Gomez was not conspiracy ended—did serve If the distinction drawn Güero. purpose. valid, Simpson is then Gibson controls as point. is more on was Gibson Gibson closely analogous precedent. the more distributing cocaine up. not hold But the distinction does him, that it His defense was supposed on a Simpson relied difference brother, In re- his who sold the cocaine. propensity evidence probative value of sponse introduced Gib- mistaken-identity focuses when a defense FBI that postarrest son’s statement to the rather particular suspect on a alternative regularly he sold cocaine 1994to identity gen- more arguing than mistaken (he in the particular denied involvement erally. But Rule does not allow case). in the upheld sale at issue We probative evidence when it is propensity prosecution’s use of Gibson’s statement evidence as a enough; bars history drug dealing about his “because Gibson, just as categorical matter. *17 at trial was that of primary his defense of the defendant’s Simpson, the evidence Gibson, at identity.” mistaken 170 F.3d history dealing prove tended to his drug of in the identity participant as a only by way pro- a forbidden square drug is hard to with United deal of Gibson dealer, drug al- 492, nearly pensity inferencе: Once Simpson, States v. 479 F.3d

863 in been involved the cocaine-distribution Simpson and ways drug dealer. Gibson conspiracy. The district court should not now conclude cannot reconciled. We have admitted this evidence. recent did not survive our that Gibson in and Lee. decisions Miller 2. The Error Harmless Was yet example is another of This case subject Evidentiary errors are exactly pro- asking how importance to review for harmlessness. See Fed. evidence is relevant with- posed other-act 52(a); McMillan, 744 F.3d R.CRIM.P. govern- relying propensity. out on The 1034; v. Vargas, United States 689 F.3d in ment maintains that the cocaine found (7th Cir.2012). 867, context, 875 was admissible because Gomez’s bedroom whether, test for harmless error is “[t]he probable it made it more that Gomez—not average juror, pros the mind of the just say Reyes Güero. But that is —was significant ecution’s case would have been relevant; it that the evidence is doesn’t tell ly persuasive improper less had the evi pro- in a us how the evidence is relevant Vargas, dence been excluded.” 689 F.3d way. pivotal ques- pensity-free On (citing Loughry, at 875 United States v. tion, government has little to offer. (7th 965, Cir.2011)). 660 F.3d The argue If there had been some basis identifying Gomez as Güero was that the cocaine in Gomez’s bedroom was quite compelling and would not have been product conspiracy, of the then so had the other-act evidence been less might qualified as direct evidence excluded. drug participation Gomez’s Romero’s First, Romero addressed his coconspira- ring apply. would not See and tor as “Güero” in numerous recorded Phillips, 745 F.3d United States calls, phone confirming always that it was (7th Cir.2014); United States v. person the same end of the on other Adams, Cir.2010); 628 F.3d in the leading up Sep- line months to the Alviar, States v. tember 3 transaction. GPS data showed (7th Cir.2009). But government driving alley Romero to the Go- behind argument, good doesn’t make that rea- arranging mez’s house after sales with son. The cocaine in Gomez’s room was a September again Güero. On Romero quantity; pure small user it was half as as arrange called a cocaine sale for Güero quarter kilogram of cocaine found in day. the next Romero drove to Milwaukee car; it was almost Romero’s and recovered September planned parked 3 as his four weeks after Romero and Gomez house, near consistent Mercedes Gomez’s doing together. ceased business past practice. agents Federal ob- end, In the offers no videorecording captured served—and a —a theory other than to connect conversation brief between Gomez and the cocaine found Gomez’s bedroom to they Romero as stood next to the Mer- Güero, identity coconspir- his as Romero’s Importantly, cedes. the two men when аtor. government’s theory sole is that parted company oppo- and left on foot possession quantity Gomez’s of a user directions, Gomez, agents stopped site days conspiracy cocaine 26 ended identification, gave he asked for his after he, Reyes, shows that rather than phone them the same number that Güero argument extraordinarily That day. Güero. up had used to set the sale that weak, important point but the more is that day agents Later seized and pure propensity: it rests on Because Go- the abandoned Mercedes and searched in the possessed quantity quarter kilogram mez a small of cocaine found a of cocaine arrest, trunk. the time of his he must have *18 Gomez, Reyes. not happened evidence cor- know that Next, jury heard other the call Romero phone Earlier that same identity as Güero. roborating Gomez’s Reyes, and happened asked Güero what Güero used were phones The three cell an in the responded Güero with account on Mineral Street to the house registered happened about what to his person third Reyes, with but the that shared Gomez after the three men left El brother-in-law address, at that bills sent to Gomez were Rey.5 Finally, when Gomezwas arrested in a box in his of the bills and he had one nearly con- his home four weeks after the True, phones the could be bedroom. еnded, his wallet was found on the spiracy too, joined Reyes Reyes and linked to right phone next to the Güe- kitchen table meeting the at El and Gomez at Romero September ro had used since stopped and Rey after Gomez short, prosecution’s the case was agents. DEA So it’s no won- searched strong any and would not have been less pointing defense on der focused his Gomez had the other-act evidence been persuasive Reyes. the finger at least it would not have excluded—or persuasive less in the significantly been convincingly refuted But other evidence average juror. the The link be- mind of theory Reyes During that was Güero. quantity the small of cocaine found tween interview, federal postarrest Gomez’s identity bedroom his as Gomez’s and agents played several of the recorded weak; extremely govern- Güero was him, including that phone calls for one took really never articulated a coher- ment has cocaine sale on place after the aborted theory why helped ent this evidence its that September 3. Gomez admitted Guero’s Excluding case. it not have serious- would recordings on the was his. This voice ly strength prosecu- of the diminished own, quite powerful admission is on its against tion’s case Gomez. We’re satisfied challenged agents’ because Gomez that the error was harmless. on with our credibility, press we harmless- Affirmеd. analysis. error See States v. Rob- (7th Cir.2013). inson, HAMILTON, Judge, joined by Circuit WOOD, Judge, Chief and ROVNER and phone September In a recorded call on WILLIAMS, Judges, concurring in Circuit retracing previous day, the events of the part dissenting part. -person in the how Güero describes first away him as he police stopped walked agrees unanimously The en banc court Romero; by admitting from his conversation with that the district court erred dissenting colleagues object stop 5. Our that that occurred—that occurred to him press interpretation exactly day way happened did not that same September phone jury. of the call before the day. to Nicolas Gomez that no coinci- It's disagree. prosecutor We It's true did dence because Nicolas Gomez is Güero. specifically agents' stop calls, contrast The context of these combined with (on foot) (in car). Reyes Gomez his But evidence, just the other one more kind of is prosecutor September discussed proof that Nicolas Gomez was Roberto phone closing argument, call detail in in some partner calls. Romero’s in all of these explaining that: evidence, touching After on some of the other point, telling prosecutor to this call, returned says- another Call [I]n Gomez —(cid:127) beyond jurors they confident could be Gomez tells Romero that Gomez had been a reasonable doubt that Gomez was Güero stopped walking when he was and had post-stop phone of the context of the "because turned the corner. Now it’s no coincidence Güero, things about phone [Güero] the man calls where talks on this Romero, telling only happened Roberto Romero about a to Nicolas Gomez.” *19 404(b) charged the evidence that Gomez the indictment. The under Rule reason of a small amount of possession is that the defendant is on trial here for nearly four weeks after cocaine specific charges conspiracy of to possess charged conspiracy ended. Its admission cocaine with intent to distribute and us justified any on of the three was not ing telephone to facilitate a drug by court and grounds accepted the district crime. He is-not on trial for those other jury. argued by government to the It government’s acts. is the burden to Sykes’ opinion for the court on the Judge prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 404(b) question merits of the Rule takes specific charged elements of the crimes clarify important steps and welcome this government here. The cannot meet its area of evidence law. See troublesome by inviting you burden to infer that the Gomez, 712 generally United States v. person defendant is a whose past acts (7th Cir.2013) (Hamil- F.3d 1159-63 suggest he has a bad character or a ton, J., dissenting). join I therefore Parts tendency to commit crimes. Sykes’ opinion. II-B-1 Judge II-A and of Nevertheless, after having done so much joining opinion also take Those this this improve our circuit’s law under Rule opportunity provide example an of the 404(b), majority the en banc still affirms instruction that should type be despite Gomez’s conviction the serious given properly when evidence is admitted 404(b) majority Rule error. The does so 404(b). the facts Suppose under Rule here that finding the Rule error was (1) that Suppose had been different. Go- harmless, in Part II-B-2 of opinion. its possessed quan- mez had later a wholesale this resulting From conclusion and the af- tity purity of cocaine of the same as the (2) firmance, I respectfully dissent. conspiracy, involved in the that We cocaine government had shown that the co- should reverse this conviction and remand probative caine would be of Gomez’s iden- highly prejudi- for a new trial without the (3) tity unfairly prejudicial, and not erroneously cial evidence admitted under limiting the defendant wanted a in- 404(b). good struction. A instruction consistent sure, government’s To be case with our circuit’s Pattern Instruction 3.11 person against the called “Güero” was air- would be: tight. gov- But was Gomez “Güero”? testimony You have heard ernment offered substantial evidence defendant committed acts other than the But that not he was. evidence is as clear charged ones in the indictment. Before contends, majority particularly as the evidence, using you must decide keep requirement when we view the likely it more than not that whether beyond proof a reasonable doubt. The the defendant took the actions that are applicable standard for harmless error is you in the indictment. If provided by Federal Rule of Criminal Pro- did, you may decide that he then consid 52(a), the court to requires cedure which help you er that evidence to decide disregard an error that “does not affect whether the defendant was the same rights.” is on the substantial The burden person as the one called “Güero.” You the error here show may any not consider this evidence Olano, was harmless. United States purpose. specific, you other To more 725, 734, 507 U.S. 113 S.Ct. that, may not infer because defen (1993); States v. Pat- L.Ed.2d 508 past, dant committed an act he Cir.1994). terson, 1239, must committed the crimes error, let’s consider the September harmless So finding To avoid that, remand, indicating that Güe- government’s “need not show defendant *20 him a second ro Gomez rather than his brother-in- not convict was jury would Richards, Reyes, who lived the same v. 719 law Victor time.” United States Cir.2013). (7th meeting 746, Even house and who was also observed F.3d 765-66 Romero, supplier, September on “probably” still would with the where the ‍‌​​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​‌‍defendant im convicted in the absence of have been evidence, error is proper agent linguist An FBI and a testified proper necessarily harmless. Id. The not phone recorded they played three juror an average is “whether question they for when interviewed him calls Gomez signifi case prosecution’s

would find arrest, and that he identified his after his improp cantly persuasive less without That voice as Güero on those calls. own Miller, States v. er evidence.” United testimony entirely on the credibil- depends (7th Cir.2012); see Kot F.3d also ity agents, They however. of the federal States, 750, 765, 328 U.S. tealcos United by did not record this critical admission (1946) (in case 66 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed. orally writing. testimo- or Such Gomez error, question is of non-constitutional ny law enforcement officers is from federal say fair assurance” whether we can “with evidence, course, substantial substantially swayed that verdict was not required was not to believe it. error). Reyes, phys- As between Gomez and 404(b) can Because Rule evidence be so ical evidence found the search was am- powerful prejudicial, we have found one the cell biguous. agents The found improper drug admission of other-acts phones billing Güero had used. The state- despite quite evidence harmful otherwise phones ments for all three Güero had used See, strong guilt. e.g., Gomez, phones were addressed to but the Lee, States v. 724 F.3d 982-83 Reyes’s registered were under name. Cir.2013) (Rule 404(b) error was not harm- really help That evidence does not decide less cocaine was found in trunk of although which one was Güero. driving, pack- car cocaine’s defendant was it, on aging fingerprint had defendant’s majority’s strongest The evidence that him witness testified defendant sold telephone comes from Gomez Güero cocaine, phone records connected de- calls between Romero and Güero after the Miller, witness); fendant to September 3 seizure of Romero’s car with (erroneous prior drug 701-02 admission of September the cocaine hidden in it. In a despite conviction was not harmless sub- phone p.m., call at 9:27 Güero described guilt). stantial evidence of Even when being than stopped someone other himself 404(b) properly evidence is admitted but is by police, exchange ambiguous: but the improperly propensity, then used show they following you But as Romero: were we have found the error to be harmful. well or not? See, Richards, e.g., 719 F.3d at 763-66. me, cousin, any more. Güero: Not case, agrees the entire court only they stopped The one was—since evidence should not have been my I brother-in-law left. saw only admitted at all because its use was to They him there at the school. stopped propensity. show Romero: Him too? agents conspira- The catch the never did act, they sought tors in on as do Güero: Yes. they ask him or Güero: Yes. stopped by

Romero: What did He was a sher- iff. Romero: they what? What did tell him or what? Eh, something, that if he had if Güero: Thеy just Güero: that he they — was— something, or weapons he had because give wanted him to permission them they supposedly looking were They to search his car. they —that weapon. someone who had a had seen him El Rey come out of over (Call 34800). 72 at No. Doc. 184-85 They here. him if gone asked he had agents stopped Reyes both Gomez and to the—to get tacos or what. What *21 September 3. Each could describe the oth- go did he there for? brother-in-law, exchange er as his so this Romero: Is that they seen the three of does not resolve the issue. us come out here? majority support The finds more from a Güero: Uh-huh. September

call at 9:29 a.m. on 4 but de- to if you, they Romero: And saw us all including scribes the conversation as more together, why don’t understand —I actually details than it did. Ac- specific why. happen you How did it to also? cording majority: to beg your pardon? Güero: I phone In a recorded call Septem- on Romero: You you also said that when retracing previ- ber the events of the came village, you over to the little day, ous Güero describes in the were searched. I don’t understand first person police stopped how the him as he why. from away

walked his conversation with Well, turning Güero: when I was Romero; happened we know that to Go- corner— mez, Reyes. not Earlier that same walking, right? Romero: You were phone call Romero asked Güero what Güero: Yes. happened Reyes, respond- and Güero 64171). (Call Doc. 72 at 189 No. A mo- person ed with an account in the third call, however, ment later in the same happened about what to his brother-in- Romero seemed to treat the car as Gue- Rey. law after the three men left El Reyes driving ro’s. was the car when actually give Ante at 864. Güero did not stopped agents. and taken explicit Romero such information about The interpret, context is difficult to timing. Although may he well have been talking Romero and Güero were still about referring stop to a previ- himself on the September the events of 3 and the seizure day, say although ous he did not so. And of the car: may asking Romero also well have been guys Romero: Those see each other ev- (which Reyes being Güero about stopped ery they once a while. were How

would course indicate Güero was doing they over there? are do- What Reyes), Reyes the name was never They ing? They plates. have mentioned between them. As translated over there. But personal plates from Spanish transcript, in the official guys doing that’s how those are it. key exchange went like this: understand, Then I Güero: from what Romero: It like your they they bring plates seems brother— those —when

your they happened bring brother-in-law —what when someone from over get person, when he came from Supposedly over there? He there. guy, right? they had another car from that that’s when come out. majority’s interpretation know whether the I don’t It can’t be. Imagine. Romero: strange, not this the adversarial test It’s would have withstood understand. they want? What failure to make government’s What did The dude. of trial. I know don’t they expecting? were also means appeal argument They wanted to fuck. what it in to rebut had an occasion Gomez never you also also since stop you maybe this court. and that? shops in there in went majority’s argu- making than Rather pardon? beg your Güero: I ment, tried to trial mean, Maybe know. I don’t Romero: I the errone- identity by emphasizing prove in, you go waiting they were 404(b) evidence. Doc. ously admitted I something. don’t or some house prosecutor finished 75 at 32-33. they have taken not that know. If closing argument of the opening segment this, dude. your just ear like of this possession by telling at 190-91.

Id. cocaine, pure much less quantity of user referring to Güero passage The first nearly shipments, and conspiracy than the *22 walking now seems being stopped while charged conspiracy the four weeks after that Güero strongest evidence the ended, identity, well as Gomez’s as showed to be the most that Gomez. While seems of mistake. Id. knowledge and absence I am exchange, the not likely reading of course, judge told the of the district And the serious Rule renders persuaded be used for all jury that the could evidence 404(b) harmless. error purposes. of those unwarranted three First, govern- the important, and most government both the emphasis by This that the argument the ment never made the is another reason judge and the trial significance the of majority makes about not evidence was admitting error pre- appellate Its briefs phone calls. harmless. only perfunctory the most harmless sented and made no mention of argument error thought the co- clearly prosecutors The Nor did the phone call. September than the powerful more caine evidence was Yes, at trial. point make this government they I think were majority’s theory. new out Güero government pointed possession in right. Evidence of cocaine on foot one of being stopped described especially ‍‌​​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​‌‍case is damn- conspiracy cocaine hap- calls, something which is actually of probative if it is ing, even not Doc. 75 at 14-15. pened to Gomez. See deciding whether any dispute. issue in the con- not draw prosecutor But the did harmless, act do not as an error was Reyes and the stop trast between jury how the guess or try second majority is therefore stop of Gomez. an “whether have We ask would decided. interpreta- an finding harmless error juror prosecution’s find the average would tion persuasive less without significantly case jury. press before the did Miller, F.3d improper evidence.” majority’s interpretation of If the new at 700. presented phone calls been had majority’s Accordingly, treat- while trial, would have had occasion to Gomez 404(b) is a welcome issue ment of the was, no it. As it there was need. challenge law, I re- circuit’s on our improvement decisive, surely were if this evidence And finding that the dissent from spectfully taken full ad- prosecutors would I error was harmless. not, serious Rule They so we do not vantage of it. did reverse Gomez’s conviction and re- would a new trial.

mand for America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee, Vargas,

Benito and Rodolfo SALINAS

Defendants-Appellants. 12-3769,

Nos. 13-1378.

United States of Appeals, Court

Seventh Circuit.

Argued April *23 Aug.

Decided notes fact to which the evi- can be linked to plausibly acts evidence dence is directed need not be in dis- purpose.... another The Rule 402 re- .... pute ruling should be made on [T]he quirement of relevance and the unfair the basis of such considerations as waste balancing of Rule 403 prejudice inquiries (see prejudice of time and undue Rule (internal full apply quota- still with force.” 403), any general rather than under re- omitted)). tion marks only that evidence quirement is admissible then, in To summarize when if in dispute.”); directed matters Fed. tent is not “at issue”—when the defendant advisory committee’s notes R.Evid. a general-intent is crime and (“No (1972) mechanical solution is of- meaningfully dispute does not intent —oth fered.”). Moreover, noted, as we have prove er-act evidence is not admissible to Supreme specifically Court has endorsed probative intent because its value will al accepted prosecution “the rule that the ways substantially outweighed by be any prove entitled to its case free contrast, In prejudice. risk of unfair when the evi- option stipulate defendant’s involving spe “at issue”-—in intent is cases away.” Chief, dence Old 519 U.S. cific-intent crimes or because the defen in 117 S.Ct. 644. The Court held Old it an in involving dant makes issue a case a justification that “if ... there a [is] Chief general-intent crime—other-act evidence nature of receiving evidence of the intent, may prove prior be admissible to acts on some issue other than status 0i.e., motive, intent, relying pro prove opportunity, must be relevant without inference, identity, or preparation, plan, knowledge, value pensity probative and its See, ), ... udice inherent in other-act evidence. accident Rule mistake or absence of Carter, 404(b) F.3d opportunity e.g., to seek United States v. guarantees (7th. Cir.2012); 117 S.Ct. 644 403 advi- Id. admission.” its Fed.R.Evid. omitted). (1972) (internal sory (explaining marks committee’s notes quotation limiting of instruc- that the effectiveness reit- requirement, fixed Though not a weighing danger a factor in tions are consid- that the district court should erate prejudice). limiting unfair A instruction non-propensity degree to which er given upon request. See must Fed. evaluating when actually issue is contested may But a defendant choose R.Evid. other- proposed value of probative gо highlighting without one to avoid other-act evidence act evidence. Because Jones, at 811 evidence. See F.3d of unfair always prej- almost carries risk (Easterbrook, J., concurring). caution We udice, real factual dis- sensitivity to' the area; judicial against freelancing this meaningful putes in the case is critical to sponte limiting instructions the mid- sua balancing. Rule 403 trial, admitted, dle of when the evidence is may preempt preference a defense to let sum, opponent’s an ob- to overcome the evidence come without the added jection to the introduction of other-act evi- emphasis limiting instruction. dence, proponent of the evidence must court should consult counsel about whether that the act is relevant first establish other give limiting and when to instruction. specific purpose per- to a other than the propensity son’s character or to behave already requires 401, 402, way. a certain See Fed.R.Evid. prosecutor notify the defendant before 404(b). need not be Other-act evidence evidence, trial of an intent to use other-act excluded whenever a inference provided requested the defense has But “an- can be drawn. its relevance to may a lack (though judge notice excuse purpose” other must be established cause). pretrial good notice for See through reasoning a chain of that does not 404(b)(2)(A)-(B). Motions in

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Nicolas Gomez
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Aug 18, 2014
Citation: 763 F.3d 845
Docket Number: 12-1104
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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