Rehberg v. Paulk
132 S. Ct. 1497
| SCOTUS | 2012Background
- Respondent James Paulk, chief investigator for the district attorney, testified before a grand jury during petitioner Rehberg's investigation prompted by anonymous faxes.
- Indictments were dismissed multiple times, including for aggravated assault, burglary, and harassing calls, before a final set of charges was filed and dismissed.
- Petitioner filed a §1983 action claiming respondent conspired to present and did present false grand jury testimony.
- District Court denied immunity; Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding respondent had absolute immunity for grand jury testimony under §1983.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether a grand jury witness has absolute immunity like trial witnesses, adopting a functional common-law approach.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether grand jury witnesses have absolute immunity under §1983. | Rehberg; seeking liability for conspiracy based on testimony. | Paulk; immunity extends to grand jury testimony to protect process. | Yes; grand jury witnesses have absolute immunity. |
| Whether a 'complaining witness' exception limits immunity for grand jury witnesses. | Petitioner argues complaining witnesses lack absolute immunity for grand jury testimony. | Respondent; distinguishing complaining witnesses based on function is inappropriate here. | No exception; grand jury witnesses receive the same immunity as trial witnesses. |
| Whether the immunity should be limited by concerns about deterrence or grand jury secrecy. | Civil liability needed to deter false grand jury testimony and prosecutorial overreach. | Deterrence there is no need; secrecy of the grand jury would be threatened by civil suits. | Deterrence concerns do not override secrecy and immune protection; immunity stands. |
| Whether extending immunity to grand jury witnesses would create improper distinctions among states or procedures. | Potentially inconsistent treatment across states using information or preliminaries. | States with different procedures still align on the grand jury function and immunity applies similarly. | No problematic distinction; grand jury secrecy and function justify uniform immunity. |
| Whether conspiracy claims against a grand jury witness are barred by absolute immunity for the testimony itself. | Conspiracy liability should be available regardless of testimony immunity. | Conspiratorial claims cannot circumvent immunity by attacking preparatory actions. | Conspiracy-based §1983 claims predicated on grand jury testimony are barred by immunity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1983) (trial-witness absolute immunity; prevents chilling testimony)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (U.S. 1976) (prosecutorial immunity; functional approach to §1983)
- Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (U.S. 1997) (functional approach; guidance by common law in immunity scope)
- Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (U.S. 1951) (legislative immunity; historically grounded immunities)
- Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (U.S. 1967) (judicial immunity for acts within official role)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (U.S. 1993) (concurring opinions on prosecutorial and witness immunities)
- Sells Engineering, Inc. v. United States, 463 U.S. 418 (U.S. 1983) (grand jury secrecy; preindictment proceedings confidentiality)
- Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (U.S. 1992) (complaining witness concept discussed)