UNITED STATES v. SELLS ENGINEERING, INC., ET AL.
No. 81-1032
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 2, 1983—Decided June 30, 1983
463 U.S. 418
Arlington Ray Robbins argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Michael E. Cahill and David P. Curnow.*
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is under what conditions attorneys for the Civil Division of the Justice Department, their paralegal and secretarial staff, and all other necessary assistants, may obtain access to grand jury materials, compiled with the assistance and knowledge of other Justice Department attorneys, for the purpose of preparing and pursuing a civil suit. We hold that such access is permissible only when the Government moves for court-ordered disclosure under
I
Respondents Peter A. Sells and Fred R. Witte were officers of respondent Sells Engineering, Inc. That company
While the enforcement case was pending in the Court of Appeals, a federal grand jury was convened to investigate charges of criminal fraud on the Navy and of evasion of federal income taxes. The grand jury subpoenaed, and respondents produced, many of the same materials that were the subject of the IRS administrative summonses.1 The grand jury indicted all three respondents on two counts of conspiracy to defraud the United States2 and nine counts of tax fraud.3 Respondents moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging grand jury misuse for civil purposes. Before the motion was decided, however, the parties reached a plea bargain. The individual respondents each pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the Government by obstructing an IRS investigation. All other counts were dismissed, and respondents withdrew their charges of grand jury misuse.
Thereafter, the Government moved for disclosure of all grand jury materials to attorneys in the Justice Department‘s Civil Division, their paralegal and secretarial assistants, and certain Defense Department experts, for use in preparing
II
A
The grand jury has always occupied a high place as an instrument of justice in our system of criminal law—so much so that it is enshrined in the Constitution. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U. S. 395, 399 (1959); Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 361-362 (1956). It serves the “dual function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 686-687 (1972) (footnote omitted). It has always been extended extraordinary powers of investigation and great responsibility for directing its own efforts:
“Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide latitude to inquire into violations of criminal law. No judge presides to monitor its proceedings. It deliberates in secret and may determine alone the course of its inquiry. The grand jury may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials. ‘It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.‘” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 343 (1974), quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 282 (1919).
The same concern for the grand jury‘s dual function underlies the “long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal courts.” United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U. S. 677, 681 (1958) (footnote omitted).
“We consistently have recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. In particular, we have noted several distinct interests served by safeguarding the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements. There also would be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment. Finally, by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.” Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U. S. 211, 218-219 (1979) (footnotes and citation omitted).
Grand jury secrecy, then, is “as important for the protection of the innocent as for the pursuit of the guilty.” Johnson,
B
Subparagraph 6(e)(3)(C) also authorizes courts to order disclosure. Under subparagraph 6(e)(3)(C)(i), a court may order disclosure “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding” (a “(C)(i) order“).9 Under subparagraph 6(e)(3)(C)(ii), a court may order disclosure under certain conditions at the request of a defendant. See also n. 7, supra.
The main issue in this case is whether attorneys in the Justice Department may obtain automatic (A)(i) disclosure of grand jury materials for use in a civil suit, or whether they must seek a (C)(i) court order for access. If a (C)(i) order is necessary, we must address the dependent question of what standards should govern issuance of the order.
III
The Government contends that all attorneys in the Justice Department qualify for automatic disclosure of grand jury materials under (A)(i), regardless of the nature of the litigation in which they intend to use the materials. We hold that (A)(i) disclosure is limited to use by those attorneys who conduct the criminal matters to which the materials pertain. This conclusion is mandated by the general purposes and policies of grand jury secrecy, by the limited policy reasons why Government attorneys are granted access to grand jury materials for criminal use, and by the legislative history of
A
The Government correctly contends that attorneys for the Civil Division of the Justice Department are within the class of “attorneys for the government” to whom (A)(i) allows dis-
It does not follow, however, that any Justice Department attorney is free to rummage through the records of any grand jury in the country, simply by right of office. Disclosure under (A)(i) is permitted only “in the performance of such attorney‘s duty.” The heart of the primary issue in this case is whether performance of duty, within the meaning of (A)(i), includes preparation and litigation of a civil suit by a Justice Department attorney who had no part in conducting the related criminal prosecution.
Given the strong historic policy of preserving grand jury secrecy, one might wonder why Government attorneys are given any automatic access at all. The draftsmen of the original Rule 6 provided the answer:
“Government attorneys are entitled to disclosure of grand jury proceedings, other than the deliberations and the votes of the jurors, inasmuch as they may be present in the grand jury room during the presentation of evidence. The rule continues this practice.” Advisory
Committee‘s Notes on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), 18 U. S. C. App., p. 1411.
This is potent evidence that
The purpose of the grand jury requires that it remain free, within constitutional and statutory limits, to operate “independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.” Stirone v. United States, 361 U. S. 212, 218 (1960) (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, a modern grand jury would be much less effective without the assistance of the prosecutor‘s office and the investigative resources it commands. The prosecutor ordinarily brings matters to the attention of the grand jury and gathers the evidence required for the jury‘s consideration. Although the grand jury may itself decide to investigate a matter or to seek certain evidence, it depends largely on the prosecutor‘s office to secure the evidence or witnesses it requires.13 The prosecutor also advises the lay jury on the applicable law. The prosecutor in turn needs to know what transpires before the grand jury in order to perform his own duty properly. If he considers that the law and the admissible evidence will not support a conviction, he can be expected to advise the grand jury not to indict. He must also examine indictments, and the basis for their issuance, to determine whether it is in the interests of justice to proceed with prosecution.14
Of course, it would be of substantial help to a Justice Department civil attorney if he had free access to a storehouse of evidence compiled by a grand jury; but that is of a different order from the prosecutor‘s need for access. The civil lawyer‘s need is ordinarily nothing more than a matter of saving time and expense. The same argument could be made for access on behalf of any lawyer in another Government agency, or indeed, in private practice. We have consistently rejected the argument that such savings can justify a breach of grand jury secrecy. E. g., Procter & Gamble, 356 U. S., at 682-683; Smith v. United States, 423 U. S. 1303, 1304 (1975) (Douglas, J., in chambers); see also Abbott, 460 U. S., at 565-573. In most cases, the same evidence that could be obtained from the grand jury will be available through ordinary discovery or other routine avenues of investigation. If, in a particular case, ordinary discovery is insufficient for some reason, the Government may request disclosure under a (C)(i) court order. See Part IV, infra.
Not only is disclosure for civil use unjustified by the considerations supporting prosecutorial access, but also it threatens to do affirmative mischief. The problem is threefold.
Second, because the Government takes an active part in the activities of the grand jury, disclosure to Government attorneys for civil use poses a significant threat to the integrity of the grand jury itself. If prosecutors in a given case knew that their colleagues would be free to use the materials generated by the grand jury for a civil case, they might be tempted to manipulate the grand jury‘s powerful investigative tools to root out additional evidence useful in the civil suit, or even to start or continue a grand jury inquiry where no criminal prosecution seemed likely. Any such use of grand jury proceedings to elicit evidence for use in a civil case is improper per se. Procter & Gamble, supra, at 683-684. We do not mean to impugn the professional characters of Justice Department lawyers in general; nor do we express any view on the allegations of misuse that have been made in this case, see n. 36, infra. Our concern is based less on any belief that grand jury misuse is in fact widespread than on our concern that, if and when it does occur, it would often be very difficult to detect and prove. Moreover, as the legislative history discussed infra, Part III-B, shows, our concern over possible misappropriation of the grand jury itself was
Third, use of grand jury materials by Government agencies in civil or administrative settings threatens to subvert the limitations applied outside the grand jury context on the Government‘s powers of discovery and investigation. While there are some limits on the investigative powers of the grand jury,17 there are few if any other forums in which a governmental body has such relatively unregulated power to compel other persons to divulge information or produce evidence. Other agencies, both within and without the Justice Department, operate under specific and detailed statutes, rules, or regulations conferring only limited authority to require citizens to testify or produce evidence. Some agencies have been granted special statutory powers to obtain information and require testimony in pursuance of their duties. Others (including the Civil Division18) are relegated to the usual course of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In either case, the limitations imposed on investigation and discovery exist for sound reasons—ranging from fundamental fairness to concern about burdensomeness and intrusiveness. If Government litigators or investigators in civil matters enjoyed unlimited access to grand jury material, though, there would be little reason for them to resort to their usual, more limited avenues of investigation. To allow
In short, if grand juries are to be granted extraordinary powers of investigation because of the difficulty and importance of their task, the use of those powers ought to be limited as far as reasonably possible to the accomplishment of
B
The Government argues that its reading of Rule 6 is compelled by a textual comparison of subparagraph 6(e)(3)(A)(i) with subparagraph 6(e)(3)(A)(ii). It points out that the former restricts a Government attorney‘s use of grand jury materials to “the performance of such attorney‘s duty,” while the latter refers more specifically to “performance of such attorney‘s duty to enforce federal criminal law” (emphasis added). The inclusion in (A)(ii) of an express limitation to criminal matters, and the absence of that limitation in the otherwise similar language of (A)(i), the Government argues, show that Congress intended to place the limitation to criminal matters on (A)(ii) disclosure but not on (A)(i) disclosure. The argument is admittedly a plausible one. If we had nothing more to go on than the bare text of the Rule, and if the subject matter at hand were something less sensitive than grand jury secrecy, we might well adopt that reasoning. The argument is not so compelling, nor the language so plain, however, as to overcome the strong arguments to the contrary drawn both from policy, supra, Part III-A, and from legislative history.
It is material in this connection that the two subparagraphs are not of contemporaneous origin. The present (A)(i) language has been in the Rule since its inception in 1946; the (A)(ii) provision was added by Congress in 1977. The Government‘s argument, at base, is that when Congress added the (A)(ii) provision containing an express limitation to criminal use, but did not add a similar limitation to (A)(i), it must have intended that no criminal-use limitation be applied to (A)(i) disclosure. The legislative history, although of less than perfect clarity, leads to the contrary conclusion. It ap-
Accordingly, when in 1976 this Court transmitted to the Congress several proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 425 U. S. 1159, a proposal was included to add one sentence to
“For purposes of [Rule 6(e)], ‘attorneys for the government’ includes those enumerated in
Rule 54(c) ; it also includes such other government personnel as are necessary to assist the attorneys for the government in the performance of their duties.” 425 U. S., at 1161.
The accompanying Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 1024 (1976 ed., Supp. V), explained that the amendment was “designed to facilitate an increasing need, on the part of government attorneys, to make use of outside expertise in complex litigation.” Ibid. The Committee noted, however, that under its proposal, disclosure to nonattorneys would be “subject to the qualification that the matters disclosed be used only for the purposes of the grand jury investigation.” Id., at 1025 (emphasis added). Yet there was no express language in the proposed Rule clearly imposing this criminal-use limitation; the only limitation on use of grand jury materials was the double reference to “the performance of [Government attorneys‘] duties.” It appears, then, that the Advisory Committee took that phrase to mean that use of grand jury materials was limited to criminal matters, absent a court order allowing civil use—a construction that would apply equally to Justice Department attorneys and their nonattorney assistants.
The proposed amendment to
against use of grand jury materials for improper purposes by Government personnel. They were unable to agree on a substitute draft.24
The Senate Judiciary Committee was more hospitable to the original proposal. After consultation with House Members,25 however, the Committee undertook to redraft Rule 6(e) to accommodate both the purpose of the proposed amendment and the concerns of the House.26 The result was Rule 6(e) in substantially its present form, passed by both Houses without significant opposition.27
Congressional criticism of the proposed amendment focused on two problems: disclosure of grand jury materials to agencies outside the Department of Justice, and use of grand jury materials for non-grand-jury purposes. The two were closely related, however; the primary objection to granting access to employees of outside agencies, such as the IRS, was a concern that they would use the information to pursue civil investigations or unrelated criminal matters, in derogation of the limitations on their usual avenues of investigation.28 Little attention was paid to the prospect that other attorneys within the Justice Department, as much as other agencies,
“Now, when you begin to move beyond the parameters of that particular investigation, we get to the point that you and I both have some trouble with. The cleanest example I can think of where a 6(e) order [i. e., a court order under what is now (C)(i)] is clearly required is where a criminal fraud investigation before a grand jury fails to produce enough legally admissible evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that criminal fraud ensued.
“It would be the practice of the Department at that time to seek a 6(e) order from the court in order that that evidence could be made available for whatever civil consequences might ensue.
“If there were fraud against the Government[,] for example, there would be a civil right of the Government to recover penalties with respect to the fraud that took place.”30
“The Rule as redrafted is designed to accommodate the belief on the one hand that Federal prosecutors should be able, without the time-consuming requirement of prior judicial interposition, to make such disclosures of grand jury information to other government personnel as they deem necessary to facilitate the performance of their duties relating to criminal law enforcement. On the other hand, the Rule seeks to allay the concerns of those who fear that such prosecutorial power will lead to misuse of the grand jury to enforce non-criminal Federal laws by (1) providing a clear prohibition, subject to the penalty of contempt and (2) requiring that a court order under paragraph (C) be obtained to authorize such a disclosure. There is, however, no intent to preclude the use of grand jury-developed evidence for civil law enforcement purposes. On the contrary, there is no reason why such use is improper, assuming that the grand jury was utilized for the legitimate purpose of a criminal investigation. Accordingly, the Committee believes and intends that the basis for a court‘s refusal to issue an order under paragraph (C) to enable the government to disclose grand jury information in a non-criminal proceeding should be no more restrictive than is the case today under prevailing court decisions.” S. Rep. No. 95-354, p. 8 (1977) (footnote omitted).
This paragraph reflects the distinction the Senate Committee had in mind: “Federal prosecutors” are given a free hand concerning use of grand jury materials, at least pursuant to their “duties relating to criminal law enforcement“; but disclosure of “grand jury-developed evidence for civil law enforcement purposes” requires a (C)(i) court order.33
IV
Since we conclude that the Government must obtain a (C)(i) court order to secure the disclosure it seeks in this case,34 we must consider what standard should govern the issuance of such an order.
“Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under
Rule 6(e) must show that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only material so needed. . . .“It is clear from Procter & Gamble and Dennis that disclosure is appropriate only in those cases where the need for it outweighs the public interest in secrecy, and that the burden of demonstrating this balance rests upon the private party seeking disclosure. It is equally clear that as the considerations justifying secrecy become less relevant, a party asserting a need for grand jury transcripts will have a lesser burden in showing justification. In sum, . . . the court‘s duty in a case of this kind is to weigh carefully the competing interests in light of the relevant circumstances and the standards announced by this Court. And if disclosure is ordered, the court may include protective limitations on the use of the disclosed material . . . .” 441 U. S., at 222-223 (citations omitted).
The Government points out that Douglas Oil and its forerunners all involved private parties seeking access to grand jury materials. It contends that the Douglas Oil standard ought not be applied when Government officials seek access “in furtherance of their responsibility to protect the public weal.” Brief for United States 43. Earlier this Term,
Our conclusion that Douglas Oil governs disclosure to public parties as well as private ones is bolstered by the legislative history of the 1977 amendment of
The Government further argues that “disclosure of grand jury materials to government attorneys typically implicates
In this case, the District Court asserted that it had found particularized need for disclosure, but its explanation of that conclusion amounted to little more than its statement that the grand jury materials sought are rationally related to the civil fraud suit to be brought by the Civil Division. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a-23a. The Court of Appeals correctly held that this was insufficient under Douglas Oil and remanded
V
The Court of Appeals correctly held that disclosure to Government attorneys and their assistants for use in a civil suit is permissible only with a court order under
Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom JUSTICE POWELL, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O‘CONNOR join, dissenting.
The Court today holds that attorneys within the Department of Justice who are not assigned to the grand jury investigation or prosecution must seek a court order on a showing of particularized need in order to obtain access, for the purpose of preparing a civil suit, to grand jury materials already in the Government‘s possession. In my view, this holding is contrary not only to the clear language but also to the history of
I
“(A) Disclosure . . . of matters occurring before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be made to—
“(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney‘s duty.”
Notwithstanding the clarity of the Rule, neither the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit nor the majority of this Court has seen fit to honor its plain language.
As nearly as we can understand, the Court of Appeals’ opinion holds that attorneys within the Department of Justice assigned to civil matters are not entitled to routine, automatic disclosure of grand jury materials under (A)(i). In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals appears to have drawn a sharp line between attorneys on the third floor of the Department of Justice assigned to civil litigation, and those on the first floor assigned to criminal cases. Such a reading is contrary to the Rule, to the intent of Congress, and to common sense.
Subparagraph (A)(i) authorizes automatic disclosure to any “attorney for the government” for use by that attorney in the performance of his assigned duty. The term “attorney for the government” is in turn defined in
Today we find that it does not end the matter. After properly acknowledging that the term “attorney for the government” embraces Civil Division attorneys, the Court turns to the next clause in the Rule and strains that clause virtually beyond recognition.
Subparagraph (A)(i) authorizes disclosure to a Government attorney “for use in the performance of such attorney‘s duty.” At one time all attorneys under the Attorney General were simply his aides. As with private law firms, a time came when it was more efficient to segregate attorneys by their specialized functions into separate Divisions within the Justice Department. An attorney in the Civil Division will naturally deal primarily with civil matters. Once it is recognized that (A)(i) authorizes disclosure to attorneys within the Civil Division, therefore, I would think it beyond question that they, as “assistants to the Attorney General,” may use the disclosed materials in performing their normal duties, which of course include the civil fraud action at issue here.
The Court concludes otherwise, however, apparently in the belief that the only duty contemplated by (A)(i) is the conduct of criminal cases!2 Nothing in (A)(i) remotely
In seeking to avoid this straightforward interpretation, the Court places considerable reliance on the fact that
Second, the Court appears to believe that Government attorneys pursuing civil matters are in essentially the same position as nonattorney support personnel with respect to both their need for grand jury materials and their likelihood to violate grand jury secrecy. This is clearly not the case, and Congress took the obvious differences into account in 1977 when it chose to adopt different standards for disclosure to Government attorneys, on the one hand, and to support personnel, on the other.
Finally, the Court overlooks the reality that in 1977 Congress revised all of
II
The Court appears to believe that there is something in the history of
A
The direct predecessor of (A)(i) was adopted in 1946. As initially promulgated,
“Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties.” (Emphasis added.)
In interpreting this Rule, the Court places almost total reliance upon the following comment in the Advisory Committee Notes:
“Government attorneys are entitled to disclosure of grand jury proceedings . . . inasmuch as they may be present in the grand jury room during the presentation of evidence. The rule continues this practice.” Advisory Committee Notes,
18 U. S. C. App., p. 1411 .
Even the Court concedes, however, that
Thus, the curious line announced by the Court today appears nowhere in either the Advisory Committee Notes or the Rule itself. Further historical examination reveals, moreover, that the Rule was understood by its drafters to permit disclosure to attorneys throughout the Department of Justice, and that the Rule consistently has been applied in just such a manner ever since it was adopted.
The historical setting and the records of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules reveal that the original draftsmen of
Nevertheless, when the
There were numerous objections to the narrowness of this Rule. Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge remarked:
“It . . . seems to me that the rule, read literally, has the effect of preventing a United States Attorney, or other authorized government attorney, from discussing developments before the grand jury with the Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or other authorized Department of Justice officials. I cannot believe that such a result was intended and I think that appropriate exception ought to be made in the rule to cover this situation.” 2 Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Preliminary Draft: Comments, Recommendations and Suggestions Concerning the Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 355 (1943).
Judge Paul J. McCormick of the Southern District of California raised the same objection:
“As a matter of common practice the United States Attorney uses the grand jury transcript rather freely with investigators and attorneys for the various governmental agencies. . . . If the rule contemplates a restriction on the United States Attorney‘s use of the transcript, I believe that he should be excepted from the provision requiring the permission of the court.” Ibid.
Similarly, Robert M. Hitchcock expressed concern that the Rule as then drafted would prevent a prosecuting attorney
The next draft (Second Preliminary Draft) reflected these comments; the first sentence of the Rule was amended to its final form, authorizing disclosure to “the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties.” The scope of the amended Rule did not go unopposed. Judge S. H. Sibley of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit proposed deleting the entire first sentence of the Rule, and redrafting the Rule to require a court order for any disclosure, including disclosure by the attorneys who had been in the grand jury room to other Justice Department attorneys. Judge Sibley explained his proposed change as follows:
“The change . . . is due to a belief that secrecy of the proceedings before the Grand Jury ought to be maintained except when otherwise ordered by the judge. A general rule permitting disclosures to attorneys for the Government is thought unwise, apparently having no check except the desire of the particular Government official who undertakes to get or make the disclosure. Embarrassing leaks might easily occur under so broad a rule applying to so many persons.” 4 id., at 13 (1944).
There can be no doubt that the draftsmen realized the need for precision in the language of the Rules; and in light of the numerous criticisms of the prior version of the Rule and Judge Sibley‘s comments on the amended version, there also can be little question that the draftsmen were fully aware of the breadth of the Rule they were proposing. If they had intended the Rule to have the crabbed meaning now advanced by the Court, they surely would have amended the first sentence of the Rule. Yet they left that sentence as it
Lester Orfield, one of the members of the Advisory Committee, later observed:
“[I]n comparison with the right of the defendant and of third parties, the right of the government to see and use the grand jury minutes is incomparably the greatest. And the government obtains discovery without first having to make a motion for it. The first sentence of
Rule 6(e) provides for disclosure to the government for use in the performance of duties and says nothing about court action.” Orfield 451 (emphasis added).
In view of the background and history of the drafting of the 1946 Rule, I do not believe there can be any doubt that Orfield and the other draftsmen were aware of the breadth of the provision for disclosure to Government attorneys.
C
The subsequent application of
On occasion, the use of grand jury materials in civil actions exceeded the bounds of
The leading case on this point is this Court‘s decision in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U. S. 677 (1958). There, the Government had convened and conducted a grand jury investigation of possible antitrust violations in the soap industry. Counsel for the Government had stated in an affidavit that the investigation served dual purposes: first, to determine whether there were violations of the antitrust laws, and, second, to determine “what action should be taken to enforce those laws through criminal proceedings, civil proceedings or both.” United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 14 F. R. D. 230, 233 (NJ 1953) (emphasis added). No indictment was returned, but soon after the conclusion of the grand jury proceeding the Government filed a civil suit. In preparing that suit, the Government used the grand jury transcript without seeking a court order, and defendants also sought access to the grand jury transcript. The District Court granted the defendants’ motion, holding that defendants should be entitled to the same right of access to these materials as the Government. 19 F. R. D. 122 (1956). This Court reversed, ruling that the defendants had not made the requisite particularized showing of need for disclosure of the testimony. 356 U. S., at 682.
The validity of the Government‘s use of the grand jury transcript for civil purposes was not directly before the Court in Procter & Gamble, but since that use had played a central role in the District Court‘s analysis, this Court addressed the issue. In so doing the Court made clear that it regarded the Government‘s civil use of the materials as entirely proper:
“[The District Court] seemed to have been influenced by the fact that the prosecution was using criminal procedures to elicit evidence in a civil case. If the prosecu-
“We cannot condemn the Government for any such practice in this case. There is no finding that the grand jury proceeding was used as a short cut to goals otherwise barred or more difficult to reach. It is true that no indictment was returned in the present case. But that is no reflection on the integrity of the prosecution. For all we know, the trails that looked fresh at the start faded along the way. What seemed at the beginning to be a case with a criminal cast apparently took on a different character as the events and transactions were disclosed. The fact that a criminal case failed does not mean that the evidence obtained could not be used in a civil case.” Id., at 683-684 (emphasis added).
Since this Court was aware that the Government was using grand jury materials to prepare its civil case without a court order, it is crystal clear that the Court approved of Government attorneys’ use of grand jury transcripts and materials in pursuing civil cases, so long as the grand jury was validly convened and the inquiry conducted for criminal investigatory purposes, and not simply used as a substitute for civil discovery.5 See also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 180 F. Supp. 195 (NJ 1959) (after remand).
“The decisions are quite clear that, in some situations at least, grand jury evidence may be used for purposes of civil trial. In United States v. Procter & Gamble, . . . the Supreme Court refused, in a civil antitrust case, to order wholesale discovery of grand jury testimony, stating that, absent any showing of bad faith on the government in subverting the grand jury process, the evidence obtained before the grand jury ‘could . . . be used in a civil case.’ . . . [A number of other] cases sanction the use by government attorneys of grand jury evidence for the purpose of preparing a civil case, provided the grand jury investigation was brought in good faith for purposes of possible criminal prosecution. . . .
“. . . I conclude that grand jury evidence may be used by Department of Justice attorneys in connection with other criminal and civil litigation conducted by the government, subject to the power of the courts to quash the grand jury subpoenas or enjoin the grand jury investiga
tion (and, in civil cases, to order full discovery to the other party) if they feel the grand jury proceeding is being subverted or abused.” Id., at 10-13 (citations and discussion of cases omitted).
D
The Court does not suggest that Congress sought to change the meaning of the provision allowing disclosure to Government attorneys when it amended
“[Subparagraph (A)(i)] continues a policy of present
rule 6(e) . Disclosure of grand jury information may be made to ‘an attorney for the Government for use in the performance of such attorney‘s duty.’ This language, which is similar to language presently in the rule, is not intended to change any current practice.” 123 Cong. Rec. 25194 (1977) (emphasis added).
See also, e. g., S. Rep. No. 95-354, pp. 5-8 (1977).
The Court nevertheless asserts that implicit in Congress’ understanding of
“The term attorneys for the government is restrictive in its application. . . . If it had been intended that the attorneys for the administrative agencies were to have free access to matters occurring before a grand jury, the rule would have so provided.” Id., at 443 (emphasis added).
This quote—and the opinion in which it appears—clearly draws a distinction between “attorneys for the government,” who were entitled to free access to grand jury materials, and attorneys for administrative agencies, who were not entitled to such automatic disclosure.
This understanding was shared not only by the Advisory Committee, but also by Congress itself. Representative Charles Wiggins, dissenting from the decision of the House Committee on the Judiciary to defer action on
“In the course of considering [the amendment to
Rule 6(e) ], U. S. Attorneys and the Justice Department were surveyed as to their perception of current practice regarding grand jury disclosures. Although the view wasnot strictly uniform, there was general agreement that disclosures at least to criminal investigative agents and other divisions within the Justice Department were permissible without court order.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-195, p. 13 (1977) (additional views of Rep. Wiggins).
“There will come a time when a grand jury uncovers violations of civil laws, or State or local laws. It then becomes the duty of the attorney for the Government, if he or some other attorney for the Government cannot act on that information, to turn it over to the appropriate governmental agency so that such agency can do its duty. However, the attorney for the Government may do this only after successfully seeking an order of the court.” Id., at 25196 (emphasis added).
See also, e. g., Hearings, at 47-54 (statement of Judge Becker).
These statements all reflect an awareness of the prevailing practice, under which attorneys throughout the Department of Justice were entitled to use grand jury materials in performing all their responsibilities, but could not turn the material over to another agency for that agency‘s use except by
III
The Court relies heavily upon perceived policy considerations that the Court seems to think favor its approach. The language and the history of the Rule are so clear that reference to policy considerations should be wholly unnecessary. Congress, in adopting (A)(i), already has made the relevant policy choices. In any event, however, the Court has erred gravely in its assessment of the policy implications of the standard it sets forth and of the standard which I believe actually appears in (A)(i).
The Court asserts that disclosure for civil use would do “affirmative mischief” in three ways. See ante, at 431-434. First, it is argued that “disclosure to Government bodies raises much the same concerns that underlie the rule of secrecy in other contexts.” Ante, at 432. Presumably, the
“First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements. There also would be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against the indictment. Finally, by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.” Id., at 219.
In raising the specter of lost secrecy, the Court ignores the fact that normal Justice Department practice—which was followed in this case—calls for disclosing grand jury materials for civil use only after the grand jury proceeding and criminal investigation have been completed, see
Furthermore, attorneys for the Justice Department are officers of the court bound to high ethical standards. The Court itself recognizes that “disclosure to Justice Department attorneys poses less risk of further leakage or improper use than would disclosure to private parties or the general public,” ante, at 445, and notes “Congress’ special concern that nonattorneys were the ones most likely to pose a danger of unauthorized use,” ante, at 442. The Court nevertheless appears to premise its analysis on the assumption that Gov
The Court next asserts that a blanket rule against access to grand jury materials for civil purposes is needed to prevent the possibility that the grand jury will be used improperly as a tool for civil discovery. I fully agree with the Court that use of grand jury proceedings for the purpose of obtaining evidence for a civil case is improper.10 But the mere potential for such abuse does not justify this Court‘s precluding Department of Justice attorneys from reviewing grand jury materials in assessing and prosecuting civil actions in the vast majority of cases where the grand jury has been convened and conducted for valid criminal investigatory purposes. As the Court recognized in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U. S. 677 (1958), the proper approach to the danger of abuse is not to adopt an across-the-board ban on civil use of grand jury materials by those not assigned to the criminal investigation, but rather for a district court to impose appropriate sanctions if it turns out that the grand jury process has
IV
The opinion of the Court today upsets longstanding practice of the Justice Department regarding disclosure of grand jury materials for civil use, without affording that Depart
