Randy E. Daniels v. Potomac Electric Power Company
100 A.3d 139
| D.C. | 2014Background
- Daniels sued PEPCO in DC Superior Court alleging DCHRA discrimination, retaliation, hostile environment, and related claims (Counts I–V) based on actions from 2002 to July 29, 2010.
- Trial court dismissed some claims (age discrimination, IIED, safe workplace) and dismissed pre-July 29, 2009 claims as untimely under a one-year statute of limitations, rejecting tolling by lulling.
- Discovery on remaining counts (2009–2010 acts) proceeded; five discovery requests were denied as imprecise/irrelevant.
- Appellee moved for summary judgment; discovery dispute and lulling issue remained unresolved.
- We reversed and remanded to consider lulling evidence, compel discovery, and reassess summary judgment after additional evidence is considered.
- This decision addresses statute of limitations, discovery, and summary-judgment posture for the limited, remaining claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the trial court required to consider lulling evidence despite pleading not raising it? | Daniels argued lulling affirmative acts toll the period. | PEPCO contended lulling was not pled, thus not reviewable. | Yes, the court remanded to consider lulling evidence. |
| Was the denial of discovery an abuse of discretion? | Discovery requests were relevant and reasonably calculated to prove discrimination/hostile environment. | Requests were vague, overbroad, and irrelevant. | Yes, the denial was an abuse; remand for further discovery. |
| Should summary judgment be decided given potential tolling and new discovery? | Outcome may change with lulling and discovery results. | Timely summary judgment should be denied until issues resolved. | Premature; remand for complete consideration of lulling and discovery. |
| Did the trial court properly apply the DCHRA statute of limitations with potential tolling? | Lulling can toll the limitations period. | Lulling not properly raised or proven; statute barred. | Reversal to allow proper consideration of lulling. |
| Did the court err in preventing consideration of lulling based on complaint content? | Lulling evidence raised in opposition should be considered. | Lulling must be alleged in the complaint. | Court should consider lulling upon remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- East v. Graphic Arts Indus. Joint Pension Trust, 718 A.2d 153 (D.C. 1998) (lulling doctrine requires affirmative action by defendant to toll limitations)
- Kamerow v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm’n, 891 A.2d 253 (D.C. 2006) (lulling is a narrow equitable exception, requires concrete evidence)
- Chase v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 669 A.2d 1264 (D.C. 1995) (foundation for lulling/equitable tolling concept)
- Drake v. McNair, 993 A.2d 607 (D.C. 2010) (affirmative acts toll limitations; defines lulling standard)
- Estate of Chapelle v. Sanders, 442 A.2d 157 (D.C. 1982) (early tolling case cited for concealment tolling concept)
- Bailey v. Greenberg, 516 A.2d 934 (D.C. 1986) (timing of limitations defense; appellate review standard)
- Futrell v. Dep’t of Labor Fed. Credit Union, 816 A.2d 793 (D.C. 2003) (discovery-related standards and abuse-of-discretion review)
- Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 624 A.2d 405 (D.C. 1992) (discovery relevance standard under Rule 26(b)(1))
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (U.S. 2002) (scope of discrimination claims; timing considerations for disparate acts)