534 P.3d 40
Cal.2023Background
- Plaintiffs Kristina Raines and Darrick Figg alleged they received job offers conditioned on preemployment medical screenings performed by U.S. Healthworks (USHW), a third‑party occupational‑health provider acting as agent for the prospective employers.
- The screening questionnaire allegedly contained numerous non‑job‑related medical questions (e.g., reproductive history, HIV, mental illness); Raines declined to answer a question about her last menstrual period, the exam was terminated, and the employer rescinded its offer.
- Plaintiffs sued USHW and related entities under FEHA and other laws; after removal and several amended complaints, the federal district court dismissed the FEHA claims on the ground that FEHA does not impose direct liability on an employer’s agent.
- The Ninth Circuit certified the question to the California Supreme Court: whether FEHA’s definition of “employer” (Gov. Code §12926(d)) permits direct FEHA liability for a business entity acting as an employer’s agent.
- The California Supreme Court held that a business‑entity agent with at least five employees may be held directly liable under FEHA when it carries out FEHA‑regulated activities on an employer’s behalf; it left open the role, if any, of employer control and liability for agents with fewer than five employees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FEHA’s definition of “employer” permits direct liability for a business‑entity agent | §12926(d) ‘‘includes’’ agents, so an agent acting for an employer is itself an FEHA employer and directly liable | The agent language only incorporates respondeat superior; only the employer — not the agent — should bear liability | A business‑entity agent with ≥5 employees may be directly liable when it carries out FEHA‑regulated activities for an employer |
| Whether Reno v. Baird and Jones control to bar agent liability | Reno/Jones should not prevent agent liability here because those cases limited liability for individual supervisors, not independent business entities | Reno/Jones foreclose interpreting the agent language to impose direct liability on agents | Reno/Jones do not control; their policy rationales (risk to individual supervisors, small‑employer exemption) are inapplicable or diminished for business‑entity agents with ≥5 employees |
| Whether common‑law agency or delegation doctrines bar direct statutory liability of agents | FEHA’s text governs; statutory definition can impose independent obligations on agents who perform regulated activities | Agency law means principal bears responsibility; agents shouldn’t be treated as employers absent independent duty to the third party | Statutory language, history, policy permit treating business‑entity agents as employers for FEHA purposes; common‑law agency is not dispositive |
| Whether agent must meet FEHA’s employee‑count threshold | Plaintiffs argue FEHA’s “includes” enlarges who is an employer but court should still apply statutory thresholds | Agents lacking five employees cannot be FEHA employers; small‑employer exemption matters | Court requires a business‑entity agent to have at least five employees to be directly liable; declined to decide agents with fewer than five employees |
Key Cases Cited
- Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal.4th 640 (1998) (individual supervisors who are not themselves employers may not be sued under FEHA)
- Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership, 42 Cal.4th 1158 (2008) (extends Reno’s rationale to retaliation claims; absence of express personal‑liability language significant)
- Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (Title VII prohibits delegating discriminatory programs to avoid liability; Manhart footnote on agents cited)
- Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982) (third‑party pension administrator can be an employer under Title VII where it significantly affects access to employment benefits)
- Carparts Distri. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) (ADA agent‑liability theory where agent controls or administers employee benefits)
- Williams v. City of Montgomery, 742 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1984) (personnel board acting in traditional employer roles may be an employer under Title VII)
- DeVito v. Chicago Park Dist., 83 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 1996) (personnel board may be ADA employer if it meets statutory requirements)
- Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994) (agent language construed as respondeat superior under ADEA)
- Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993) (agent provision read as incorporating respondeat superior under Title VII)
- Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994) (agent language interpreted to incorporate respondeat superior under Title VII)
