60 F.4th 1170
8th Cir.2023Background
- In 2020 the City of Edina, MN enacted Ordinance No. 2020-08, banning the sale, offer for sale, or distribution of "flavored tobacco products."
- R.J. Reynolds sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the ordinance is preempted by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA).
- The TCA contains three relevant provisions: the Preservation Clause (states may enact stricter tobacco laws), the Preemption Clause (preempts state requirements "relating to tobacco product standards"), and the Savings Clause (says the Preemption Clause does not apply to requirements "relating to the sale, distribution, or use" of tobacco).
- The district court granted Edina’s motion to dismiss Reynolds’ complaint, reasoning the ordinance, even if a product-standard regulation, is saved by the Savings Clause as a sales-related requirement.
- On appeal the Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the TCA (expressly or impliedly) preempts Edina’s ordinance.
- The court affirmed, holding the ordinance is not preempted: the Savings Clause can be read as an exception to the Preemption Clause preserving local sales restrictions, and no conflict preemption was shown.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ordinance is a "tobacco product standard" under the TCA (express preemption) | Reynolds: The ban effectively regulates product composition/standards and falls within the Preemption Clause | Edina: The ordinance regulates sale/distribution, not manufacture or product composition, so it is not a product standard | The court agreed with precedent that sales bans are not necessarily product standards; even if treated as a product standard, the Savings Clause can save it |
| Proper effect of the Savings Clause: clarification vs. exception | Reynolds: The Savings Clause should be read narrowly and cannot be used to rescue regulations that functionally impose product standards | Edina: The Savings Clause should be read as an exception to the Preemption Clause, preserving laws "relating to the sale" of tobacco even if they touch product characteristics | Court adopted the reading that disfavors preemption: the Savings Clause can operate as an exception to the Preemption Clause, preserving sales-related prohibitions |
| Whether the TCA preempts a "blanket" prohibition on sale of a tobacco product | Reynolds: A total sales ban is not a mere "requirement relating to sale" and should not be saved by the Savings Clause | Edina: The statute's use of "requirement" applies equally; prohibitions on sale are encompassed and saved by the Savings Clause | Court rejected Reynolds' textual distinction and held a blanket sales prohibition can be saved; absent clear congressional intent to preempt, favor the states |
| Whether the ordinance is impliedly preempted (conflict preemption) | Reynolds: Edina's ban frustrates the federal scheme and FDA's regulatory choices, impeding statutory objectives | Edina: The ordinance does not obstruct Congress's purposes; FDA choices do not equate to congressional intent to preempt state authority to regulate sales | Court held Reynolds failed to show conflict preemption: the ordinance does not stand as an obstacle to Congress's objectives and the agency's policy choices do not bind Congress |
Key Cases Cited
- U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428 (2d Cir. 2013) (sales bans are not necessarily tobacco-product standards)
- Nat'l Ass'n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2013) (sales regulations distinguished from product standards)
- Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008) (ambiguities in preemption clauses resolved to disfavor preemption)
- Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) (interpretive canon re: effect of related provisions)
- Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (overview of preemption doctrines and state authority)
- Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995) (conflict preemption obstructs federal objectives)
- Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (implied preemption requires examining statute's purpose)
- Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011) (limits on freewheeling preemption inquiries and deference to Congress)
- R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of Edina, 482 F. Supp. 3d 875 (D. Minn. 2020) (district court opinion granting City's motion to dismiss)
- Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (when clause text permits more than one reading, prefer reading that disfavors preemption)
