R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Phil J. Marotta, etc.
214 So. 3d 590
| Fla. | 2017Background
- This is an appeal from the Fourth District’s decision in Marotta, an Engle-progeny wrongful-death action against R.J. Reynolds alleging nicotine manipulation, addiction, and death from lung cancer. The trial jury found Reynolds strictly liable, assigned fault (58% Reynolds, 42% decedent), and awarded compensatory damages; the trial court precluded punitive damages. The Fourth District affirmed on preemption but denied punitive damages.
- The certified question asked whether federal law implicitly preempts Engle-progeny state tort claims (strict liability and negligence) arising from the sale of cigarettes. The Florida Supreme Court rephrased it to remove the implication that Engle liability rests solely on the sale of cigarettes.
- Engle (the prior class action) produced Phase I findings given claim-preclusive effect to subsequent individual suits, including findings that nicotine is addictive, cigarettes cause enumerated diseases, defendants manufactured defective cigarettes, and defendants concealed material information.
- Reynolds’ preemption argument: federal tobacco statutes and regulatory scheme demonstrate Congress intended to regulate but not ban cigarettes, so state tort liability that functionally bans cigarettes (i.e., liability for sale of ordinary cigarettes) is obstacle-preempted.
- The court analyzed (1) the scope of federal preemption in the tobacco context and (2) whether Engle Phase I findings impose liability based solely on the inherent characteristics of cigarettes. It held federal law does not implicitly preempt Engle-progeny strict liability and negligence claims because Engle liability was based on alleged conduct (nicotine manipulation and defective design), not merely the sale of ordinary cigarettes.
- The court quashed the Fourth District’s ruling to the extent it precluded punitive damages, citing Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Marotta) | Defendant's Argument (Reynolds) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal law implicitly preempts Engle-progeny strict liability and negligence claims | Engle-progeny claims premised on defendants’ misconduct (nicotine manipulation) are valid state tort claims | Such state tort claims (if they impose liability for sale of ordinary cigarettes) conflict with Congress’s intent to regulate, not ban, cigarettes and are obstacle-preempted | No preemption: Engle-progeny strict liability and negligence claims are not implicitly preempted where liability rests on alleged conduct/design, not mere sale of ordinary cigarettes |
| Whether Engle Phase I findings impose liability based solely on the sale of ordinary cigarettes (i.e., amount to a functional ban) | Engle findings reflect defendants’ deliberate manipulation of nicotine and defective design, not liability solely for selling cigarettes | Engle effectively imposed a duty breached by every sale of cigarettes containing nicotine, which would conflict with federal regulatory policy | Engle did not base liability solely on sale of cigarettes; findings reflect specific culpable conduct (nicotine manipulation, design/marketing) |
| Whether plaintiffs may seek punitive damages in Engle-progeny suits | Punitive damages are available for claims properly raised in individual Engle-progeny actions | Trial court excluded punitive damages; defendant supported exclusion | Punitive damages are not categorically barred; the Fourth District’s punitive-damages affirmance was quashed consistent with this Court’s decision in Soffer |
Key Cases Cited
- Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (class Phase I findings later given claim-preclusive effect in Engle-progeny suits)
- Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (preemption analysis of FCLAA; inquiry whether state duty constitutes a requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health with respect to advertising or promotion)
- FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (Congressial scheme excluded tobacco from FDA authority and recognized federal regulation does not necessarily displace state police powers)
- Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008) (presumption against preemption; congressional purpose is the touchstone of preemption analysis)
- Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013) (clarified Engle’s res judicata effect as claim preclusion, not issue preclusion)
- Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (illustrative of obstacle preemption where federal regulation authorized a range of safety choices that a tort claim would displace)
- Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 782 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2015) (contrary view: held Engle-progeny product-liability claims implicitly preempted when they rest solely on inherent dangerousness of cigarettes)