105 F.4th 1179
9th Cir.2024Background
- Purushothaman Rajaram, a naturalized U.S. citizen and IT professional, applied to Meta Platforms, Inc. for jobs but was rejected multiple times.
- Rajaram alleges Meta favored hiring noncitizens on H-1B visas (who can be paid less), discriminating against U.S. citizens in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
- Rajaram filed a putative class action, asserting that § 1981 prohibits such citizenship-based discrimination.
- The district court dismissed Rajaram’s complaint, holding that § 1981 does not cover discrimination based on U.S. citizenship status.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo, focusing on the text and history of § 1981.
- There is an acknowledged split of authority, with the Fifth Circuit having previously held § 1981 does not cover citizenship discrimination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 1981 prohibit discrimination against U.S. citizens based on citizenship in hiring? | § 1981 guarantees “all persons” the same contracting rights as “white citizens,” so citizens can sue when noncitizens are favored. | § 1981 protects only against race or alienage discrimination, not citizenship; citizens by definition always have the same rights as citizens. | Yes; the plain text covers citizenship discrimination against citizens because affording noncitizens greater rights than citizens violates statutory guarantee. |
| Relevance of McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail to citizenship discrimination | The Supreme Court’s reasoning that § 1981 protects “all persons,” including whites, applies equally to citizenship, so citizens are protected. | McDonald’s reasoning focused on race and legislative history, not citizenship; extending it to citizenship is unwarranted. | The majority extends McDonald to the citizenship context, using its logic to support rights for citizens under § 1981. |
| Impact of the legislative history on the scope of § 1981 | Legislative history supports broad protections, and the statutory text is unambiguous. | Legislative history shows the statute’s focus was on race, not citizenship. | Text is unambiguous; legislative history cannot override clear statutory text. |
| Whether circuit precedent or parallel statutory provisions limit § 1981 to alienage discrimination only | Legislative and statutory evolution extended § 1981 to “all persons,” not just noncitizens. | Provisions like 18 U.S.C. § 242 and prior Fifth Circuit precedent support limiting protection to alienage, not citizenship. | Clear statutory language requires equal rights for all; distinction between citizens and noncitizens protection is not grounded in text. |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (implied federal remedy under § 1981 for private employment discrimination)
- Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006) (section 1981 protects would-be contractors)
- McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (section 1981 applies to all persons, including whites, regarding racial discrimination)
- General Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (traces the history and purpose of the Civil Rights Act underlying § 1981)
- Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (legislative history of § 1981 as applied to aliens)
- Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (statutory interpretation must be consistent across applications)
- Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (plain statutory text must be enforced as written)
- Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (section 1981 prohibits discrimination against noncitizens)