Price v. Panetta
674 F.3d 1335
Fed. Cir.2012Background
- Price, a civilian DoD employee, served as a re-employed annuitant from 2007 to January 3, 2009 under NSPS.
- NSPS provided performance payouts as either salary increases, bonuses, or both, based on annual appraisals.
- The 2008 appraisal period ended September 30, 2008; Price contends he earned a bonus under NSPS for that period.
- The DoD fixed the bonus/salary payout effective date as the first day of the first pay period after January 1 of each year (January 4, 2009 for 2008 year).
- Price was not employed on January 4, 2009, and thus argues he should receive a bonus either on September 30, 2008 or January 1, 2009.
- The district court rejected Price’s claim, ruling the NSPS payout date for bonuses aligned with salary increases; Price appealed seeking Little Tucker Act relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act | Price contends the district court has jurisdiction to award a money-mandating remedy. | DoD maintains jurisdiction exists but merits must be adjudicated in a non-Tucker Act framework if appropriate. | Jurisdiction properly lies under the Little Tucker Act; court may adjudicate the merits. |
| Whether NSPS bonus payments are money-mandating | The bonus for the 2008 period should be payable if earned and the employee was employed on the payout date. | The statute/regulations vest bonuses only if the employee is employed on the payout’s effective date; bonuses are not automatically money-mandating. | The NSPS regulation is money-mandating when the employee qualifies; the Department’s interpretation governs. |
| Effective date for the bonus component of NSPS pay | The end of the appraisal period (Sept 30, 2008) or Jan 1, 2009 should be the bonus’s effective date. | The effective date for bonuses is the same as for salary increases: the first pay period after Jan 1 of each year. | Agency interpretation that the bonus’s effective date is the first pay period after Jan 1 applies; Price not entitled. |
| Deference to agency interpretation of NSPS regulations | Regulations should be interpreted in Price’s favor given the timing of the entitlement. | Regulatory interpretation is entitled to deference if not plainly erroneous and reflects the agency's fair view. | The Department’s interpretation is entitled to deference; it accurately reflects prior practice and regulatory history. |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. United States, 463 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (money-mandating when agency determination triggers pay entitlement)
- Doe v. United States, 463 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (jurisdiction and entitlement under Tucker Act when statute mandates payment)
- Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (money-mandating source requires entitlement to damages when conditions met)
- United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (money-mandating analysis for Tucker Act claims)
- Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA, 525 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (right to payment under money-mandating statute can be enforced under Tucker Act)
- Brodowy v. United States, 482 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (agency money-mandating interpretation and jurisdictional stance)
- Hall v. United States, 617 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (juries and compensation under money-mandating statutes)
- In re United States, 463 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (statutory salary fixation as money-mandating)
- Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (S. Ct. 2007) (agency interpretation entitled to deference when reflecting considered judgment)
- Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (S. Ct. 1997) (deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations)
- Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (S. Ct. 1945) (deferral to agency interpretation unless plainly erroneous)