947 F.3d 983
6th Cir.2020Background
- Prianka Bose, a Rhodes College student, alleged Professor Roberto de la Salud Bea fabricated cheating accusations after she rebuffed his personal advances; the Honor Council found Bose guilty and expelled her.
- Bose filed internal Title IX complaints (investigator found harassment allegations unsustained) and then sued Rhodes (Title IX retaliation, breach of contract) and Bea (defamation).
- Bea reported cheating and submitted documents to the Honor Council; district court dismissed the defamation claim holding those statements absolutely privileged as part of a quasi-judicial proceeding.
- After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Rhodes on Bose’s Title IX retaliation claim; Bose appealed that ruling and the defamation dismissal.
- On appeal the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the Title IX claim (rejecting a cat’s paw theory to impute Bea’s motive to Rhodes) but reversed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the defamation claim, holding Tennessee absolute privilege does not extend to private college disciplinary proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rhodes can be held liable under Title IX by imputing Bea’s retaliatory motive via the "cat’s paw" theory | Bose: cat’s paw links Bea’s retaliatory animus to Rhodes’ expulsion decision, establishing causation | Rhodes: Title IX requires recipient’s own misconduct; cat’s paw (agency/respondeat superior) cannot create institutional liability | Cat’s paw not available under Title IX; affirmed summary judgment for Rhodes; Bose forfeited any deliberate-indifference-to-retaliation theory |
| Whether Bea’s statements to Rhodes’ Honor Council are absolutely privileged under Tennessee law (quasi-judicial privilege) | Bose: statements not absolutely privileged because Rhodes’ Honor Council is a private body | Bea: statements made in quasi-judicial proceedings and thus absolutely privileged | Tennessee absolute privilege limited to public/state (judicial or quasi-judicial) proceedings; private college disciplinary proceedings are not covered; reversed dismissal of defamation claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (Title IX damages available only for recipient’s own official misconduct and where an appropriate official has actual knowledge and is deliberately indifferent)
- Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (school liable under Title IX for student-on-student harassment when the recipient is deliberately indifferent)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (Title IX encompasses retaliation claims)
- Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011) (explaining "cat’s paw" theory in employment discrimination context)
- Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2011) (Second Circuit allowed a retaliation theory to proceed—discussed for contrast on notice/deliberate-indifference vs. cat’s paw)
- Lambdin Funeral Serv. Inc. v. Griffith, 559 S.W.2d 791 (Tenn. 1978) (Tennessee recognizes absolute privilege for statements in quasi-judicial proceedings, historically applied to public/state bodies)
- Jones v. Trice, 360 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1962) (discussing absolute privilege limitation to legislative and judicial proceedings and other acts of state)