Powell v. State, 310, 2016

Derrick Powell was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses; a jury recommended death by a 7–5 vote, and the judge imposed death; convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in 2012.
Powell filed a postconviction motion; the Superior Court denied relief in May 2016; that denial was on appeal when Powell moved to vacate his death sentence based on Hurst and this Court's Rauf decision.
In Hurst v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose death; Rauf applied Hurst to Delaware law and held 11 Del. C. § 4209 unconstitutional because judges made the critical findings.
Rauf further required that necessary sentencing findings be made by a unanimous jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and held Delaware’s scheme could not be cured by severance.
The sole issue here was whether Rauf (and the higher beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt burden for aggravators) must be applied retroactively to Powell, whose sentence was final before Rauf.
The Court concluded Rauf announces a watershed procedural rule (because it changed the burden of proof on facts central to death’s imposition) and therefore must be applied retroactively; Powell’s death sentence was vacated and he was resentenced to life without parole.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rauf/Hurst apply retroactively to Powell (sentence final)	State: Rauf should not apply retroactively; Summerlin/Scri\ro v. Summerlin limits retroactivity (Ring not retroactive).	Powell: Hurst/Rauf announce a new rule that must be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.	Rauf applies retroactively; Powell’s death sentence vacated and converted to life without parole.
Whether Rauf is within Teague’s exceptions to nonretroactivity	State: Rauf is a new procedural rule not qualifying as watershed; Summerlin distinguishes Ring.	Powell: Rauf alters burden of proof (preponderance → beyond reasonable doubt), implicating truth‑finding and fundamental fairness.	Rauf fits Teague’s watershed exception because it changes a burden of proof central to reliable sentencing.
Whether the change in burden of proof here is like Winship and thus retroactive	State: contends distinction from Winship/Ivan V.	Powell: Winship→Ivan V. require retroactivity for changes to reasonable‑doubt standard.	Court analogized Rauf’s burden change to Winship/Ivan V. and held it must be retroactive.
Remedy required if retroactivity found	State: unspecified alternatives; argued precedents limit wholesale resentencing.	Powell: vacate death sentence and impose life without parole per statute.	Court ordered death sentence vacated and resentenced to imprisonment for life without benefit of parole.

Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (held Delaware’s capital sentencing statute unconstitutional under Hurst and required jury unanimity and proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find each fact necessary to impose death)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (capital sentencing facts determining eligibility for death must be found by a jury)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity of new rules in collateral review, with watershed exception)
Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (In re Winship’s reasonable‑doubt rule applied retroactively because it is central to truth‑finding)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (reasonable‑doubt standard required for criminal convictions)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (refused to make Ring retroactive on collateral review)