The Court held in
In re Winship,
“Where thе major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impаirs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuraсy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by stаte or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or аccepted practice, nor severe impact оn the administration of justice has sufficed to require prospeсtive application in these circumstances.”
Williams
v.
United States,
Winship
expressly hеld that the reasonable-doubt standard “is a prime instrument for reducing thе risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocеnce — that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ princiрle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law’.... ‘Due process commands that no man shаll lose his- liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of
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his guilt.’ To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensаble, for it 'impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reаching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.’ ”
Plainly, thеn, the major purpose of the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt announced in Wins hip was to ovеrcome an aspect of a criminal trial that substantially impаirs the truth-finding function, and Winship is thus to be given complete retroactive effect. The motion for leave to .proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Apрellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department, is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It -is so ordered.
Notes
The Court of Appeals followed
Matter of D.,
27 N. Y. 2d 90,
