Porro v. Barnes
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23247
| 10th Cir. | 2010Background
- Alfredo Yero Porro, a federal immigration detainee, was restrained in a Jefferson County Jail restraint chair after a disruptive incident by CERT members.
- A CERT member tasered Porro at least three times following the restraint, leading to his injury and a § 1983 suit against Lovett, Sheriff Barnes, and Sheriff Bryant.
- The district court entered judgment for Porro against Lovett for excessive force and damages, and granted summary judgment for Barnes and Bryant, finding no triable basis for their liability.
- Porro argued Barnes (individually) personally participated or approved the tasering, and that Barnes and Bryant (official capacity) were liable for county policy failures to train.
- The Tenth Circuit reviews de novo on summary judgment and affirms the district court, ruling Porro failed to show Barnes or Bryant personally violated due process or to establish deliberate indifference by the county. Lovett's judgment remains intact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper constitutional standard for immigration detainee excessive force | Porro should be analyzed under the standard that fits his detention context. | Appropriate standard depends on the amendment applicable to detainees; may vary by status. | Due process clause governs the excessive force claim by immigration detainees. |
| Liability of Barnes (individual capacity) for excessive force | Barnes personally participated or approved the tasering and is liable. | Barnes had no personal force, involvement, or prior knowledge; no liability. | Barnes not liable; no direct personal involvement or deliberate act by Barnes. |
| Liability of Barnes and Bryant (official capacity) for failure to train | County failed to train in a way that caused a constitutional violation; deliberate indifference. | County trained jailers to use tasers only when there is a direct threat; no deliberate indifference shown. | Failure to train prophylactically cannot alone create a triable issue; no deliberate indifference shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (excessive force standard depends on context (search/seizure))
- Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1992) (intent and degree of injury factors in due process analysis)
- Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (U.S. 1977) (cruel and unusual punishment framework for convicted prisoners)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (U.S. 1998) (due process analysis for pretrial detainees with arbitrary action)
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (municipal liability for unconstitutional official policy or custom)
- Barzingus v. Wilheim, 306 F.3d 17 (10th Cir. 2010) (supervisor liability not automatic; mens rea required)
- Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 1996) (no strict supervisor liability under §1983)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard; plausibility governs §1983 claims)
- Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2010) (limits on supervisor liability post-Iqbal)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (U.S. 1989) (mocked policy failure as moving force for §1983)
- Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756 (10th Cir. 1999) (use of training deficiencies in §1983 claims)