PITTS v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC
1:16-cv-04501
D.N.J.May 25, 2017Background
- Pro se plaintiff Genoveva Pitts sued Bayview Loan Servicing under the FDCPA alleging multiple communications (Jan–May 2016) seeking to collect a mortgage-related debt connected to foreclosure.
- Pitts claimed Bayview contacted her without her prior written consent or court permission, and that two communications (Mar 18 and May 20) failed to identify Bayview as a debt collector.
- She sought statutory and substantial actual damages and alleged mental anguish and anxiety.
- Bayview moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Pitts did not oppose and filed no responsive papers.
- The court treated well-pleaded facts as true and applied the plausibility standard (Iqbal/Twombly line) in evaluating whether Pitts adequately alleged specific FDCPA violations.
- The court concluded Pitts failed to allege facts showing a violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c or 1692e(11) and granted dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether communications violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c (improper communications) | Bayview contacted Pitts without her prior written consent or court permission, thus violating § 1692c | Bayview is a mortgage servicer communicating about a mortgage; Pitts did not plead the particulars required by § 1692c (unusual time/place, third parties, represented by counsel, employment contact, or a cease request) | Court: Dismiss — complaints do not allege the specific conduct § 1692c prohibits, so no plausible § 1692c claim |
| Whether communications violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (required disclosures) | Two communications failed to disclose that Bayview was a debt collector in subsequent communications | The March and May notices explicitly stated they were "informational only" and not attempts to collect; thus they were not false or misleading under § 1692e(11) | Court: Dismiss — the notices’ unambiguous language defeats a plausible § 1692e(11) claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (per curiam) (pro se complaints are to be liberally construed)
- Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004) (pro se pleadings given liberal construction)
- Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2003) (liberal construction for pro se complaints)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (plausibility standard for federal pleadings)
- Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2012) (strip conclusory statements, evaluate well-pled allegations)
- Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) (distinguishing factual allegations from legal conclusions)
- Bailey v. Security Nat’l Serv. Corp., 154 F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 1998) (FDCPA interpretation regarding communications and collection attempts)
