Pit River Tribe v. Blm, 939 F.3d 962

The dispute concerns 26 “unproven” geothermal leases in the Glass Mountain Unit (California) that were committed to a unit agreement along with a single lease BLM deemed capable of commercial production.
BLM in 1998 vacated prior 5-year extensions and instead continued all 26 unproven leases for up to 40 years under 30 U.S.C. § 1005(a) based on the single paying-well determination for the proven lease.
Pit River Tribe and environmental groups sued, alleging the continuations violated the Geothermal Steam Act (GSA) and related laws; the case previously returned to the district court after this Court (Pit River III) found prudential standing.
On remand the district court granted summary judgment for Pit River, concluding § 1005(a) is unambiguous and authorizes 40-year production continuations only on an individual lease basis (not unit‑wide), vacated BLM’s 1998 continuations for the 26 leases, and remanded to the agency.
BLM appealed, arguing § 1005(a) should be read to allow unit‑wide continuations (relying on the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) backdrop and other GSA provisions); the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 30 U.S.C. § 1005(a) authorizes 40‑year continuations for all leases in a unit when any single lease in the unit becomes productive during the primary 10‑year term	§1005(a) authorizes production continuations only on an individual lease basis—§1005(a) omits the term “unit plan” and thus does not permit unit‑wide continuations	§1005(a) should be read in context of the GSA and the MLA’s unitization framework, so a paying‑well in a unit should allow unit‑wide 40‑year continuations	§1005(a) is clear and unambiguous: continuations under §1005(a) are lease‑by‑lease only; omission of “unit plan” in §1005(a) is dispositive.
Appealability: whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand/vacatur order	Remand order is appealable because the district court conclusively resolved a separable legal issue and the agency will be constrained on remand (risk of wasted proceedings)	BLM challenged appealability but sought review of the remand ruling	Court has jurisdiction under the Alsea three‑factor test; immediate review required to avoid foreclosing meaningful appellate review.

Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 793 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2015) (previous panel holding on prudential standing and remand to consider merits)
Alsea Valley All. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004) (three‑factor test for appealability of remand orders)
Geo‑Energy Partners‑1983 Ltd. v. Salazar, 613 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing GSA’s purpose and geothermal resources)
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002) (canon: differing statutory language implies differing congressional intent)
BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176 (2004) (statutory‑interpretation principle: presume Congress means what it says)
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (if congressional intent is clear, courts must apply the statute as written)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for agency deference when statute is ambiguous)
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (statutory construction caution against inferring indirect congressional choices)