546 S.W.3d 492
Ark. Ct. App.2018Background
- Glenda Sue Talley, mentally incapacitated by Alzheimer’s/dementia, was admitted to Pine Hills on March 10, 2012; admission packet included an optional arbitration agreement.
- Tonja Belt (daughter) signed the arbitration form as "Responsible Party" and marked her relationship as "Daughter;" Glenda Sue did not sign.
- Prior to incapacity, Glenda Sue had executed a power of attorney appointing Jesse Alan Talley as her agent (Jesse Alan later sued on Glenda Sue’s behalf).
- Appellants (Pine Hills and administrators) moved to compel arbitration arguing Belt’s signature created a valid agreement and that Glenda Sue was an intended third-party beneficiary.
- The circuit court denied the motion, finding Belt lacked authority to bind Glenda Sue and that no valid arbitration agreement existed or conferred a benefit on Glenda Sue; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jesse Alan) | Defendant's Argument (Appellants) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a valid arbitration agreement binds Glenda Sue via Belt (third‑party beneficiary/agent authority) | Belt lacked authority to sign; Jesse Alan (POA) did not authorize Belt; no valid agreement | Belt signed as Responsible Party and plaintiffs argue a contract existed with Belt in her individual capacity making Glenda Sue an intended beneficiary | Court: No — Belt had no representative authority; no valid arbitration agreement with Glenda Sue; Belt did not sign in her individual capacity |
| Whether the claims fall within the arbitration agreement’s scope | Claims not subject because no valid arbitration agreement; issues for court | Claims fall within broad arbitration clause and should be compelled | Moot — court did not reach scope because no valid agreement existed |
Key Cases Cited
- HPD, LLC v. TETRA Techs., Inc., 424 S.W.3d 304 (Ark. 2012) (arbitration questions are governed by contract‑construction principles under state law)
- Quarles v. Evans, 428 S.W.3d 437 (Ark. 2013) (rules on construction and enforceability of arbitration agreements)
- Diamante v. Dye, 430 S.W.3d 196 (Ark. App. 2013) (elements required for an enforceable arbitration agreement)
- Progressive Eldercare Servs.-Chicot, Inc. v. Long, 449 S.W.3d 324 (Ark. App. 2014) (discussing authority and capacity to bind another to arbitration)
- Broadway Health & Rehab, LLC v. Roberts, 524 S.W.3d 407 (Ark. App. 2017) (third‑party‑beneficiary analysis in the context of arbitration clauses)