330 F. Supp. 3d 1
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- Maurice McGinnis, a Pigford class member, initially chose Track A in 1999, received a $50,000 award but sought to move to Track B; the court later ordered arbitration under Track B and warned him about the higher proof standard.
- Under Track B, parties agreed schedules and exchanged witness/exhibit lists; McGinnis designated himself and an expert on damages but repeatedly failed to meet multiple deadlines (expert report, discovery, direct testimony, pretrial filings).
- Counsel (John Shoreman) and the arbitrator granted several extensions; McGinnis withheld authorization to disclose his expert report and counsel later signaled possible withdrawal; a revised schedule precluded untimely expert evidence.
- The arbitrator excluded the late damages materials, found McGinnis presented insufficient evidence, granted the government’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and dismissed the Track B claim.
- A petition for Monitor Review (filed April 2017) asserted McGinnis’s mental incompetence (state conservatorship order and a medical evaluation) caused the procedural defaults and asked the monitor to direct reexamination and reset deadlines; the government moved to dismiss as futile and beyond the monitor’s authority.
- The court dismissed the petition: monitor review would be futile because the monitor is limited to the arbitration record (which lacks evidence of clear and manifest error), the consent decree bars wholesale deadline resets, and Rule 60(b)(5) relief is unavailable because McGinnis retained counsel and is bound by counsel’s failures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Monitor may reexamine the arbitrator’s decision under ¶12(b)(iii) because of McGinnis’s alleged incompetence | McGinnis: incompetence (shown by state conservatorship and medical report) caused procedural defaults; monitor should direct reexamination/reset deadlines | Govt: monitor limited to the arbitration record and cannot grant a do‑over; record lacks clear/manifest error; relief would be futile | Denied — monitor review would be futile; monitor limited to arbitrator’s record which does not show clear and manifest error or a fundamental miscarriage of justice |
| Whether the monitor may admit new evidence (post‑arbitration) to show incompetence | McGinnis: new evidence proves incompetence and excuses defaults | Govt: consent decree and order of reference prohibit supplementing the arbitration record on monitor review | Denied — monitor may not consider additional materials beyond the arbitration record |
| Whether the consent decree permits resetting Track B deadlines or otherwise reopening arbitration | McGinnis: equitable jurisdiction should allow resetting deadlines for an incompetent claimant | Govt: consent decree’s plain language makes arbitrator decisions final except limited monitor reexamination; resetting deadlines would deny Dept. the benefit of its bargain | Denied — consent decree bars re‑setting Track B deadlines; monitor lacks authority to permit wholesale do‑over |
| Whether Rule 60(b)(5) permits modification of the consent decree due to counsel’s failures | McGinnis: counsel’s conduct and claimant’s incapacity warrant relief | Govt: Rule 60(b)(5) not argued in detail; generally parties are bound by retained counsel’s acts | Denied — Rule 60(b)(5) relief unavailable because McGinnis voluntarily retained Shoreman and is bound by his acts; class‑action exception not applicable here |
Key Cases Cited
- Pigford v. Vilsack, 777 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir.) (interpreting consent decree provisions governing Track B review)
- Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir.) (consent‑decree modification under Rule 60(b)(5); competent representation requirement and limits on relief for attorney error)
- Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (U.S.) (standard for modifying consent decrees under Rule 60(b)(5))
- Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (U.S.) (principle that parties are bound by acts/omissions of voluntarily chosen counsel)
- Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380 (U.S.) (attorney‑related excuse standards for procedural defaults)
- United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp., 758 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir.) (consent‑decree interpretation governed by contract principles)
- Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 213 F. Supp. 3d 200 (D.D.C.) (consent‑decree interpretation grounded in text and contemporaneous purpose)
- United States v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (U.S.) (permitting aids to construction when interpreting consent decrees)