Phillip Manderscheid v. LAZ Parking of Texas, LLC, and Boot Man, Inc. D/B/A Premier Parking Enforcement, 506 S.W.3d 521

Background

Manderscheid's car was booted in a private LAZ Parking lot; he paid $113.25 to Boot Man to remove the boot and was informed he could request a justice-court "boot hearing."
The notice required a written hearing request to be delivered to the justice court within 14 days (excluding weekends/holidays); Manderscheid submitted his request three days late and the justice court nonetheless held a hearing.
The justice court found probable cause to boot the car and denied reimbursement; Manderscheid appealed to the county court at law and timely demanded a jury and paid the jury fee.
On the day of trial the county court refused Manderscheid's jury demand (concluding no statutory right to jury) and, when Manderscheid refused to proceed without a jury, dismissed the case for want of prosecution.
Manderscheid appealed; the court of appeals considered (1) whether the 14-day request deadline in Tex. Occ. Code §2308.456(a) is jurisdictional, and (2) whether an appellant in a boot-hearing appeal is entitled to a jury trial in the county court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 14‑day deadline to request a boot hearing is jurisdictional	Manderscheid argued the justice court had jurisdiction because it conducted the hearing despite late filing; appeal should be considered on merits	Boot Man argued failure to timely request deprived justice court and appellate courts of subject‑matter jurisdiction, requiring dismissal	The 14‑day deadline is not jurisdictional; it creates a waiver remedy but does not strip court jurisdiction, so the appeal proceeds
Whether appellant is entitled to a jury trial on appeal from a justice‑court boot hearing	Manderscheid argued he timely demanded a jury and paid the fee, entitling him to a jury in county court de novo	Boot Man argued the Occupations Code and boot‑hearing provisions do not grant a right to jury	The court held the appeal is governed by the civil rules applicable to justice courts, which (under former Tex. R. Civ. P. 544 / current Rule 504) grant either party a jury if demanded and fee paid; Manderscheid was entitled to a jury
Whether dismissal for want of prosecution was proper after Manderscheid refused to proceed without a jury	Manderscheid argued dismissal was improper because the court wrongly denied his statutory/rule-based jury right	Boot Man argued refusal to proceed justified dismissal	Court reversed dismissal because mandamus/right-to-jury ruling was erroneous; case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the entitlement to a jury
Effect of court's scheduling beyond 21 days (timeliness of trial)	Manderscheid contended denial of jury also tied to trial being set beyond 21 days after appeal	Boot Man did not press substantial contrary argument on this point	Court did not reach or decide Manderscheid's ancillary timing claims because reversal and remand on jury issue rendered them unnecessary

Key Cases Cited

Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2014) (framework for determining whether statutory timing provisions are jurisdictional)
City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2009) (presumption against construing statutes as jurisdictional absent clear legislative intent)
Texas Dep’t of Public Safety v. Shaikh, 445 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (timing provision for administrative hearing not jurisdictional; statute’s silence on jurisdictional consequence is significant)
Mercedes‑Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1996) (standard that denial of jury demand reviewed for abuse of discretion, but statutory/rule interpretation reviewed de novo)
Bradt v. Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (clear, specific procedural rules are applied according to their plain meaning; rule interpretation is reviewed de novo)