PHILIP H. BERGER v. EMERSON CLIMATE TECHNOLOGIES, SCROLL COMPRESSORS LLC, and GEORGE SVARANOWIC, Defendants-Respondents.
508 S.W.3d 136
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Philip H. Berger (Employee) sued Emerson Climate Technologies, Scroll Compressors LLC, and George Svaranowic (Respondents) after a favorable jury verdict in a prior toxic-exposure case (the Copeland case), alleging MHRA disability discrimination (failure to reasonably accommodate), retaliation, and wrongful discharge for exercising access to the courts.
- Employee alleged he tried to return to work after the Copeland trial but was barred from the plant, told he could not return without medical clearance, and that open warehouse positions that would avoid chemical exposure were available and would be reasonable accommodations.
- Respondents moved to dismiss the second amended petition, arguing judicial and collateral estoppel (based on positions or evidence from the Copeland trial) and that the petition failed to state discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful-discharge claims.
- The trial court took judicial notice of the Copeland file/transcripts and granted dismissal with prejudice for reasons in Respondents’ motion; Employee appealed.
- On appeal the court: rejected collateral estoppel (Respondents conceded the Copeland judgment is not final); rejected judicial estoppel (prior positions were not clearly inconsistent with current claims); reversed dismissal of discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful-discharge claims; and found two issues about Emerson’s role moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Judicial estoppel (point 1) | Berger did not take a clearly inconsistent position in Copeland; MHRA reasonable-accommodation question was not adjudicated there. | Berger’s statements/evidence at Copeland (testimony/closing) showed he could not work, so judicial estoppel bars his accommodation claim. | Reversed: prior positions were not sufficiently clear or inconsistent to invoke judicial estoppel. |
| Collateral estoppel (point 2) | Berger said Copeland did not decide the accommodation issue; estoppel inappropriate. | Copeland litigation decided ability-to-work issues; precludes relitigation. | Reversed (granting point 2) after Respondents conceded Copeland judgment is not final; collateral estoppel requires final judgment. |
| Disability discrimination (failure to plead a vacant/qualified position) (point 3) | Petition alleges open warehouse positions existed for which Berger was qualified and which would avoid exposures — sufficient to plead accommodation/claim. | Plaintiff failed to plead a vacant position for which he was qualified; citation to cases requiring such allegations. | Reversed dismissal: petition sufficiently alleges reasonable accommodation (vacant warehouse position) and states an MHRA discrimination claim. |
| Retaliation (protected activity & causation) (point 4) | Berger alleged complaints to management/HR, a charge filed, adverse actions (barred from work, opposed unemployment, termination) and that complaints contributed to actions. | Timing and facts do not show protected activity preceded adverse acts; allegation conclusory. | Reversed dismissal: petition alleges protected complaints and facts permitting an inference of causation—states a retaliation claim. |
| Wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (point 5) | Petition alleges Respondents prevented return to work and terminated him in March 2015 in retaliation for accessing courts. | Berger voluntarily left when he did not provide medical clearance; no termination alleged. | Reversed dismissal: petition sufficiently alleges termination and public-policy wrongful discharge. |
| Emerson’s role / integrated-entity / joint-employer (points 6–7) | Alleged Emerson acted in Scroll’s interest, provided policies, managed employees—sufficient to proceed. | No good-faith basis Emerson was employer; insufficient direct participation alleged. | Moot on appeal: trial court’s dismissal did not specifically address Emerson; issues not decided and thus dismissed as moot. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lang v. Goldsworthy, 470 S.W.3d 748 (Mo. banc) (de novo review of dismissal)
- Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. banc) (pleading must be taken as true on motion to dismiss)
- Naylor Senior Citizens Housing, LP v. Side Construction Co., 423 S.W.3d 238 (Mo. banc) (matters outside pleadings not considered on motion to dismiss)
- Ellis v. Hehner, 448 S.W.3d 320 (Mo. App. E.D.) (collateral estoppel requires judgment on merits)
- Medley v. Valentine Radford Communications, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 315 (Mo. App. W.D.) (MHRA: disabled plaintiff may still work with or without reasonable accommodation)
- Umphries v. Jones, 804 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. App. E.D.) (employer not required to find another job if plaintiff not qualified; alternative positions must be reasonably available)
- Berkowski v. St. Louis County Board of Election Commissioners, 854 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. App. E.D.) (elements of MHRA discharge claim)
- Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (U.S. Supreme Court) (ADA claims that plaintiff can work with reasonable accommodation may be consistent with other disability determinations)