Perry v. Ridgeland Correctional Institution, 1:17-cv-02524

Fifteen pro se inmates at Ridgeland Correctional Institution filed a single § 1983 complaint challenging cell living conditions and sought to proceed as a class action.
The plaintiffs are indigent prisoners seeking to proceed in forma pauperis.
The complaint named several prison defendants (same defendants for all plaintiffs).
The Fourth Circuit precedent and PLRA issues were central to the court’s analysis about joinder and class representation by pro se prisoners.
The court concluded individualized review was required because of PLRA fee and exhaustion requirements and potential differing exhaustion/damage outcomes.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether pro se prisoners may bring a class action or jointly proceed as multiple plaintiffs	Plaintiffs sought to proceed together (class/joinder) to challenge conditions	Pro se status limits competence to represent others; joint action is improper under Fourth Circuit/PLRA guidance	Pro se prisoners cannot proceed as a class or jointly; joinder disallowed in this action
Whether PLRA fee and exhaustion requirements permit multiple plaintiffs in one action	Single filing should cover the group or be allowed to proceed together	PLRA requires each prisoner to be responsible for full filing fee and to exhaust administrative remedies individually	PLRA mandates individual fee responsibility and exhaustion; one prisoner’s exhaustion/fee does not satisfy others
Appropriate remedy for improperly joined multiple prisoner plaintiffs	Plaintiffs implicitly seek collective adjudication in this docket	Court should sever or dismiss improperly joined co-plaintiffs to ensure compliance with PLRA and exhaustion requirements	Court severed claims: case will pertain only to first-named plaintiff (Randy Mast); clerk to terminate others and open separate cases for each plaintiff for individual initial review

Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975) (pro se prisoner may not represent others in a class action)
Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1981) (pro se prisoner’s suit is limited to his own rights)
Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001) (prisoners may not join in one action under PLRA; severance appropriate)
Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2009) (more flexible approach to permissive joinder of prisoner plaintiffs)
Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2004) (permissive joinder discussion for prisoner plaintiffs)
In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131 (6th Cir. 1997) (analysis on joinder and PLRA implications)
Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2010) (indigent prisoners must be held responsible for full filing fees under PLRA)
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (exhaustion requirement under PLRA requires proper administrative exhaustion)
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (PLRA exhaustion principle applied to prisoner civil claims)
Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627 (2016) (PLRA fee-collection mechanism interpretation)