Perry Austin v. Lorie Davis, Director
876 F.3d 757
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Perry Austin, previously convicted of sexual offenses, confessed to murdering a nine‑year‑old (D.K.) and was indicted for capital murder; he pleaded guilty and the jury sentenced him to death.
- Before trial Austin sought to represent himself; the trial court ordered a competency evaluation (Dr. Brown) and conducted Faretta colloquies, finding Austin competent and permitting pro se representation with standby counsel.
- Austin repeatedly stated in letters and court exchanges that he wanted to waive counsel, accept responsibility, and preferred death (or life without parole) rather than litigate—while post‑conviction experts later diagnosed major depression, suicidality, and frontal‑lobe dysfunction.
- Austin filed state habeas late; the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed as untimely. He filed federal habeas asserting incompetence, involuntariness of plea/waiver, ineffective assistance for failing to investigate competency, and juror bias based on post‑trial juror statements.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the State and denied an evidentiary hearing; the Fifth Circuit granted a COA in part but ultimately affirmed the denial of habeas relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Competency to stand trial / to waive counsel / to plead guilty | Austin argues his long history of mental illness, prison‑induced deterioration, suicidality, and later expert opinions show he was incompetent and could not rationally waive counsel or plead guilty | State relies on trial‑court Faretta colloquies, Dr. Brown’s pretrial competency evaluation, counsel’s view, and Austin’s coherent letters and in‑court demeanor showing competence | Competency is a factual finding entitled to §2254(e)(1) deference; Austin failed to rebut by clear and convincing evidence; even de novo review would not show incompetence — claim denied |
| Procedural adequacy of competency inquiry (Pate claim) | Trial court should have held a standalone competency hearing or reinvestigated when contrary mental‑health evidence emerged at trial | Trial court held a Faretta hearing informed by expert evaluation and observed Austin’s demeanor; no bona fide doubt existed requiring additional inquiry | No Pate violation: state court’s implicit finding that no bona fide doubt existed is entitled to deference and was not overcome |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel for not investigating competency pre‑Faretta | Counsel failed to pursue mental‑health records or further testing despite Austin’s history, prejudicing outcome | Counsel requested and relied on a court‑ordered psychiatric evaluation and testified he never doubted competency; Austin cannot show a reasonable probability of a different outcome | Strickland prejudice not shown given strong evidence supporting competence and the evaluation performed; claim denied |
| Juror bias based on post‑trial juror statements (McDonough claim) | Post‑trial juror affidavits show dishonest voir dire answers and that jurors were predisposed to death, which would have supported challenges for cause | Post‑trial juror statements are barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and Warger; moreover, Austin waived or would not have challenged jurors given his trial strategy to obtain death | Post‑trial juror statements inadmissible under Rule 606(b) as interpreted in Warger; even if admissible, Austin failed McDonough’s two‑part test and/or waived relief by accepting jurors consistent with his strategy |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has a constitutional right to self‑representation but must knowingly and intelligently waive counsel)
- Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (competency standard: sufficient present ability to consult with counsel and a rational and factual understanding of proceedings)
- Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (trial court must order competency hearing when evidence objectively raises bona fide doubt of competence)
- McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984) (new‑trial standard when juror failed to answer honestly on voir dire and correct answer would have been valid basis for challenge)
- Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014) (Rule 606(b) bars juror testimony to impeach verdict based on voir dire lies; post‑trial juror affidavits ordinarily inadmissible)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (same competency standard applies to pleading guilty and waiving counsel)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Pena‑Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (narrow Sixth Amendment exception to no‑impeachment rule for explicit racial bias in jury deliberations)