Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105

Background

Wescley Fonseca Pereira, a Brazilian national, overstayed his visa after entering the U.S. in 2000 and was served in person in 2006 with a document labeled "Notice to Appear" that did not specify the time or date of his initial removal hearing.
An Immigration Court later mailed a hearing notice with date/time in 2007, but it was returned as undeliverable; Pereira missed the hearing and was ordered removed in absentia; proceedings were reopened in 2013.
Pereira applied for cancellation of removal, arguing he had 10 years of continuous physical presence and that the 2006 notice did not trigger the statutory "stop-time" rule because it lacked time-and-place information.
The BIA (following Matter of Camarillo) and the First Circuit held that a notice labeled "notice to appear" triggers the stop-time rule even if it omits time/date; the First Circuit applied Chevron deference to the agency.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a document that fails to specify the time and place of proceedings is not a "notice to appear under §1229(a)" and therefore does not trigger the stop-time rule; the Court relied on plain text, statutory context, and common sense.

Issues

Issue	Pereira's Argument	Sessions' Argument	Held
Whether a document styled "Notice to Appear" that omits the time and place of the initial hearing triggers the stop-time rule (8 U.S.C. §1229b(d)(1))	The 2006 document did not specify time/place so it is not a §1229(a) "notice to appear" and cannot stop accrual of continuous presence	A document labeled "Notice to Appear" and issued under §1229(a) triggers the stop-time rule even if it omits time/place; BIA interpretation is reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference	The Court held no: to trigger the stop-time rule, the Government must serve a §1229(a) notice that at least specifies the time and place of the proceedings; reversed the First Circuit and BIA reading
Whether Chevron deference is required here	Pereira: statutory text is unambiguous; no deference needed	Government: BIA interpretation is reasonable and should be deferred to under Chevron	Court: did not reach Chevron—decided the statute is unambiguous on its face, so Chevron deference unnecessary
Proper meaning of "under §1229(a)" in the stop-time rule	Means "in accordance with" §1229(a)’s substantive requirements (including time/place)	Means "authorized by" §1229(a) or "issued under the authority of" (so a document need not include all §1229(a)(1) items)	Court: "under" means "in accordance with" or "according to," tying the stop-time trigger to §1229(a)(1)’s time-and-place requirement
Whether practical/admin concerns (scheduling difficulties) justify reading omission of time/place to still trigger the stop-time rule	Pereira: statutory text controls; requiring time/place is consistent with Congress’ goals and protections (e.g., opportunity to secure counsel)	Government: logistical realities (DHS may not know Immigration Court scheduling) make time/place requirement impracticable; policy supports BIA reading	Court: practical concerns do not overcome clear statutory text; §1229(a)(2) permits changes to time/place and administrative coordination can address scheduling

Key Cases Cited

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishes framework for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations)
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (courts should not depart from clear statutory text based on practical concerns)
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) (context guides meaning of chameleon words like "under")
Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, 566 U.S. 560 (2012) (identical words in different parts of the same act are normally given the same meaning)
Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2001) (ministerial defects in procedural filings do not necessarily render the filing void when intent is clear)
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013) (statutory terms should be construed in context)